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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT:
POLICY EROSION IN A HIGHLY
PARTISAN AGE
THOMAS O. MCGARITY†
ABSTRACT
Students of the policymaking process are familiar with the fashion
in which the policies underlying crisis-driven legislation are gradually
eroded during the implementation process. A substantial body of
administrative-law scholarship stands for the proposition that
policymaking in administrative agencies is not confined to the formal
structures of administrative law as envisioned by the drafters of the
Administrative Procedure Act. This Article suggests that in this era of
deep divisions over the proper role of government in society, highstakes rulemaking has become a “blood sport” in which regulated
industries, and occasionally beneficiary groups, are willing to spend
millions of dollars to shape public opinion and influence powerful
political actors to exert political pressure on agencies. In addition, the
implementation game has attracted a wider variety of players and has
spread to arenas that are far less structured and far more overtly
political than the agency hearing rooms and appellate courtrooms of
the past. Employing as an illustration the Federal Reserve Board’s
attempt to implement the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, this Article
suggests some general characteristics of this new model of high-stakes
rulemaking, provides some tentative thoughts on the implications of
this model for administrative law, and offers some possible responses
to the phenomenon aimed at taming some of its least attractive
characteristics and at ensuring that it does not further erode public
trust in the administrative process.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress often enacts new regulatory programs and major
expansions of existing regulatory programs following a crisis or a
series of crises that focuses public attention on the failure of existing
laws to protect the public or the environment from abuses of
economic power by companies pursuing private gain in the
1
marketplace. As the media report stories about innocent victims of
irresponsible corporate conduct, the public demands greater
protection from the powerful economic actors who created the
conditions that precipitated the crises. Investigative journalists,
congressional committees, and presidential commissions spotlight
longstanding abuses that went unnoticed by policymakers and the
public before the crises. Members of Congress debate the causes of
the crises and consider legislation designed to bring about a rapid end
to the suffering, help the victims put their lives back in order, and
prevent similar crises from occurring in the future.
Most of the protective regulatory programs of the Progressive
2
Era, the New Deal, and the Public Interest Era were established after
1. Cf. STEPHEN J. CECCOLI, PILL POLITICS 15 (2004) (“[T]he occurrences of drug-related
tragedies throughout the twentieth century in the United States . . . have provided important
catalysts for drug regulation.”); COMM. TO ENSURE SAFE FOOD FROM PROD. TO
CONSUMPTION, INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD FROM
PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 8 (1998) (“The federal government response to food safety
issues is too often crisis-driven.”); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC
POLICIES 94–96 (updated 2d ed. 2011) (noting that “a focusing event like a crisis or disaster”
may provide the “push” needed for a problem “to get the attention of people in and around
government”).
2. I refer to the period of active government extending roughly from the mid-1960s
through the mid-1970s as the “Public Interest Era.” See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO
HARM (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript ch. 2).
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widely publicized tragedies or abuses had stirred public opinion to
levels sufficient to overcome the inertial forces that otherwise
3
overwhelm Congress and the regulatory agencies. Students of the
policymaking process have long understood that the protective
purposes of regulatory programs established over the opposition of
regulated industries during times of crisis are often undermined
through a slow process of erosion, drift, or slippage, as the industries,
agencies, and beneficiary groups engage in what Professor Eugene
4
Bardach calls “the implementation game.” As the crises that gave
3. See id.; cf. Richard J. Lazarus, Climate Change Law in and over Time, 2 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 29, 33–34 (2010) (“I fully expect that, buoyed by a new wave of
scientific reports and the backing of the White House, climate change’s lawmaking moment will,
Lazarus-like, soon be resurrected. . . . [T]he inherent problem with such lawmaking moments is
just that—they are moments.”). This crisis-driven pattern is well known to students of the
policymaking process as a typical governmental response to the collective-action problem. See
generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 1–2 (1965) (“[U]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite small,
or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interests.”). The costs of complying with consumer- and environmental-protection regulations
are borne directly by the companies subject to the requirements or restrictions, but the benefits
of the protections they provide are spread across a diffuse and unorganized public that is no
match for the organized opposition of the prospective regulatees. Amy Sinden, In Defense of
Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409
(2005); see also JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS
113–14 (2010) (asserting that “influenc[ing] the exercise of government authority in a modern
democracy generally requires a range of formidable capabilities” and observing that those
capabilities “are the attributes of organizations, not discrete, atomized voters”). Therefore, it
often takes a consciousness-raising crisis to move Congress or an agency to create a new
regulatory program. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE
POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 29–52 (2008) (noting that “catalysts [for
collective action] may operate with special force during times of actual or perceived ‘crisis’” and
that “one very important way citizens respond to the predicament implied by the logic of
collective action is by delegating regulatory authority to political representatives”).
4. See EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A
BILL BECOMES LAW 85 (1977) (“The goals embodied in a policy mandate typically undergo
some change during the implementation phase. . . . The politics of renegotiating goals can lead
in several directions: trimming them back, distorting or preventing them, and even adding to
them in a manner that eventually leads to an unsupportable political burden.”); see also
JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT
EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND, at xvii–xxiii, 187 (1979)
(discussing the problem of divergence between policy and implementation); David Epstein &
Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political
Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 957 (1999) (“[T]he basic problem that Congress
faces when delegating authority is one of bureaucratic drift, or the ability of an agency to enact
policies different from those preferred by the enacting coalition.”); Daniel A. Farber, Taking
Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999) (discussing the importance of “slippage” in environmental law);
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rise to public demand for a government program fade from memory
and the beneficiary groups that fought for it move on to other
pressing matters, the agency charged with implementing the new
program struggles to promulgate and enforce the required regulations
over the continued opposition of the regulated industry. The industry,
meanwhile, carefully monitors and frequently interacts with the
agency as the agency sets its regulatory agenda, collects and analyzes
scientific and economic information, and prepares the various support
5
documents that accompany modern rulemaking.
Under the conventional model of administrative rulemaking, the
agency initiates a rulemaking by assembling and analyzing the
relevant technical studies and then drafting a notice of proposed
rulemaking—the preamble of which highlights the issues; discusses
the relevant scientific, technical, and economic studies; and explains
the agency’s proposal. The agency then presents the draft to the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB). OIRA elicits comments from
other interested departments and agencies and provides comments on
the agency’s lengthy regulatory-impact analysis. Having cleared
OIRA review, the agency then publishes the notice in the Federal
Register and invites public comment. The affected industries and the
general public then provide comments and technical information to
the agency during the comment period. The agency analyzes the
comments and drafts a notice of final rulemaking setting out the
terms and conditions of the final rule, the rationale for the rule, and
the agency’s response to the public comments that have crossed a
threshold of materiality. Affected parties may then seek judicial
6
review of the agency’s rule.
Lazarus, supra note 3, at 33–34 (“Subsequent legislative amendments, limited budgets,
appropriations riders, interpretive agency rulings, massive delays in rule-making, and simple
nonenforcement are more than capable of converting a seemingly uncompromising legal
mandate into nothing more than a symbolic aspirational statement. . . . The same powerful
short-term impulses that seek to prevent a law’s enactment in the first instance . . . . typically
remain to seek the law’s ultimate undoing over time.”).
5. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1380–83 (2010) (“What develops from the administrative process during the
development of the actual rule . . . is a form of information symbiosis between the agencies and
the most knowledgeable and resourceful groups.”); Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa
Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards,
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 110–13 (2011) (describing the “opportunity for imbalanced interest
group input into rulemakings . . . during the formative development of a proposed rule”).
6. See generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions,
105 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 476 (2011) (outlining the rulemaking process).
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The regulated industry actively participates in this process by
offering information and analysis to the agency staff, meeting with
high-level agency officials, and participating in reviews of proposed
7
rules and regulatory-analysis documents before OIRA. When the
agency publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking, the regulated
8
companies typically dominate the public-comment process. They
submit reams of material and lengthy briefs explaining why
disfavored regulatory alternatives are unlawful, unduly burdensome,
unsupported by the available technical studies, or unlikely to achieve
9
the agency’s desired goal. When the agency publishes the final rule,
the regulated industry often challenges the action in court as arbitrary
10
and capricious, ultra vires, or both. If the industry persuades the
court to set aside the rule, the agency must either terminate the action
or attempt to correct the infirmity that the court has identified. If the
agency prevails in court, some companies will demand variances and
exemptions, whereas others will probe the edges of legality as their
lawyers come up with plausible interpretations of the relevant

7. See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY 271–91 (1991)
(describing OIRA review, including incidents of industry involvement with the review process);
RENA I. STEINZOR, MOTHER EARTH AND UNCLE SAM 54–56 (2008) (“EPA is beleaguered by
business interests trying to forestall implementation of . . . regulations [and] inundating the
Agency with technical materials regarding the scientific, legal, and economic implications of its
proposals.”); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335,
365–66 (2006) (“A review of [twenty-five rules that were significantly affected by the OMB]
showed that OMB never supported changes that would make environmental, health, or safety
regulations more stringent. . . . In every single case, OMB favored changes that would reduce
the burdens of regulation on regulated parties.”); see also Wagner, supra note 5, at 1379–80 (“In
most complex rulemakings, the agency appears to be quite dependant on knowledgeable
stakeholders to educate it about critical issues peculiarly within their grasp. Such
communications can be quite a bonus for these select groups, too, providing them with the
opportunity to shape or even frame the agency’s regulatory project in the course of their
tutorials and informal discussions.”).
8. See Wagner et al., supra note 5, at 117 (“The formal comments lodged on a complex
rule will come predominantly from regulated industry, and the changes made to the proposed
rule in the final rule will mirror this imbalance and generally favor industry.”).
9. Cf. Wagner, supra note 5 (discussing the problems of “filter failure” and information
overload in administrative law).
10. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189, 1295–1315 (1986) (describing how the evolution of judicial review of agency
rulemaking opened the door to industry challenges); Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of
Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 206 (1974) (“It has been widely assumed that [the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard of judicial review] is applicable to informal rulemaking.”).
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definitions and requirements that will mitigate the potential
11
constraints on the companies’ activities.
Under the pressure of constant opposition from the regulated
industries and sporadic countervailing pressure from beneficiaries of
the regulated programs, statutory deadlines are missed, ambitious
policy goals remain unachieved, and the protections envisioned by the
12
authors of the agency’s organic statute gradually erode. As the
agency ages and settles into routines, its policies gradually become
13
more industry friendly. The industry adapts to the regulatory
14
program, and life becomes easier for everyone, except perhaps for
15
some of the intended beneficiaries. After the program has been in
effect for a number of years, Congress may revisit the organic statute
16
to reauthorize it or to make midcourse corrections. Alternatively, a
new crisis may force the program back onto the legislative agenda,

11. See generally Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975) (evaluating
the permissibility of individual variances from federally approved state implementation plans);
Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the Regulatory
State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1162–65 (2010) (describing “minimal compliers” with
administrative regulations); NAM Coalition Petitions CPSC for Interim Final Rule on
Exclusions to New Lead Limits, 36 PRODUCT SAFETY AND LIABILITY REP. 1271 (2008)
(discussing a request by the National Association of Manufacturers for certain exemptions from
lower lead limits set by the Consumer Product Safety Commission in 2008).
12. Cf. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
74–102 (1955) (describing the life cycle of an administrative agency); William H. Clune III, A
Political Model of Implementation and Implications of the Model for Public Policy, Research,
and the Changing Roles of Law and Lawyers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 47, 65 (1983) (describing the
negotiations between the regulated and regulating organizations that “construct[] the meaning
of compliance over a period of time” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13. BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 86–87.
14. Id. at 87.
15. Cf. id. at 91 (“Because the ICC is unable to deal effectively with the regulatory
demands of transportation media other than railroads, there are signs of growing agitation by
nonrailroad interests for regulatory changes.”).
16. For example, Congress provided “mid-course corrections,” Gershon Eliezer Cohen,
Mixing Zones: Diluting Pollution Under the Clean Water Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 15 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted), to the 1972 Clean Water Act, Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)), in 1977, when it changed the “best available
control technology” requirement for existing sources of conventional pollutants to “best
conventional control technology” and modified the “best available technology” requirement to
apply exclusively to toxic and nonconventional pollutants, Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-217, sec. 42(a), §§ 301(b)(1)(A), 301(b)(2)(A)–(E), 91 Stat. 1566, 1582–83 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311); see also Cohen, supra, at 15 (summarizing these changes).
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causing the industry and beneficiary groups to rejoin the battle in the
17
legislative arena.
In this depiction of the regulatory process, the implementation
18
game is simply “politics by other means.” By passing the
19
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Congress attempted to cabin
these “other means” through lawyer-dominated procedures. In
addition, Congress, presidents, and the courts have added to the
20
modest procedural protections of Section 553 of the APA
requirements that agencies must provide support for scientific and
technical conclusions in a “rulemaking record,” respond to public
comments that pass a threshold of materiality, and prepare various
analyses of the impact of proposed regulations on the economy and
on small businesses—in an effort to make agency rulemaking more
21
transparent and less arbitrary. As a result of these requirements,
however, the rulemaking process is also far more burdensome and
more expensive for all of the participants in the policymaking process.
Despite these procedural and analytical requirements, a
substantial body of administrative-law scholarship demonstrates that
agency policymaking has not been limited to the formal structures of
administrative law as articulated in the APA. Administrative lawyers,
and therefore administrative-law scholars, must also concern
themselves with decisions made in interactions between high-level
agency personnel and desk officers in OIRA, between high-level
agency officials and their counterparts in other regulatory agencies,
and between high-level agency officials and the staffs of the agency’s
22
authorizing and appropriations committees in Congress. One
17. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 95 (“The period of old age is unlikely to terminate
until some scandal or emergency calls attention dramatically to the failure of the regulation and
the need to redefine regulatory objectives and public policies.”).
18. Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s
Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 103 (2001) (quoting
BARDACH, supra note 4, at 85) (internal quotation mark omitted).
19. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
20. See APA § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (listing the basic procedural requirements for agency
rulemaking, including publishing a notice in the Federal Register and requesting and considering
public comments).
21. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400–13 (1992) (listing additional congressionally, judicially, and presidentially
imposed requirements on the agency rulemaking process).
22. Cf., e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON
ESTABLISHMENT 45–47 (2d ed. 1989) (“[L]egislation is drafted in very general terms, so some
agency . . . must translate a vague policy mandate into a functioning program, a process
that . . . incidentally, [involves] the trampling of numerous toes. At the next
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primary conclusion of this literature is that the “other means”
employed in influencing the exercise of delegated policymaking
power are not necessarily limited to the practices and procedures of
administrative law as traditionally understood.
In this Article, I raise the possibility that the nation has entered a
period in which the population is so deeply divided about the proper
role of government, regulated industries are so willing to spend
millions of dollars to vindicate their interests, and political discourse
is so unrestrained that an even more expansive model of
implementation may be warranted, at least in the context of high23
stakes rulemaking initiatives. First, the implementation game has
spread to arenas that are far less structured and far more political
than the agency hearing rooms and appellate courtrooms of the past.
Second, the roster of players has expanded beyond agency and OIRA
staffs, advocates for the regulated industry and beneficiary groups,
and congressional aides to include individuals and organizations with
broad policy agendas, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, think
tanks, grassroots organizations, media pundits, and Internet bloggers.
Third, because many parties play the implementation game in
multiple arenas, the game has become far more strategic and the
range of allowable tactics has widened rather dramatically. Finally, in
this deeply divided political economy, the players in the
implementation game no longer make a pretense of separation

stage, . . . constituents petition their congressman to intervene in the . . . decision processes of
the bureaucracy. The cycle closes when the congressman lends a sympathetic ear, piously
denounces the evils of bureaucracy, intervenes in the latter’s decisions, and rides a grateful
electorate to ever more impressive electoral showings.”); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984) (proposing a theory of congressional oversight of agency action that
distinguishes between “police-patrol oversight,” in which Congress itself directly monitors
agencies, and “fire-alarm oversight,” in which “Congress establishes a system . . . enabl[ing]
individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative decisions, to charge
executive agencies with violating congressional goals, and to seek remedies from agencies,
courts, and Congress”); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or
Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL.
ECON. 765, 766 (1983) (developing “a model of agency decision making based on the premise
that agencies are controlled by the legislature” and “argu[ing], therefore, that to understand the
genesis of agencies, as well as the stability and change in agency policy, we must understand the
underlying legislative politics”).
23. I will use the term “high-stakes rulemaking initiatives” to refer to major rulemaking
exercises in which the stakes are especially high, such as when an agency is attempting to
implement a new regulatory program or a major expansion of an existing program, or when a
proceeding has the potential to establish an important precedent with large economic
consequences for a regulated industry or the beneficiaries of a regulatory program.
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between the domains of politics and administrative law, and they are
far less restrained in the rhetoric they employ to influence agency
24
policymaking.
In this new milieu, “winning” can mean more than compelling
unreasonable delays in agency action, invoking APA procedures to
impede the policymaking process, or persuading the agency to accept
a particular position on the relevant law and facts. Winning can
consist of extracting promises from nominees during the confirmation
process, preventing the confirmation of disfavored nominees, or
preventing the confirmation of any agency leaders until the
administration has agreed to change the agency’s decisionmaking
structure. Winning can also mean incapacitating the agency by
reducing its annual appropriation, repealing the agency’s organic act,
or whittling away its regulatory authority through rifle-shot riders
25
attached to must-pass legislation. The players are less reluctant to
attack agencies and the statutes those agencies administer head on.
The players launch their attacks much earlier in the evolution of
regulatory programs, and they feel free to go beyond attacks on the
agencies as institutions to launch ad hominem attacks on agency
decisionmakers.
In short, I raise the possibility that, for some high-stakes
rulemaking initiatives in some areas of regulation, implementation is
26
not so much “politics by other means” as it is “politics as usual.”
And because politics is so very different from the deliberative,
lawyer-dominated domain of traditional administrative law, the word
“law” may no longer be an accurate descriptor. Former U.S.

24. See generally Neal Devins, Tom DeLay: Popular Constitutionalist?, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1055, 1059 (2006) (arguing that politics in the United States has become increasingly
polarized in recent years and predicting that the “increasing ideological divide” is likely to
widen in the future).
25. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Deregulatory Riders Redux, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. &
ADMIN. L. (forthcoming 2012); see also Donovan Slack, Republicans Seek Repeal of Financial
Rules, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 7, 2011, at A1 (discussing components of the Republican plan to “rein
in regulation of businesses”); Jessica Holzer, House Panel Targets Consumer Bureau, SEC
Budgets, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2011, 6:01 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52702303339904576404102094921400.html (noting that Rep. Jo Ann Emerson “acknowledged
that some Republicans want[ed] to hobble the agency created by the Dodd-Frank financial law
by depriving it of funds”); Kate Sheppard, House Votes To Block EPA Climate Regs, MOTHER
JONES (Feb. 18, 2011), http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2011/02/house-votes-block-epaclimate-regs (noting that the House of Representatives passed a continuing resolution that
“include[d] a massive cut to the EPA’s budget” in connection with barring the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) from regulating greenhouse-gas emissions).
26. See supra note 18.
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt
referred in 2010 to federal regulation as a “kind of a blood sport” in
which the regulated industries attempt “to make the particular
agency” promulgating an unwelcome regulation “look stupid or inept
27
or venal.” If the implementation of regulatory statutes has become a
blood sport in important contexts, and if the goal of administrative
law extends beyond ensuring procedural regularity to a concern about
the effective implementation of legislation, then it would behoove
administrative-law scholars to pay attention to the larger setting in
which informal rulemaking now takes place and to begin thinking
about the implications of these developments for the field.
The conventional model still governs most run-of-the-mill
rulemaking. The regulations that make up the vast bulk of the
rulemaking output of the federal agencies are not of such importance
that they are likely to warrant the considerable expense of an all-out
war, nor are they likely to attract the attention of the powerful
political actors who are capable of transforming technical disputes
into fierce ideological battles. In high-impact rulemaking exercises
that have the potential for both high political visibility and large costs
or benefits, however, many regulatees and beneficiary groups have
dramatically intensified their efforts to influence the conventional
rulemaking process, while at the same time broadening the focus of
their strategies beyond the confines of that process to include
members of Congress, the media, political pundits, and the general
public. During times of divided government, the battles are waged
both in the agency and in Congress, where sympathetic committees
schedule hearings on proposed regulations even as the agencies are
receiving and analyzing public comments on the same proposed
regulations pursuant to the conventional rulemaking model.
The fact that regulated industries do not pursue blood-sport
strategies for most rules does not mean that the new model is
irrelevant to most rulemaking exercises. One of the important
benefits of the blood-sport strategy for a regulated industry is the in
terrorem effect that it has on regulatory agencies as they go about
their day-to-day business, knowing that any rulemaking of any
importance could escalate into a blood-sport battle. Part I of this
Article provides a detailed examination of the blood-sport model in
action in the context of the Federal Reserve Board’s (the Fed’s)
27. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 53 (2011)
(quoting Interview with Arthur Levitt (Oct. 1, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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attempt to implement the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
29
Act). Drawing on this example and other recent high-stakes
rulemaking efforts by other agencies, Part II suggests some general
characteristics of the blood-sport model. Part III provides some
rather tentative thoughts on the implications of the blood-sport
model for administrative law, and Part IV offers some possible
responses to the phenomenon that are aimed at eliminating, or at
least taming, some of its least attractive characteristics and at ensuring
that it does not further erode public trust in the administrative
process.
I. BLOOD-SPORT STRATEGIES IN IMPLEMENTING THE
DURBIN AMENDMENT
A. Introduction
In the wake of the financial meltdown of 2008, Congress enacted
the Dodd-Frank Act, a comprehensive financial-reform statute that
empowered several existing banking agencies and a new agency
called the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to
promulgate regulations to protect consumers from predatory lending
30
practices and the financial system from another meltdown.
Somewhat surprisingly, the first rulemaking action under the Act to
generate a blood-sport battle was the Fed’s attempt to implement a
last-minute amendment to the statute that required it to regulate the

28. 111 CONG. REC. S3651–52 (daily ed. May 12, 2010).
29. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
30. Id.; see also SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS 177, 181–85, 192 (2010)
(chronicling the events following the 2008 crisis, including the “enormous” “damage to the real
economy” and to government finances, the surprising recovery of investment banking, the fact
that “when the banks faced off with the government, they held all the cards” because the
government could not afford to let them fail, and the financial industry’s attempts to influence
proposed financial regulations); DAVID SKEEL, NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 3–4 (2011)
(summarizing the “[p]ath to [e]nactment” of the Dodd-Frank Act); Brady Dennis, Obama
Ushers in New Financial Era, WASH. POST, July 22, 2010, at A13 (describing the hopes and
concerns expressed in response to President Obama’s signing of the Dodd-Frank Act);
Donovan Slack, Republicans Seek Repeal of Financial Rules, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 7, 2011, at A1
(citing a fall 2010 Gallup poll in which 61 percent of the respondents said they approved of the
Dodd-Frank Act, making it one of the most popular pieces of legislation passed during the
Obama administration).

MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/12/2012 12:12 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT

1683

“interchange fees” that banks issuing debit cards charge to retailers
31
each time a consumer uses a debit card to make a purchase.
Introduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s, debit cards allow
consumers to access funds in their accounts electronically in a way
that many consumers find more convenient than using checks or
32
cash. Depository institutions, such as national banks and credit
33
unions, typically issue debit cards to their account holders. Debit
cards employ two different types of authentication methods: a
physical signature that can often be accomplished electronically and a
34
personal identification number (PIN). The debit-card infrastructure
35
varies depending on the identification method the consumer selects.
Most debit-card transactions are processed over a four-party system
in which a network, such as Visa or MasterCard, receives transaction
information from a merchant and either electronically transfers the
payment from the bank that issued the card to the merchant’s bank or
36
declines to make the transfer.
The interchange fee is established by the network and is
automatically paid out of the merchant’s account by the merchant’s
37
bank to the card issuer. The purpose of the fee is to compensate the
issuing bank for processing the transaction and to offset the
additional losses that issuing banks inevitably incur due to fraudulent
38
transactions. The two networks that dominate the market—Visa and
MasterCard—compete with one another to win banks’ business by,
39
among other things, setting high interchange fees on transactions. As
debit cards gained increasing consumer acceptance during the 2000s,

31. 111 CONG. REC. S3651–52 (daily ed. May 12, 2010).
32. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July 20, 2011)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 43,396.
38. See id. at 43,394 n.2 (defining “interchange fee” as “any fee established, charged, or
received by a payment card network for the purpose of compensating an issuer for its
involvement in an electronic debit transaction” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at
43,401 (“[D]epending on the facts and circumstances, . . . the [electronic] transaction [may be]
guaranteed and the amount of the transaction must be absorbed as a fraud loss by the
issuer . . . .”).
39. James C. Miller III, Op-Ed., Debit Card Market Is Broken and Needs Fixing, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Apr. 7, 2011, at A17.
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40

interchange fees increased fairly rapidly. The networks established
operating rules, including rules that established interchange fees, on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. Under this system, if a merchant did not
comply with a network’s terms and conditions, it would lose access to
the network and, presumably, much of the business derived from
41
debit-card purchases.
42
By 2009, debit-card interchange fees totaled $16.2 billion. The
average interchange fee was 56 cents—1.53 percent of the average
transaction amount—for signature debit transactions and 23 cents—
0.58 percent of the average transaction amount—for PIN
43
transactions. By contrast, the median per-transaction cost incurred
by issuing banks across all debit-card issuers was 11 cents per
44
transaction. Of this cost, the median amount attributable to fraud45
prevention activities was 1.7 cents per transaction.
The large difference between the average interchange fee and
the average per-transaction cost translated into large profits for the
issuing banks. Depending on the elasticity of the demand for the
purchased items, merchants either absorbed the loss or passed it on to
consumers in the form of higher prices. To the extent that the fees
were passed along, though, all consumers paid the extra premium, not
just those who purchased goods with debit cards. Consequently, very
few consumers were aware of the fact that they were indirectly paying
46
interchange fees through higher prices.
Interchange fees were, however, quite apparent to merchants. By
2010, interchange fees in the United States were the highest in the
40. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,395 (stating that over
the past decade, “[d]ebit card payments have grown more than any other form of electronic
payment”); id. at 43,396 (noting that “most PIN debit networks raised the levels of the fixed and
ad valorem components of fees, in addition to raising the caps on overall fees”); Miller, supra
note 39 (asserting that interchange fees have increased rapidly).
41. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396 (“[E]ach card
network specifies operating rules that govern the relationships between network
participants. . . . [M]erchants . . . may be required to comply with a network’s rules or risk losing
access to that network.”).
42. Id. at 43,397.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th
Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System) (pointing out that interchange fees are “[g]enerally unnoticed by the
customer”).
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47

world. In fact, interchange fees constituted the largest expense after
48
payroll for some retailers such as 7-Eleven convenience stores.
Because the networks usually moved in tandem and had every
incentive to please the issuers by keeping fees high, even large bigbox stores such as Wal-Mart seemed powerless to exert downward
49
pressure on interchange fees. The merchants strongly supported
legislation that would cap the fees at an amount that was reasonably
related to costs and that would require issuers to accept at least two
50
networks to ensure greater competition among the networks.
Relying on assurances from the retail industry that much of the
savings resulting from governmental intervention would be passed
along to consumers in the form of lower prices, consumer advocates
51
supported the merchants’ efforts to place limits on interchange fees.
Debit-card issuers, a diverse group that includes large national
banks, credit unions, and small community banks, strongly opposed

47. Id. at 30 (statement of Rep. Peter Welch).
48. Id. at 45 (statement of David Seltzer, Vice President and Treasurer, 7-Eleven Inc., on
behalf of the Retail Industry Leaders Association).
49. See id. at 31 (statement of Rep. Peter Welch) (“Merchants have literally no power
individually to be able to negotiate a price. So, we got to this point where the charges to our
merchants, . . . mom-and-pop stores as well as the Wal-Marts and Home Depots, became the
highest in the world.”).
50. See id. at 31 (statement of Sean P. Duffy, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. &
Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.) (observing that merchants “seem to advocate
for Congress stepping in and advocating for price fixing in regard to Visa, banks, and their
fees”); id. at 36 (statement of Constantino (Gus) Prentzas, Owner, Pavilion Florals and Life &
Health Fitness) (noting that interchange “fees . . . have doubled in the last 2 to 3 years alone”
and “fully support[ing] the debit card rules proposed by the Federal Reserve and any other
efforts to help cur[b] swipe fees”); id. at 41–42 (statement of Doug Kantor, Partner, Steptoe &
Johnson, on behalf of the Merchants Payments Coalition) (arguing that interchange fees are
“tremendously unfair to merchants”); id. at 45 (statement of David Seltzer, Vice President and
Treasurer, 7-Eleven Inc., on behalf of the Retail Industry Leaders Association) (stating that
interchange fees for 7-Eleven franchisees quadrupled from 2002 to 2010); Edward Wyatt,
Lowering of Fees for Debit Cards Is Lobby Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at A1 (quoting
Douglas Kantor, a lobbyist for the Merchants Payments Coalition, complaining that interchange
fees are stifling businesses).
51. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note
46, at 9 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System) (“The idea is that lower interchange fees . . . would lower cost to merchants
who possibly in competitive environments, could lower their cost to consumers.”); Oversight of
Federal Payment of Interchange Fees: How To Save Taxpayer Dollars: Hearing Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 44–46 (2010) (statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (noting the
impact of interchange fees on consumers and stating that “[t]he Durbin interchange
amendment . . . takes important steps to end unfair and anti-competitive practices in the credit
and debit card marketplace”).
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any regulation of interchange fees. They worried that the caps would
not take into account all of the risk factors that card issuers had built
53
into the interchange fees. In particular, the banks believed that the
merchant and consumer groups had greatly underestimated the costs
54
of preventing and adjusting for fraud. According to the banks, in
addition to forcing card issuers to lay off workers to reduce costs,
capping interchange fees would discourage investment in new fraud55
prevention technologies.
Debit-card issuers argued that merchants would not necessarily
pass the savings from lowered interchange fees on to consumers in
the form of reduced prices because there would be no requirement
56
that they do so. Moreover, the issuers contended, if issuing banks
were unable to recoup their costs, they would have to tighten their
standards for issuing debit cards, thereby making debit cards less
57
available to low- and moderate-income consumers. Issuers also
claimed that they would be forced to eliminate various rewards
52. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note
46, at 37 (statement of Frank Michael, President and CEO, Allied Credit Union, on behalf of
the Credit Union National Association) (opposing the rules implementing the Durbin
Amendment); id. at 40 (statement of David W. Kemper, Chairman, President, and CEO,
Commerce Bank, on behalf of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers
Association) (urging Congress “to take immediate action to stop the proposed [interchange-fee]
rule from being implemented”).
53. Cf. id. at 43 (statement of Joshua R. Floum, General Counsel, Visa Inc.) (noting that
the price controls would “make[] it virtually impossible for issuers to recover the cost of the
infrastructure and operations required to build and manage a world-class debit system and
[would] discourage[] future investment in fraud protection”).
54. Cf. id. at 44–45 (“The [Fed] admits that its interchange proposal will permit issuers to
recover only a small fraction of their costs . . . . Investment in data security and fraud prevention
can only be made if there [is an] . . . opportunity to recover the cost of these investments.”).
55. See id. at 43 (asserting that interchange-fee caps “discourage[] future investment in
fraud protection”); Chris Serres, Bankers Push Back on Fee Limits, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Mar. 9, 2011, at 1A (relaying concerns that interchange-fee caps would lead banks to discharge
employees and citing one bank’s claim that it would have to lay off more than seventeen
hundred workers).
56. Cf. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note
46, at 2 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System) (stating that interchange fees are “[g]enerally unnoticed by the customer”); id.
at 44 (statement of Joshua R. Floum, General Counsel, Visa Inc.) (“[T]here is no requirement
or evidence that merchants will pass on th[e] windfall to consumers.”).
57. See id. at 29 (statement of Rep. Stevan Pearce, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. &
Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.) (reasoning that the inability to offset the risk
of debit-card overdrafts would lead banks “to start shutting off customers from access”); id. at
40 (statement of David W. Kemper, Chairman, President, and CEO, Commerce Bank, on
behalf of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Association) (“[T]he
Fed’s proposed rule will . . . push[] low-income customers out of the banking system.”).
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programs that they had established to encourage consumers to use
58
their debit cards. Finally, issuers argued that they would have to
make up for losses in their debit-card operations by raising fees in
59
other areas, such as checking accounts.
B. The Durbin Amendment
Toward the end of the Senate’s consideration of the massive
Dodd-Frank Act, Senator Richard Durbin offered an amendment
60
that would authorize the Fed to regulate interchange fees. When it
was eventually enacted, the Durbin Amendment required the Fed to
prescribe regulations within nine months requiring interchange fees
to be “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer
61
with respect to the transaction.” The agency was, however,
empowered to “allow for an adjustment to the fee” as “reasonably
necessary to make allowance for costs incurred by the issuer in
62
preventing fraud.” In addition, the Fed was required to promulgate

58. See id. at 9 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System) (observing that debit-card “rewards are often made possible through
higher interchange fees”).
59. See id. at 38 (statement of Frank Michael, President and CEO, Allied Credit Union, on
behalf of the Credit Union National Association) (listing higher debit-card fees and elimination
of free checking accounts as some of the changes that credit unions would need to make to
replace the lost revenue); id. at 40 (statement of David W. Kemper, Chairman, President, and
CEO, Commerce Bank, on behalf of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer
Bankers Association) (“[B]anks will have to find other ways to recover revenue and this will
ultimately lead to new fees for the consumer.”); id. at 43–44 (statement of Joshua R. Floum,
General Counsel, Visa Inc.) (citing a study by the Independent Community Bankers of America
in which “[m]ore than 90 percent of [the member banks] reported that they will be forced to
increase other fees to consumer[s] to compensate for the interchange regulation”).
60. See 111 CONG. REC. S3651–52 (daily ed. May 12, 2010); Todd Zywicki, Durbin’s
Innovation Killer, THE AM. (June 11, 2011), http://www.american.com/archive/2011/june/
durbin2019s-innovation-killer (noting that the Durbin Amendment was “[a]ttached as a floor
amendment . . . to the Senate version of the Dodd-Frank legislation” “at the very last
moment”).
61. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)
§ 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2)–(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2010). To determine “reasonable and
proportional” interchange fees, the statute required the Fed to “consider the functional
similarity between” debit-card transactions and checks, which clear without interchange fees. Id.
§ 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1936o-2(a)(4)(A). Under the statute, the Fed must also distinguish
between the incremental cost incurred by the issuer for a particular transaction and other costs
that are not specific to a particular transaction. Id. § 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(B).
62. Id. § 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(5)(A)(i); see also Understanding the Federal
Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, at 4 (statement of Sarah Bloom
Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (noting that the Fed
“requested comment on different conceptual approaches for implementing a fraud prevention
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regulations prohibiting network “exclusivity arrangements” and
requiring issuers to provide merchants with at least two unaffiliated
63
network options for each debit-card transaction. Finally, the statute
exempted small issuers with assets of less than $10 billion from the
interchange-fee standard, although not from the exclusivity
64
restrictions.
On the one hand, merchant and consumer groups were thrilled
65
with these developments. The banking industry, on the other hand,
stunned by this unanticipated last-minute amendment to the statute,
made it known that it was unwilling to live with the new regulatory
66
program. Outspoken JPMorgan Chase & Co. Chief Executive
Officer Jamie Dimon told the Council of Institutional Investors that
the Durbin Amendment was “idiotic” and should not have been
passed because it “had nothing to do with the crisis” that had inspired
67
the Dodd-Frank Act. The industry was thus determined to fight the
Durbin Amendment at every step of its implementation.
C. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
The Fed proceeded expeditiously with the rulemaking. Among
other things, the agency commissioned a survey of sixteen paymentcard networks and 131 financial institutions that had assets of $10

adjustment to the interchange fee standard” and that its members “[were] reserving judgment
on the terms of the final rule until [they had] the opportunity to consider these comments”).
63. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(1)(A) (“The Board
shall . . . prescribe regulations providing that an issuer or payment card network shall
not . . . restrict the number of payment card networks on which an electronic debit transaction
may be processed to (i) 1 such network; or (ii) 2 or more such networks which are owned,
controlled, or otherwise operated by [affiliated entities].”); see also Understanding the Federal
Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, at 3 (statement of Sarah Bloom
Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“[N]etwork exclusivity
and routing provisions . . . could promote competition among networks and place downward
pressure on interchange fees.”).
64. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A) (“[T]he Board shall
exempt such issuers from [interchange-fee] regulations prescribed under paragraph (3)(A).”);
Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, at 2–3
(statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System) (“The statute exempts small issuers . . . from this interchange fee standard but it does
not exempt them from the exclusivity and routing restrictions.”).
65. T.W. Farnam, Simmons Wins Swipe Fee Deal for His Prepaid Card, WASH. POST, June
24, 2010, at A19; Edward Wyatt, Lowering of Fees for Debit Cards Is Lobby Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2011, at A1.
66. See Wyatt, supra note 65 (describing the banking industry’s opposition to the law).
67. Cheyenne Hopkins, JPMorgan: Delay Durbin, Save Perks?, AM. BANKER, Apr. 6,
2011, at 1 (quoting Dimon) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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69

billion or more. In its notice of proposed rulemaking, published on
December 28, 2010, the Fed requested comments on two alternative
70
approaches to implementing the interchange-fee standard. The first
approach would allow the issuer to comply with the standard either
by calculating its allowable costs and ensuring that it did not receive
any interchange fee in excess of those costs or by adhering to a “safe71
harbor” cap of seven cents per transaction. If the issuer did not elect
to use the safe harbor, a cap of twelve cents per transaction would still
72
apply. The second approach would adopt a flat twelve-cents-pertransaction cap for all covered issuers and would require the networks
73
to ensure that issuers did not receive amounts in excess of the cap.
Either approach would reduce fees substantially below the 2010
74
average of forty-four cents per transaction. As required by statute,
the proposal would exempt from the interchange-fee restrictions any
issuer that, together with its affiliates, had assets of less than $10
75
billion.
The proposal also offered two alternatives for implementing the
statute’s network-exclusivity prohibition. The first alternative would
allow a debit-card transaction to be routed over at least two
unaffiliated debit-card networks—for example, one signature-based
76
network and one unaffiliated PIN-based network. The second
alternative would require a debit card to have at least two unaffiliated
68. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,478, 43,479 (interim final
rule July 20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
69. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722 (proposed Dec. 28,
2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
70. Id. at 81,726.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 81,737. The agency based the twelve-cents-per-transaction cap on the average
variable costs revealed in its industry survey. The median bank’s average variable cost was
seven cents per transaction, but the twelve-cent number was based on the eightieth percentile of
issuing banks that responded. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on
Interchange Fees, supra note 46, at 7–8 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
74. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46,
at 3 (statement of Kenny Marchant, Member, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.)
75. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,756; see also Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(a)
(Supp. IV 2010) (exempting issuers with assets of less than $10 billion).
76. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,726; see also
Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, at 3
(statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System) (summarizing the two alternatives in the proposed rule).
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networks for each method of authorization that could be used with
77
that card. The latter approach would provide more merchants with a
78
routing choice but would entail much higher operational costs.
Finally, the proposal requested comments on two approaches to
implementing the fraud-prevention adjustment to the interchange
79
fee. The first approach would focus on the likelihood that major
innovations would result in substantial reductions in industry-wide
80
fraud.
The second approach, without focusing on specific
technologies, would focus on the steps that would be reasonably
necessary for an issuer to take to maintain an effective fraud81
prevention program. Because the agency’s survey showed a
substantially lower incidence of fraud for PIN-based debit
82
transactions than for signature-based debit transactions, the Fed also
requested comment on whether fraud adjustments should distinguish
83
between PIN and signature transactions.
D. Judicial Challenge to the Durbin Amendment
Unwilling to wait for the Fed to promulgate a final rule, TCF
National Bank filed a lawsuit in federal district court in South Dakota
84
challenging the constitutionality of the Durbin Amendment. The
district court refused to grant TCF’s request for a temporary
85
injunction, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed, holding that TCF was unlikely to prevail on its claim that

77. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,726–27.
78. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46,
at 3 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System).
79. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,740.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 81,741.
83. Id. at 81,742–43.
84. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 WL 1578535 (D.S.D. Apr. 25,
2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. 2011). Compare Complaint at 1, TCF Nat’l Bank, No. 104149, 2010 WL 3960576, at *1 (stating that the complaint was filed on October 12, 2010), with
Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,394 (appearing in the July 20,
2011, issue of the Federal Register). For background information on the TCF lawsuit, see Chris
Serres, Limits on Debit Card Fees on Trial, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 4, 2011, at 1A.
85. TCF Nat’l Bank, 2011 WL 1578535, at *5 (denying TCF’s motion for a preliminary
injunction).

MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/12/2012 12:12 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT

1691

the Fed’s threatened action would deprive it of substantive due
86
process.
E. Reactions to the Proposal
The Fed “received thousands of comments raising a variety of
87
issues.” Merchant groups and some consumer groups supported the
88
interchange-fee proposal. They preferred the first alternative for the
interchange fee-standard, but they wanted to lower the cap from
89
twelve cents per transaction to as low as four cents per transaction.
On the network-exclusivity issue, the merchants preferred the second
alternative because it would provide more routing choices and
because it would allow for more market discipline on interchange and
90
network fees. With respect to the fraud-related proposals, they
generally favored the first option, which focused on the likelihood
that major innovations would result in substantial reductions in
91
industry-wide fraud.
Issuers generally opposed the proposal entirely, arguing that
both fee-limiting alternatives would result in increased fees for
cardholders and other bank customers, would decrease the
availability of debit cards to low-income consumers, and would stifle
92
innovation. They preferred a single, stand-alone cap, but they urged
the Fed to substantially increase the cap to reflect a number of
93
additional costs.
With respect to the network-exclusivity

86. See TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1161, 1164–65 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[E]ven
assuming that TCF possesses a sufficient property interest to raise a due-process challenge, we
do not believe that TCF is likely to prevail. . . . [W]e affirm the district court’s denial of TCF’s
motion for a preliminary injunction.”).
87. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46,
at 4 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System).
88. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,402 (July 20, 2011)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235) (“Merchants, their trade groups, and some consumers
supported the Board’s proposal . . . .”); Edward Wyatt, 9 Senators Seek To Delay Debit Card Fee
Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2011, at B3 (stating that retailers and consumer groups were
generally in favor of the proposal).
89. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,402.
90. Id. at 43,403.
91. Id. at 43,402; Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,478, 43,479
(interim final rule July 20, 2011) (to be codified as 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
92. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,402.
93. Id. Interestingly, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in the Treasury
Department weighed in on the proposal and sided with the banks. See Donna Borak, OCC Joins
Fight Against ‘Narrow’ Interchange Rule, AM. BANKER, Mar. 9, 2011, at 3 (reporting that the
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requirements, the issuers preferred the first alternative but argued
that even that alternative “would impose significant operational
burdens” on networks and issuers with very “little [offsetting]
94
consumer benefit.” Card issuers maintained that requiring them to
allow access to at least two networks would precipitate a “race to the
bottom” that would drive rates down as retailers sought the lowestprice option “regardless of quality or value delivered to the
95
consumer.” Finally, they favored the second fraud alternative
because it would provide flexibility to issuers to “tailor their fraudprevention activities to address most effectively the risks they faced
96
and changing fraud patterns.”
Although the proposal included the exemption for small issuers,
small banks, and credit unions, these entities predicted that
competition would force them to adhere to the lower caps that the
97
Fed had established for the big banks. They suspected that few
merchants would be willing to pay higher fees to small issuers when
most of their customers procured their debit cards from large
98
issuers. Several small banks argued that the Fed should provide an
administrative exemption from the network-exclusivity requirements
to match the statutory exemption from the interchange-fee
99
requirements.

Comptroller of the Currency warned that the proposal could hurt banks); Serres, supra note 55
(stating that the Comptroller of the Currency wrote to the Fed arguing that the proposal was
too narrow).
94. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,403.
95. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46,
at 44 (statement of Joshua R. Floum, General Counsel, Visa Inc.).
96. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,402; Debit Card
Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,479.
97. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,402.
98. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note
46, at 38 (statement of Frank Michael, President and CEO, Allied Credit Union, on behalf of
the Credit Union National Association) (“If the [small-issuer] carve out is entirely ineffective
and credit union interchange fees converge on the rate set for very large institutions, credit
unions will find their net income reduced by $1.6 billion.”); id. at 41 (statement of David W.
Kemper, Chairman, President, and CEO, Commerce Bank, on behalf of the American Bankers
Association and the Consumer Bankers Association) (“[T]he exemption for small banks will
ultimately be ineffective. Every community banker . . . with whom I speak strongly believes his
or her bank will be severely affected by the interchange price controls imposed on larger
banks. . . . Market share will flow to the lower-priced product of big banks, forcing small banks
to lose customers if they don’t follow suit.”).
99. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,403.
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F. Lobbying, Campaign Contributions, and Public Relations
Issuers launched a massive lobbying campaign to persuade
agency personnel to adopt the issuers’ preferred approaches to the
regulations and to persuade Congress to repeal or modify the Durbin
Amendment—or at least to delay its implementation date until after
100
the 2012 elections. One less apparent purpose of the congressionallobbying campaign was to persuade individual members of Congress
to put pressure on the Fed to make the final rule friendlier to the
banking industry. The Independent Community Bankers of America
spent around $1.2 million lobbying banking regulators and Congress
101
during the first quarter of 2011. The Credit Union National
Association (CUNA), which spent approximately $750,000 on
lobbying, also generated an estimated 144,000 contacts with
102
lawmakers during the first three months of 2011. The two major
networks, Visa and MasterCard, hired eighteen lobbying firms to
103
influence the agency and Congress on the interchange-fee rule. The
retail merchants followed suit with an intense lobbying campaign of
104
their own. The Sunlight Foundation reported that the various
interest groups advancing the merchants’ cause had hired 124
lobbying firms to influence agency and congressional action with
105
respect to the interchange-fee rule.
The affected industries backed up their lobbying activities with
106
hefty campaign contributions to key senators and representatives.
According to the Sunlight Foundation, banking interests funneled
100. See Wyatt, supra note 65 (describing an “all-out assault on Capitol Hill” and the card
issuers’ tactic of “enlisting a growing cadre of lawmakers and lobbyists to push for changes,
delay or outright repeal”).
101. Ben Protess, Community Banks Lobby To Limit New Regulations, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK BLOG (May 23, 2011, 8:37 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/
community-banks-lobby-to-limit-new-regulations.
102. Victoria McGrane, Wall Street, Banks Press To Shape Dodd-Frank Rules, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 22, 2011, at A5.
103. Edward Wyatt, Senate Votes Down a Delay in Rules on Debit Card Fees, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2011, at B1. The Sunlight Foundation reported that sixty-eight of the seventy-nine
lobbyists hired by Visa and MasterCard had previously worked in the federal government. Id.
104. See Wyatt, supra note 65 (naming the lobbying representatives of retailers and noting
the intensity of the lobbying effort).
105. Paul Blumenthal, Merchants, Retailers Employ Revolving Door Lobbyists in Regulatory
Fight, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 19, 2011, 12:16 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/
04/19/merchants-retailers-employ-revolving-door-lobbyists-in-regulatory-fight.
106. See Gary Rivlin, The Billion-Dollar Bank Heist, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 2011, at 9, 10
(reporting that banks and trade associations contributed millions of dollars to the campaigns of
representatives who could influence the Dodd-Frank Act).
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$662,000 to selected committee members through the Electronic
107
Payments Coalition during the first few months of 2011. CUNA’s
political action committee sent more than $400,000 to federal
108
candidates during the first four months of 2011. The 2010 elections
presented a unique opportunity for Republican politicians to redirect
the industry’s generous campaign contributions into Republican
coffers. In September 2010, the financial-services industry sent 71
percent of its campaign contributions to Republicans, compared to 44
109
percent for the same month in 2009. The Sunlight Foundation found
that 70 percent of the campaign contributions that House Committee
on Financial Services Chairman Spencer Bachus received during the
110
first quarter of 2011 came from the financial-services industry.
During the first quarter of 2011, seven of the ten Republican
freshmen on the committee received about 40 percent of their
111
campaign contributions from the financial-services industry.
The banking industry supported its lobbying campaign with an
expensive public-relations campaign aimed at generating public
112
pressure on the agency and Congress. A coalition of banks and
networks placed advertisements in newspapers warning that
113
“[b]ureaucrats want to take away your debit card!” Networktelevision advertisements complained that “‘community banks and
credit unions will be squeezed’” by ‘“bad’ regulation” if Congress did
114
not stop the Fed. Banking-industry representatives told the media
that the Fed’s proposed “price controls” would provide windfalls to
big-box stores like Wal-Mart and would force banks to charge higher
115
fees for debit cards and to do away with free checking. Several large
banks announced that they were planning to reduce or eliminate

107. See Ylan Q. Mui & Cezary Podkul, Banks Lose Fight over Swipe Fees, WASH. POST,
June 9, 2011, at A13 (citing figures reported by the Sunlight Foundation).
108. Trades Continue To Gear Up for Election, CREDIT UNION TIMES, June 1, 2011, at 28,
28.
109. Nelson D. Schwartz, Power Shift Is Expected by C.E.O.’s, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, at
B1.
110. Rivlin, supra note 106, at 11.
111. Id.
112. Cf. Mui & Podkul, supra note 107 (describing the industry’s campaign efforts).
113. Wyatt, supra note 65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Protess, supra note 101.
115. Serres, supra note 55 (internal quotation mark omitted) (predicting that banks would
impose higher fees on consumers in response to the interchange-fee rule); Wyatt, supra note 65
(reporting that the change in interchange fees would likely create windfalls for large retailers).
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debit-card rewards programs but that they would not implement the
116
changes if Congress delayed the Fed regulations.
The efforts to sway public opinion were not confined to the
mainstream media. Metro cars in Washington, D.C.’s mass-transit
system, in which many Fed employees presumably traveled, featured
117
ads opposing the Fed’s proposal. A bankers’ group created a
website called “Don’t Make Us Pay” to provide the banking
industry’s take on the dispute and to urge consumers to send a form
118
email to their congresspersons. CUNA posted a YouTube video in
which the association’s president alluded to a massive security breach
at Michaels arts-and-crafts stores as an example of the security risks
that consumers would face if banks and credit unions did not receive
sufficiently high interchange fees to support innovative fraud119
prevention technologies.
A group of retailers called the Merchants Payments Coalition
responded to the banking-industry initiative with advertisements that
depicted overweight bankers smoking cigars and rifling through onehundred-dollar bills, and criticized banks for accepting federal bailout
money at the same time that they were “looking for another
120
handout.” A public-relations firm hired by the merchants coined the
term “swipe fee” as a substitute for the term “interchange fee” in the
121
debates. In May 2011, the National Retail Federation (NRF)
launched a “major nationwide 60-day lobbying, grassroots and media
campaign” aimed at ensuring that the Fed promulgated an

116. See Hopkins, supra note 67 (quoting a JPMorgan Chase official as saying that the bank
would not change its debit-card program if Congress delayed the regulation); E. Scott Reckard,
Debit Cards Poised To Get Much Costlier, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at B1 (reporting that JP
Morgan, Wells Fargo, and other banks were phasing out or reducing debit-card rewards
programs in response to the interchange-fee regulations); Bill Hardekopf, Debit-Card Rewards:
Beginning of the End?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/
Business/2011/0401/Debit-card-rewards-beginning-of-the-end (announcing that Chase debitcard holders would no longer receive rewards for using the card).
117. See Mui & Podkul, supra note 107 (reporting that financial firms covered Metro cars in
advertisements).
118. DON’T MAKE US PAY, http://dontmakeuspay.org (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
119. Cheney YouTube Video Urges Interchange Delay Action, CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N
(June 6, 2011), http://www.cuna.org/newsnow/11/wash060311-3.html.
120. Serres, supra note 84 (quoting the advertisement) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See Marc Hochstein, The PR Whiz Who Coined ‘Swipe Fees,’ AM. BANKER, June 30,
2011, at 8 (reporting that Taylor West, an employee of a Washington public-relations firm,
coined the term swipe fee).
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interchange-fee rule that was acceptable to retailers. Targeted
advertisements aired across the country. For example, advertisements
airing on television stations across Alaska warned that “[t]wo out of
every one hundred dollars we spend in stores or online go to the
credit card industry” and urged viewers to call the state’s two senators
to “tell them to stop the big bank credit card industry from swiping
123
our money.”
Consumer groups lacked the resources to launch a publicrelations campaign, but they did complain to the press that high
interchange fees were wholly unwarranted. They noted that banks
had saved billions in operating costs as consumers moved away from
personal checks to debit cards and that the banks had failed to pass
124
on the savings to consumers. Having coaxed consumers into using
125
debit cards, banks were “diabolical” to begin raising debit-card fees.
G. Industry Allies
Conservative think tanks and grassroots organizations also
entered the fray. The probusiness Competitive Enterprise Institute
(CEI) circulated a letter signed by many other groups, including
Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform and the Christian
Coalition of America, urging Congress to delay the implementation
126
of the rule pending further study and analysis. One Tea Party
122. National Retail Federation Launches Major 60-Day Advocacy Campaign To Preserve
Swipe Fee Reform, BUS. WIRE (May 18, 2011, 12:15 PM EST), http://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20110518006516/en/National-Retail-Federation-Launches-Major-60-Day-Advocacy.
Among other things, the campaign included an “intensive grassroots campaign mobilizing
retailers from across the country”; a “fly-in with hundreds of business owners . . . to meet with
members of Congress and urge that the reforms go through as planned”; an “aggressive media
relations campaign including . . . interviews with national and local news outlets, and nationwide
placement of op-eds”; a “nationwide print and radio advertising campaign
including . . . hundreds of thousands of dollars in radio ads in key markets nationwide”; and the
use of “social media and viral video to educate legislators and the public.” Id.
123. National Retail Federation Airs Radio Ads Urging Murkowski and Begich To Support
Swipe Fee Reform, ENHANCED ONLINE NEWS (May 31, 2011, 5:33 PM EDT), http://eon.
businesswire.com/news/eon/20110531007077/en.
124. See Reckard, supra note 116 (reporting that consumer advocates were angry at banks
for raising interchange fees because the cost savings of debit cards was not being passed on to
consumers).
125. See id. (quoting Ed Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest
Research Group) (internal quotation mark omitted).
126. Letter from Grover Norquist, President, Ams. for Tax Reform, et al., to Members of
Congress (Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/atrfiles/files/files/040111lt_
Interchange%281%29.pdf. John Berlau of the CEI warned that “we must stop the . . . oncoming
train wreck that threatens the savings of consumers as well as the safety and soundness of the
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organization featured the Fed’s interchange-fee rule on a webpage
that prominently featured the slogan “Don’t Make Us Pay” and
warned that the rule would result in fewer rewards, more debit-card
127
restrictions, and higher debit-card fees. When Bank of America
announced that it would introduce a five-dollar monthly debit-card
fee, Rush Limbaugh rushed to the bank’s defense, telling his listeners
that the fee was the bank’s proper response to the Durbin
Amendment, “which was tacked on to the already despicable Dodd128
Frank bill at the last minute.”
H. Congressional Hearings
Two hearings on the interchange-fee rule before the House
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit
provided a forum for opponents of the proposed rule to criticize it
129
outside of the Fed’s ongoing rulemaking process. The first witness
at the first hearing on February 17, 2011, was Sarah Bloom Raskin, a
130
member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Although Raskin was reluctant to promise any particular outcome
from the pending rulemaking, she was quite forthcoming about the
studies underlying the proposal and the possibility that the small131
bank exclusion from the interchange-fee cap could prove illusory.
Nevertheless, she was subjected to browbeating exchanges by two
subcommittee members. Representative Blaine Luetkemeyer
peppered Raskin with questions, cut her off before she could respond,

financial system with price controls that don’t even cover the cost of services to retailers.” Press
Release, Ams. for Tax Reform, Competitive Enter. Inst. & 60 Plus Ass’n, Free-Market Groups
Support Halting Dodd-Frank Price Controls (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://s3.amazonaws
.com/atrfiles/files/files/040511pr_interchangefees.pdf (quoting Berlau).
127. Debit Card Rule; Take Action To Stop It, S. TIER TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://sttpp.
wordpress.com/action-alerts/take-action-stop-the-debit-card-rule (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
128. The Rush Limbaugh Show (Premiere Networks radio broadcast Oct. 4, 2011)
(transcript available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2011/10/04/dick_durbin_calls_for_
run_on_bank).
129. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46;
The Effect of Dodd-Frank on Small Financial Institutions and Small Businesses: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong.
(2011).
130. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46,
at 2 (statement of Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
131. See id. at 32 (discussing the survey conducted evaluating the impact of the Durbin
Amendment and acknowledging that the impact on “small community banks” was not
“included in the survey”).
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and then chastised her for failing to be responsive. Representative
Donald Manzullo insisted that the Fed was rushing to judgment and
demanded that Raskin admit that “[her] survey and [her] studies
133
[were] flawed.” When Raskin said that she was “not ready to admit
134
that,” Representative Manzullo interrupted her and accused her of
135
being disingenuous.
The banking industry’s witnesses focused on the adverse
consequences that they predicted would flow from the Fed’s
136
proposal. They urged Congress to call an immediate halt to the
rulemaking process. If, after additional study and hearings, Congress
should decide that further action was still needed, it could allow the
137
Fed to reinitiate the rulemaking process. And if Congress was not
prepared to pretermit the proceeding, it should at least delay the
rulemaking process to give the banking agencies an opportunity to
138
study the matter further. Representative David Scott told Raskin

132. See id. at 25 (statements of Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors, and Rep.
Luetkemeyer, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs.) (“MR. LUETKEMEYER: Yet in your written testimony, your written testimony says the
proposed rule interprets the incremental cost to be an exclusion of fixed costs would be
required. Which one is it? . . . MS. RASKIN: It is actually both. MR. LUETKEMEYER: No, no, no.
Yes or no? Which—we are not going there—take up my 5 minutes—very quickly. Which one is?
MS. RASKIN: I am afraid I don’t see a conflict and I could— MR. LUETKEMEYER: I am sorry. I
see a tremendous conflict . . . .”).
133. Id. at 33 (statement of Rep. Manzullo, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer
Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.).
134. Id. (statement of Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System).
135. Id. at 33–34 (statement of Rep. Manzullo, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. &
Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.).
136. See The Effect of Dodd-Frank on Small Financial Institutions and Small Businesses,
supra note 129, at 9 (statement of John P. Buckley, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer,
Gerber Federal Credit Union, on behalf of the National Association of Federal Credit Unions)
(arguing that the proposed rule would be “disastrous for credit unions and the 19 million
members [they] serve” because “the exemption for financial institutions under $10 billion in
assets [would] not work”); id. at 14 (statement of James D. MacPhee, Chairman, Independent
Community Bankers of America) (testifying that the proposal’s “[r]egulatory and paperwork
requirements [would] impose a disproportionate burden on community banks, thereby
diminishing their profitability and ability to attract capital and support their customers,
including small businesses”).
137. Id. at 10 (statement of John P. Buckley, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer,
Gerber Federal Credit Union, on behalf of the National Association of Federal Credit Unions).
138. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note
46, at 43 (statement of Joshua R. Floum, General Counsel, Visa Inc.) (arguing that “Congress
should consider extending the implementation date and requesting an impact study on
unintended consequences”); Donna Borak & Stacy Kaper, Durbin Rules Revisited: Cold Feet on
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that he hoped that she would take away from the hearing the message
“that a delay in the implementation of this rule [was] definitely in
139
order.”
Subcommittee Chairman Shelley Moore Capito questioned
whether the small-bank exemption from the interchange-fee cap
would be of any real benefit to small banks and credit unions in light
of the possibility that the merchants might shift their business away
from banks claiming the exemption to the big banks that were
140
charging the lower regulated fees. Proponents of small banks
argued that one way to ensure that the exemption was meaningful
would be to require networks to impose a “two-tier” system on
merchants that would prevent merchants from refusing to accept
cards issued by small banks with their associated higher interchange
141
fees. Raskin agreed that there were “legitimate questions regarding
how in fact small issuers [were] going to in essence have this
exemption work in their favor” because the agency had concluded
that it lacked the authority to require the merchants to employ a two142
tier system.
I.

Senator Tester’s Rider

The intense lobbying efforts by the banking industry had a
noticeable impact. By early 2011, several members who had voted for
the Durbin Amendment in 2010 expressed reservations about the law
and urged the Fed to err on the side of allowing issuers to charge
143
higher interchange fees to account for fraud-prevention expenses.
144
In March 2011, Senator Jon Tester introduced a bill that would have
Interchange Reg Proposal, AM. BANKER, Feb. 18, 2011, at 1 (stating that both political parties
urged the Fed to delay the implementation of the interchange-fee regulation).
139. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46,
at 15 (statement of Rep. Scott, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs.).
140. Cf. id. at 4–5 (statement of Rep. Capito, Chairman, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. &
Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.) (“[T]he question [is] that if you are an issuer
from a community bank or a credit union, [and] your interchange fee [can] remain higher, will
there be, as you [Raskin] said, dollar pressure to move customers towards the lower cost
interchange issuers?”).
141. Borak & Kaper, supra note 138 (quoting former Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) Chairperson Sheila Bair).
142. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46,
at 4–5 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System).
143. Wyatt, supra note 65.
144. Debit Interchange Fee Study Act, S. 575, 112th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2011).
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delayed the implementation of the interchange-fee regulation for two
145
years and required the Fed to repropose the rule after further study.
Within seventeen days, Tester received campaign donations from a
146
number of banking interests totaling at least $60,000. To the delight
of Tester’s opponent in the 2012 campaign, retailers then reacted by
filling the Montana airwaves and newspapers with attack ads
147
characterizing Tester as a handmaiden of the big Wall Street banks.
The Montana Bankers Association and credit-union groups
148
responded with a barrage of advertisements defending Tester. In
the end, the retailers prevailed after supporters of an appropriations
rider containing the Tester Amendment failed to garner the sixty
149
votes necessary to override a promised filibuster.
J.

The Notice of Final Rulemaking

After the Tester Amendment’s defeat, the banking industry and
its allies in the think tanks shifted their attention once again to the
Fed, which had missed its April 2011 deadline for promulgating a
150
final rule because it had to process more than 11,000 comments. The
151
final rule, which came out on July 20, 2011, adopted a modified
152
version of the stand-alone cap—the option favored by the banks.
Rather than forcing issuers to justify interchange fees up to a twelve153
cents-per-transaction cap, the final rule provided that an issuer
could not receive a per-transaction interchange fee in excess of the

145. Cheyenne Hopkins, Interchange Limits Play Key Role in Tester Race, AM. BANKER,
May 4, 2011, at 1.
146. Alexander Bolton, Swipe-Fee Opponents Direct Campaign Money to Tester, THE HILL,
Apr. 20, 2011, at 9.
147. See Hopkins, supra note 145 (“Groups including the Montana Petroleum Marketers
and Convenience Store Association, Montana Retail Association and several national merchant
advocacy groups are portraying Tester as a friend of Wall Street banks.”).
148. See id. (“[Retailer ads supporting Tester] are being countered by ads from the Montana
Bankers Association as well as community bank and credit union groups, who have launched
their own TV, radio and print ads on the issue.”).
149. Mui & Podkul, supra note 107; Wyatt, supra note 103.
150. Joe Adler, Banks’ Swipe Fee Fight Shifts to Fed, AM. BANKER, June 9, 2011, at 1
(stating that bankers focused on persuading the Fed to change the interchange-fee policy); Ylan
Q. Mui, Retailers Fight Back over Debit-Card Swipe Fees, WASH. POST, May 19, 2011, at A13
(reporting that the Fed said it had missed its deadline because over eleven thousand comments
had been submitted).
151. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394 (July 20, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
152. Id. at 43,402.
153. See id. at 43,401 (discussing the proposed twelve-cents cap).
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sum of twenty-one cents plus an “ad valorem” component of five
154
basis points of the transaction’s value. With respect to network
exclusivity, the Fed again adopted the alternative favored by the
banks, thereby requiring issuers to provide access to two unaffiliated
155
networks for each transaction. The final rule exempted small banks
from the interchange-fee standard but not from the network156
exclusivity requirements.
The Fed published a separate interim final rule to address the
157
fraud-prevention adjustment. It adopted the “more general, less
prescriptive approach” regarding the eligibility of an issuer to receive
the adjustment, and it set the adjustment at one cent per
158
transaction. To avail itself of the fraud-prevention adjustment, an
issuer would be required to develop and implement policies and
procedures designed to identify and prevent fraudulent transactions,
to monitor the incidence of losses and reimbursements attributable to
fraud, respond to suspicious electronic transactions, and to ensure
159
that debit-card data remained secure. In explaining why it had
selected the option preferred by the banks, the Fed observed that
“[t]he dynamic nature of the debit card fraud environment requires
standards that permit issuers to determine themselves the best
160
methods to detect, prevent, and mitigate fraud losses.”
K. Reactions to the Final Rule
161

Retailers were greatly disappointed by the new rule. In
November, three retailer trade associations sought judicial review of

154. Id. at 43,472. For the average debit-card transaction of thirty-eight dollars, the ad
valorem component was two cents. Edward Wyatt, Fed Halves Debit Card Bank Fees, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2011, at B1.
155. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,403, 43,468.
156. Id. at 43,467 (exempting small issuers from interchange-fee provisions but not
mentioning exclusivity provisions).
157. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,478 (interim final rule July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
158. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,404.
159. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,480.
160. Id. at 43,484.
161. See Donna Borak & Rob Blackwell, Fed Raises Swipe Fee Limit, but Banks, Retailers
Cry Foul, AM. BANKER, June 30, 2001, at 1 (stating that retailers were unhappy with the final
rule); Wyatt, supra note 154 (relaying the characterization by Mallory Duncan, chairman of the
Merchants Payments Coalition, of the rule as “unacceptable to Main Street merchants”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the rule in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Consumer groups agreed that the Fed had “capitulated to intense
163
lobbying by bankers,” but they nevertheless hoped that consumers
164
would receive “a small break” in lower prices for consumer goods.
The banking industry also expressed some dismay that the rule had
effectively reduced interchange fees by almost one-half, but it
recognized that the Fed had taken “a significant step in reducing the
165
harm that could have resulted from the proposed rule.” Outside
observers predicted that, although consumers would not experience a
direct impact in lower prices, they might expect to see prices rising
166
less rapidly for a time.
The networks immediately responded to the rule by assessing a
new “network-participation” fee to all merchants using any of their
167
cards, debit or otherwise. In response to the new fees, banks began
to announce new cardholder fees. Two months before the rule went
into effect, Wells Fargo announced that it would be charging a threedollar fee to its debit cardholders in five states for every month during
168
which they used their cards. When the rule finally became effective
in early October 2011, Bank of America announced that it would
begin charging customers a fee of five dollars for every month during
169
which they used their cards. Consumer reaction to the fees was
extremely negative, and the reaction was compounded by the Occupy
Wall Street movement, which at that moment was focusing public

162. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1–6, NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., No. 1:11-cv-02075 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2011); see also Edward Wyatt, Retailers Push
Fed for Yet Lower Debit Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, at B1 (describing the background of
the lawsuit); Maya Jackson Randall, Retailers Sue Fed over Debit-Card Fee Rule, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 22, 2011, 3:25 PM EST), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702045314045770
54433584869976.html (same).
163. Press Release, Pub. Citizen, Public Citizen Critiques Federal Reserve Surrender to
Bank Lobbyists (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroom
redirect.cfm?ID=3372.
164. See id. (pointing out that the new twenty-six-cents cap was still lower than the average
prerule interchange fee of forty-four cents).
165. Wyatt, supra note 154 (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Cf. id. (predicting that consumers are more likely to see a slower increase in prices).
167. Andrew Johnson, Visa Revamps Its Pricing To Defend Debit Market Share, AM.
BANKER, July 29, 2011, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Will Hernandez, Wells Tests $3 Monthly Debit Fee in Five States, AM. BANKER, Aug.
18, 2011, at 2. JPMorgan Chase tested a similar fee on checking accounts in a small market. Id.
169. Ylan Q. Mui, Bank of America Scraps Debit Card Fee amid Uproar, WASH. POST, Nov.
2, 2011, at A1.
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170

attention on the misbehavior of large banks. More than 300,000
people signed an online petition to stop the cardholder fee, and
21,000 people pledged to close their accounts with Bank of
171
America. A month later, Bank of America and the other banks
172
rescinded the fees.
II. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF BLOOD-SPORT RULEMAKING
The interchange-fee rulemaking experience illustrates how
stakeholders in high-stakes rulemakings have begun going beyond the
conventional responses to rulemaking initiatives by adopting a new
toolbox of strategies better suited to the deeply divided political
economy. If the players on one side of the policy debate perceive that
they are unlikely to prevail in the administrative arena, they will
move the implementation game to another arena—the White House,
a congressional hearing, a political fundraising dinner, a think-tank
white paper, talk-radio programs, attack advertising, telephone
solicitation and “push polls,” or Internet blogs. Many of these new
venues were amply used in the battle that accompanied the
interchange-fee rulemaking. In addition, although lawyers for the
stakeholders employ the careful language of administrative law in
arenas in which that language is expected, spokespersons and allies
also employ the heated rhetoric of modern political discourse in
arenas in which that language is more likely to succeed. This Part
probes these, among other, contours of blood-sport rulemaking.
A. Thoroughgoing Participation
The stakeholders that employ blood-sport strategies continue to
play vigorously on the traditional fields of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. They submit extensive filings during the comment
period, testify at hearings, and participate in related exercises such as
173
Affected entities with the financial
negotiated rulemaking.
resources to do so submit lengthy briefs containing hundreds and
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Tara Siegel Bernard, Bank of America Drops Plan for Debit Card Fee, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2011, at A1.
173. See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1371 (“The rulemaking review game, for example,
produces incentives for stakeholders to fill the record with intricate details, raise every
conceivable argument, err on the side of including attachments that may not be terribly helpful,
engage in negotiations outside of formal notice-and-comment parameters, and raise every
litigation threat within their grasp.”).
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even thousands of pages of information, analysis, and argumentation
that can quickly lead to what Professor Wendy Wagner characterizes
174
as “information excess.” These submissions also constitute the
factual basis for subsequent judicial challenges to the substance of the
175
agency’s final rule. Empirical analyses of public comments in
informal rulemakings generally reach the unremarkable conclusion
that regulated industries typically dominate the public-comment
176
process. Moreover, regulatee participation has a discernible impact
on rulemaking outcomes. The result can be “information capture”—
the “excessive use of information and related information costs as a
means of gaining control over regulatory decisionmaking in informal
177
rulemakings.” A 2011 study of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) rules regulating hazardous air pollutants concluded
that substantive changes to the rules in response to public comments
favored industry over public-interest groups by a five-to-one
178
margin. Information capture is by no means a new phenomenon,
but the incentive to overwhelm an agency with information will
generally be higher in the context of high-impact rules that are likely
to give rise to blood-sport battles.
B. Vigorous Lobbying
Companies and trade associations with an interest in major
rulemakings sometimes hire in-house or outside lobbyists to assist
their efforts to affect rulemaking outcomes long before the
publication of notices of proposed rulemaking in the Federal

174. Id. at 1355; cf. id. at 1331 (noting that “parties have little reason to economize on the
information they submit to agencies” because they “are not held to any limits on the
information they file, nor must they assume any of the costs the agency incurs in processing
their voluminous filings”).
175. Cf. id. at 1381 (“Given the high level of deference that typically occurs during judicial
review, regulated parties will perceive major advantages to getting in at the ground floor, before
the proposed rule is published.”).
176. See, e.g., Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who
Participates? Whose Votes Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 252–53 (1998)
(finding that “business commenters” dominate the rulemaking process at the EPA and the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, submitting between 66.7 and 100 percent of
the comments); Wagner et al., supra note 5, at 128 (“[I]ndustry comments . . . comprised over
81% of the comments submitted on [hazardous air pollutants] rules during the notice-andcomment period . . . .”).
177. Wagner, supra note 5, at 1325.
178. See Wagner et al., supra note 5, at 131 n.2 (“Industry enjoyed more affirmative changes
relative to the public interest for 87% of the rules.”).
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Register. The lobbyists are generally familiar with the agency, often
because they are former employees, and they maintain close personal
contacts with agency personnel to gain information on the likely
180
content of proposed and final regulations. Knowing that their
rulemaking activities are being carefully watched by companies and
interest groups that have the power to influence the White House or
Congress, agency staffers may “attempt to placate these monitors by
formulating rules that are more palatable to them than the rules that
181
otherwise would be sent to the agency head.”
The agency’s technical staff and economists are usually heavily
dependent on others for the information needed to prepare agency
182
analyses and craft agency proposals. Consequently, those entities
with access to the needed information—often the regulated
companies—may “enjoy special advantages in the [rulemaking]
183
process.” Both before and after the formal comment period on a
rule, during which time the agencies often place the content of
communications with outsiders in the public record, “informationally
endowed stakeholders and agency staff can negotiate regulatory
policies in the shadows, where they are typically free of mandatory
184
docket and recordkeeping requirements.”
Shadow conversations are not limited to technical staff and
economists. High- and mid-level officials at most agencies are also
generally willing to meet with lobbyists from beneficiary groups and
affected industries both before and after the publication of the notice
of proposed rulemaking to receive information, hear legal and policy
185
arguments, and entertain suggestions for change. As the banking
179. See William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and
Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 66, 69–70 (2004) (describing prenotice participation in rulemaking and highlighting
concerns among agency officials about ex parte contacts); see also supra Part I.F.
180. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1079 (2001) (“[R]epresentatives of interest groups directly affected by
an agency program are likely to be repeat players who maintain stable channels of
communications with agency staff members.”).
181. Id. at 1079–80.
182. See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1380 (“In most complex rulemakings, the agency appears
to be quite dependant on knowledgeable stakeholders to educate it about critical issues
peculiarly within their grasp.”).
183. Id. at 1365.
184. Id. at 1366.
185. Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492–93 (1992)
(“No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking when she
is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested parties. . . . To secure the genuine
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agencies began to implement the requirements of the Dodd-Frank
Act, the president of the Financial Services Forum, an industry trade
association, stressed that it was “critical to have a seat at the table and
186
participate in a dialogue.” Representatives of financial-services
companies met with officials implementing the Dodd-Frank Act’s
controversial Volcker Rule on more than 350 occasions before the
187
agencies had even issued a notice of proposed rulemaking. Officials
at OIRA are likewise willing to meet with affected groups both
188
before and during the time that OIRA is reviewing a rule. A study
of 1,056 rules about which OIRA met with outside groups found that
43 percent of those meetings took place before the rule had been
189
released to the public. These sorts of meetings undoubtedly
influence the content of at least some of the rules that the agencies

reality, rather than a formal show, of public participation, a variety of techniques is available—
from informal meetings with trade associations and other constituency groups, to roundtables,
to floating ‘trial balloons’ in speeches or leaks to the trade press . . . .”); Seidenfeld, supra note
180, at 1078 (“One suspects that agency staff also maintains contacts with representatives from
affected interest groups . . . .”).
186. Schwartz, supra note 109 (quoting Rob Nichols) (internal quotation mark omitted); see
also Robert Kuttner, Too Big To Be Governed?, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2010, at 28, 28 (quoting
former FDIC chairman Sheila Bair, who observed that “[e]very lawyer in town [was] on the
payroll of one bank or another”).
187. Jean Eaglesham & Victoria McGrane, Behind Scenes, Battle for Face Time as
Regulators Craft Rule’s Wording, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2011, at C2. Executives from the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce met on an almost daily basis with officials in the banking agencies and
in the new CFPB during its formative stages. Eric Lichtblau & Robert Pear, Rule Makers
Emerge from the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A32. Goldman Sachs representatives
met with the staff of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission fifty-five times during the last
half of 2010 as the agency worked on the derivatives regulations that would be crucial to
Goldman’s bottom line. Jim Puzzanghera, Goldman Sachs Flexes Its Lobbying Muscle, L.A.
TIMES, July 5, 2011, at B1.
188. See RENA STEINZOR, MICHAEL PATOKA & JAMES GOODWIN, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE
REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE (2011) (discussing OIRA’s meetings
with outside parties while conducting formal and informal reviews of proposed agency rules);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF
AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 69 (2003) (“There
was evidence that outside parties had contacted OIRA before or during OIRA’s formal review
period regarding about half of the significantly changed rules . . . .”); see also Steven Croley,
White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821,
852–65 (2003) (providing an empirical analysis of OIRA’s meetings with outside parties during
the rulemaking process); OMB Meets with Environmental Groups, Industry To Discuss
Interstate Transport Rule, 42 ENV’T REP. 1374 (2011). Another example of the intense lobbying
of agencies and the White House is the “lobbying blitz” that for-profit colleges aimed at the
Department of Education in response to the Department’s efforts to promulgate regulations
protecting prospective students from false and misleading solicitations. Eric Lichtblau, With
Lobbying Blitz, Profit-Making Colleges Diluted New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at A1.
189. STEINZOR ET AL., supra note 188, at 10.
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ultimately propose, or the participants would not spend their time
190
and money setting them up.
In high-stakes rulemakings, lobbyists and the industries that
employ them can sometimes exert sufficient pressure on agencies,
either directly or indirectly through the intervention of important
members of Congress, to take the additional step of meeting with the
ultimate agency decisionmakers. For example, lobbyists for the
Luminant Corporation were sufficiently influential to secure a
meeting between company executives and EPA Administrator Lisa
Jackson to discuss easing Luminant’s transition into compliance with
the agency’s cross-state rule limiting the interstate transport of air
191
pollutants.
As a result of this meeting, the EPA increased
192
Luminant’s share of the initial allowances to emit two pollutants.
Influential lobbyists can also prevail upon political operatives in the
White House to persuade the head of OIRA or even the president to
intervene in the decisionmaking process. For example, President
Obama ordered EPA Administrator Jackson to withdraw a relatively
stringent potential standard for ground-level ozone after a lobbyist

190. See Croley, supra note 188, at 876–77 (“While the type of interest groups represented at
meetings do not predict a greater likelihood that a rule will be changed among the set of rules
that are the subject of meetings, clearly rules that are the subject of meetings are more likely to
be changed among the set of all rules under review. Thus, even if an OIRA meeting itself is not
the cause of a change in a rule, a meeting reflects some underlying dynamic that leads to a
change in a rule.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 180, at 1073 (concluding that industry has better
access to OIRA and the White House than public-interest groups do); Wagner, supra note 5, at
1366 (“Although proposed rules, on the surface, appear to be drafted by agency staff based on
internal technical analyses, most of them are likely the result of extensive negotiations with
interested parties that remain unrecorded and perhaps even unacknowledged.”).
191. Jessica Coomes, Jackson Among Top EPA Officials Working with Luminant on
Compliance with Air Rule, 42 ENV’T REP. 2119 (2011).
192. EPA, Activists Reject Luminant Blaming Transport Rule for Plant Closures, INSIDE
EPA, Sept. 16, 2011, available at Factiva, Doc. No. EPAW000020110915e79g0000a; see also Out
of Thin Air: EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci., Space
& Tech., 112th Cong. (2011) available at http://science.house.gov/hearing/full-committeehearing-epas-cross-state-air-pollution-rule (prepared statement of Regina McCarthy, Assistant
Administrator for Air and Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) (“Based on
technical information companies have recently provided, we are initiating a process to increase
the emissions ‘budget’ for Texas by tens of thousands of additional tons . . . .”); Jessica Coomes,
EPA Official Signals Agency’s Flexibility in Cross-State Air Rule Implementation, 42 ENV’T REP.
2118 (summarizing the EPA’s effort to increase Texas’s emissions budget); Coomes, supra note
191 (noting Administrator Jackson’s personal involvement in the compliance-assistance effort);
Elizabeth Souder & Randy Lee Loftis, EFH Shutdown Plan Draws Skepticism, DALL.
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 16, 2011, at A1 (describing Luminant’s complaints about the proposed
rule and the EPA’s efforts to assist the company with compliance, including giving away
emissions allowances).
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for the American Petroleum Institute showed the White House chief
of staff a map highlighting in red and blue the possible implications of
that ozone standard for the president’s ongoing reelection
193
campaign.
Additionally, companies and trade associations are well aware of
the tendency of agency staff to tailor rules to fit the preferences of
194
chairpersons of congressional committees.
Therefore, these
organizations also employ lobbyists to generate pressure on the
agency from key members of Congress through telephone calls and
letters demanding information and explanations during the pendency
195
of the rulemaking. Occasionally, the efforts of the lobbyists are
persuasive enough to generate a legislative response such as an
amendment to the relevant statute or a limitation rider attached to
must-pass legislation prohibiting the agency from spending any
196
money on the rulemaking initiative. When the industry elects to
pursue a legislative response, lobbying efforts can increase
dramatically, as demonstrated by the use of the Tester rider to delay
197
the implementation of the Fed’s interchange-fee rule.
C. Public-Relations Campaigns and Attack Advertising
A rulemaking initiative can be so important to affected interests
that those affected organizations are willing to spend considerable
193. John M. Broder, Re-election Strategy Is Tied to a Shift on Smog, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
2011, at A1. Industry groups also launched a public-relations offensive against the rule that
included letter-writing campaigns and advertisements in periodicals read by Washington, D.C.,
policymakers. Id.
194. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 180, at 1082 (“[T]raditional congressional oversight of
agency rulemaking may induce the agency to tailor the rule to the preferences of members of
the oversight committee, especially the chairpersons of such committees.”).
195. The American Bankers Association and the Independent Community Bankers
Association, both of which were very active in the interchange-fee rulemaking and related
congressional oversight, spent $2.2 million and $1 million respectively on lobbying during the
first quarter of 2011. Richard Newman, Wall St. Reform Battle Escalates, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark), June 26, 2011, at 1. Goldman Sachs alone spent $1.3 million lobbying during the first
four months of 2011. Puzzanghera, supra note 187. All told, the banks and their trade
associations spent more on lobbying the banking agencies and Congress during the first quarter
of 2011—$27 million—than they did during the same period in 2010 when the debate over the
Dodd-Frank Act was at its most intense—$26.3 million. McGrane, supra note 102; see also Ben
Protess, Wall Street Lobbyist Aims To ‘Reform the Reform,’ N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG
(July 14, 2011, 11:06 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/wall-street-lobbyists-try-toreform-the-reform (reporting that the banking industry spent an estimated $52 million on
lobbying during the first quarter of 2011).
196. See McGarity, supra note 25.
197. See supra Part I.I.
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sums on public-relations campaigns and advertising to influence the
198
rulemaking outcome. One goal of these campaigns is to sway agency
decisionmakers, who, like everyone else, watch television, read the
newspaper, and travel on the local trains and buses. Another goal of
these campaigns is to generate letters, emails, and phone calls from
ordinary citizens to the agency or Congress demanding that the
proposed rule be overturned or modified. Affected companies and
interest groups can enhance the public response by working with
grassroots organizations such as FreedomWorks, a prominent force
199
behind the Tea Party movement, to educate the public about the
200
proposed regulation and its possible economic consequences.
D. Coordination with Think Tanks, Media Pundits, and Bloggers
Any agency launching a rulemaking initiative of any
consequence can expect to be the object of sometimes thoughtful, but
more often scornful, criticism from think tanks, media pundits, and
bloggers. The American Enterprise Institute, the CEI, the American
Legislative Exchange Council, and the Mercatus Institute, for
201
example, are frequent critics of federal rulemaking activities.

198. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Erica Hepp, Note, Barking up the
Wrong Channel: An Analysis of Communication Law Problems Through the Lens of Media
Concentration Rules, 85 B.U. L. REV. 553, 569–71 (2005) (describing the advertising and publicrelations campaigns in response to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) consideration
of media-ownership rules in the mid-2000s).
199. See generally Press Release, FreedomWorks for Am., FreedomWorks Launches Super
PAC, “FreedomWorks for America” at Florida CPAC (Sept. 23, 2011), available at http://www.
freedomworksforamerica.org/press-releases/freedomworks-launches-super-pac-freedomworksfor-america-at-florida-cpac (announcing the formation of the FreedomWorks for America super
PAC and associating it with the Tea Party movement).
200. While the EPA was in the process of promulgating two high-stakes rules regulating
emissions from power plants, FreedomWorks criticized the EPA for going “behind Congress’s
back” to create “a series of unnecessary ‘train wreck’ environmental regulations” that would
impose “hundreds of billions of dollars of costs on the economy.” James Hammerton, The Train
Wreck at the Obama EPA, FREEDOMWORKS (July 21 2011), http://www.freedomworks.org/
blog/jhammerton/the-train-wreck-at-the-obama-epa.
201. See, e.g., DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, THE CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY 118–22 (2007)
(discussing the American Enterprise Institute); ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON 64–70 (1997)
(“[T]he Republican majority on the [House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment]
introduced their big guns in the case against ozone science—Fred Singer and several witnesses
from ideologically conservative think tanks, including the Competitive Enterprise
Institute . . . .”); DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT 181 (2008) (discussing the CEI
and its efforts to challenge various EPA publications); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN
WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION 49 (2004) (noting that the American Enterprise Institute is
“[t]he oldest conservative think tank in Washington”); DAVID M. RICCI, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 160–61 (1993) (describing the development of the
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Because they can satisfy journalists’ demands for sound bites and
titillating anecdotes within the timeframes demanded by media
deadlines, think tanks are an attractive source of information for
202
reporters. Talk-show host Rush Limbaugh is also a frequent critic of
203
federal rulemaking. When agency rulemaking initiatives attract
media attention, the regulatees can usually depend on Limbaugh to
come to their aid with ad hominem attacks on the agencies and
204
agency leaders. Limbaugh, for example, castigated the Durbin
Amendment as the Fed was attempting to promulgate the
205
implementing regulations. High-profile talk-show hosts have been
joined by dozens of bloggers and podcasters who oppose virtually any
206
form of government intervention into the marketplace.

American Enterprise Institute, including its 1971 emergence as a “Brookings-like think tank in
opposition to the Carter administration”); Robert L. Borosage, The Mighty Wurlitzer, AM.
PROSPECT, May 2002, at 13, 13 (discussing several think tanks, including the Heritage
Foundation); Bob Davis, In Washington, Tiny Think Tank Wields Big Stick on Regulation,
WALL ST. J., July 16, 2004, at A1 (discussing the Mercatus Institute’s criticism of government
regulation).
202. See DAVID BROCK, THE REPUBLICAN NOISE MACHINE 52 (2004) (“[R]eporters
quoted freely from conservative research . . . .”); WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE
PEOPLE 300 (1991) (“The sponsored research at Washington think tanks has become a principal
source for the ideas that reporters judge to be newsworthy and for the packaged opinions from
‘experts’ that reporters dutifully quote on every current subject.”); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL
PIERSON, OFF CENTER 179 (2005) (“Over the past two decades, conservatives have succeeded
in building a substantial media empire.”); WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN,
DISTORTING THE LAW 153 (2004) (“Most of the newspaper journalists . . . interviewed affirmed
that they had received abundant reading material from tort reform groups and often had
contacted such advocates for information or commentary on articles.”); TRUDY LIEBERMAN,
SLANTING THE STORY: THE FORCES THAT SHAPE THE NEWS 9 (2000) (“Conservative groups
have learned to boil down their messages to fit the new model of soundbite journalism, leaving
the details for the weighty studies and policy analyses disseminated in more elite venues.”);
Gregg Easterbrook, Ideas Move Nations, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1986, at 66, 69 (describing
conservative think tanks’ efforts to woo reporters and the reporters’ eventual dependence on
them).
203. See supra text accompanying note 128.
204. See, e.g., Quotes: The Big Voice on the Right, THE RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW
(Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2011/09/22/quotes_the_big_voice_on_the_
right (characterizing the federal government as a “marauding band” issuing a “never-ending list
of regulations” and calling Elizabeth Warren “a parasite who hates her host” and “[who] is
willing to destroy the host while she sucks the life out of it”).
205. See The Rush Limbaugh Show, supra note 128 (blaming the Durbin Amendment for
the increase in interchange fees).
206. See, e.g., COFFEE & MARKETS, http://coffeeandmarkets.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2012)
(archiving such podcasts).
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E. Intense Congressional Oversight
Congressional authorization and oversight committees have
always paid careful attention to the major rulemaking activities of the
207
agencies for which they are responsible. Congressional monitoring,
through oversight hearings and less formal communications between
congressional and agency staff, allows influential members of
Congress to convey their preferences to agencies regarding particular
208
rulemaking initiatives. As the political parties have become more
ideologically unified, however, congressional committees controlled
by one party have increasingly begun to push the boundaries of
civility in overseeing rulemaking that is conducted by an
209
administration controlled by the other party.
Congressional
oversight committees acknowledge few restrictions on their power to
force agencies to take actions that may or may not be consistent with
the statutes enacted by prior Congresses, even though, under the rule
of law, such restrictions exist to cabin agency discretion, a
phenomenon that Professors J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman refer
210
to as “disjointed majoritarianism.”
Much of what oversight committees do can fairly be
characterized as “message politics,” which Professor Neal Devins
defines as the use of “the legislative process to make symbolic

207. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 130–
35, 138–39 (2006) (finding that Congress often “attempt[s] to influence the execution of the law
by communicating directly with agency personnel”); McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 22, at
176 (remarking that the “widespread perception that Congress has neglected its oversight
responsibility is a widespread mistake”); Weingast & Moran, supra note 22, at 792
(“Congressional institutions . . . afford considerable influence [over agencies].”).
208. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 180, at 1077–78 (noting that “Congress asserts its influence
on agencies” through “active monitoring by congressional committees both on a formal and
informal level” and that, “[g]iven the threat of cuts in appropriations or statutory limitations on
agency authority, agencies have a strong incentive to conform their actions to be at least
acceptable to the committee chair and a majority of committee members”).
209. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2311 (2001)
(“[T]he possibility of significant legislative accomplishment . . . has grown dim in an era of
divided government with high polarization . . . .”); cf. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2344 (2006) (asserting that electoral
accountability is least effective “when party control of government is divided”); Levinson &
Pildes, supra, at 2363 (citing Kagan) (“Dean Kagan convincingly shows that, in an era of
cohesive and polarized parties, divided government tends to displace policymaking from the
legislative to the administrative process.”); McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 165
(remarking that “neglect of oversight has become a stylized fact: widely and dutifully reported,
it is often bemoaned, sometimes explained, but almost never seriously questioned”).
210. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition To Control Delegated
Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1500 (2003).
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211

statements to voters and other constituents.” During blood-sport
confrontations over agency rulemaking, the intended recipients of
these messages are the companies, trade associations, and interest
212
groups that battle over rulemaking initiatives in the agencies. But
the committees have the power to do much more than send messages.
Agency leaders know that congressional committees have the power
to amend agency statutes, cut agency budgets, and generally make life
miserable for executive-branch officials who must testify in legislative
213
and oversight hearings. One prominent industry lobbyist observed
in 2010 that “[i]f a regulator knows they’re going to get yelled at on
214
Capitol Hill, that influences their decisions.”
The 2010 elections ushered in a new focus on agency oversight.
Just as banking agencies were promulgating the initial Dodd-Frank
regulations, the midterm elections returned the House of
215
Representatives to Republican control and left the Democratic
216
Party with a razor-thin majority in the Senate. The fact that the Tea
Party movement, which emphasized limited government and
deregulation, played an important role in selecting the Republican
217
candidates during primary season —and arguably influenced the
outcome of many general elections—placed regulatory oversight even
211. Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of
Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 758 (2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Beermann, supra note 207, at 125 (noting that oversight hearings “provide an
opportunity for members of Congress to express their views, often consisting of displeasure with
the agency’s performance, to agency personnel and the voting public”).
212. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 180, at 1078 (“[C]ommittee members [may] wait[] until the
interest groups that are affected by proposed agency actions come to them to complain about
such actions. Such complaints act like a fire alarm, which, when rung, stimulates the committee
to begin hearings and investigations. One suspects that agency staff also maintains contacts with
representatives from affected interest groups and tries to keep such groups sufficiently placated
to dissuade them from sounding the alarm to the oversight committee.” (footnote omitted)).
213. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 121 (“Informal [congressional] oversight and
supervision often take place with a threat in the background that if an agency does not align its
actions with the desires of legislators, it will find itself subject to legislation including changes to
the substance of its program, changes to its structure, reductions or reallocations of its budget or
targeted appropriations riders.”).
214. Schwartz, supra note 109 (quoting an industry lobbyist) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
215. See House Big Board, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/house/bigboard (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (listing the House election results).
216. See Senate Big Board, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/senate/bigboard (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (listing the Senate election results).
217. Kate Zernike, Shaping Tea Party Passion into Campaign Force, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2010, at A1 (“FreedomWorks has made Tea Party conservatives the surprise community
organizing force of the 2010 midterm elections . . . .”).
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higher on the House leadership’s list of priorities. The new chairman
of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Darrell Issa, promised to subject the regulators in the Obama
218
administration to “seven hearings a week, times 40 weeks.” The
new chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services,
Spencer Bachus, explained that he believed that the purpose of the
219
federal banking agencies was “to serve the banks.” The new
chairman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit, Shelley Moore Capito, announced that one of her
top priorities would be to “reshape” several provisions of the Dodd220
Frank Act.
As discussed in Part I, the House committees that oversee
financial-services regulation actively interjected themselves into the
interchange-fee rulemaking while the comment periods for the rules
were open and the agency was actively considering incoming
221
comments.
The hearings gave the interests favored by the
committee leadership a second opportunity to influence the agency’s
deliberations. They also gave committee members—no doubt armed
with questions prepared by lobbyists—an opportunity to crossexamine agency decisionmakers on issues of law, policy, and fact that
the agency was in the process of resolving in the context of the
rulemaking. These interactions conveyed a none-too-subtle warning
that the agency would likely suffer adverse consequences if the final
rules were not friendlier to banking interests than the initial
proposals.

218. Editorial, The Corporate House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, at A26 (quoting Rep. Issa)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The committee held a number of hearings with provocative
titles. E.g., How a Broken Process Leads to Flawed Regulations: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Impediments to Job Creation:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2011).
219. Jay Fitzgerald, Barney Frank Lays into Successor, BOS. HERALD, Dec. 16, 2010, at 29
(quoting Rep. Bachus) (internal quotation mark omitted).
220. Stacy Kaper, New Subcommittee Chairs Target CFPB, GSE Reform, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 10, 2010, at 1 (quoting Rep. Capito).
221. See Robert Schmidt, Wall Street Banking on GOP To Push Its Legislative Goals, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 19, 2010, at A10 (stating that Wall Street will try to persuade members of
Congress to influence the new financial regulations); Jean Eaglesham, Deborah Solomon &
Victoria McGrane, Reprieve for Wall Street Is Expected To Be Limited, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704506404575592762664134550.html
(describing the committees’ plans for involvement in the rulemaking); see also supra notes 129–
42 and accompanying text.
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F. Lengthy Confirmation Battles
At the outset of any new administration, interest groups attempt
to persuade the White House to appoint to agency leadership
positions people who are likely to favor the groups’ interests in future
high-stakes rulemakings. Industry groups will oppose, and beneficiary
groups will support, nominees who are likely to be aggressive
222
regulators. Both will promise a difficult confirmation fight if the
223
president nominates a disfavored candidate. And if the president
nevertheless chooses such a candidate, the groups will press members
of the relevant Senate committee to ask hard questions during the
224
confirmation hearings and to vote against confirmation. Industry
champions in the Senate will often extract substantive concessions
from the administration by holding up nominations until some
225
deregulatory condition has been met. To the extent that they can
deliver the votes, senators representing the interests of beneficiary
groups will do the same.
In a highly partisan era, one in which the “Advice and Consent
226
of the Senate” really means the consent of a supermajority of sixty
227
senators, it is not especially difficult to hold up a presidential
222. For example, consumer groups strongly supported Elizabeth Warren, a strong
consumer advocate, to be the first head of the CFPB, but banking interests strongly opposed her
candidacy. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Warren’s Candidacy Raises a Partisan Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2010, at B1 (noting that “[b]ankers oppose[d] [Warren’s] nomination” because
she had “invented the idea” of the CFPB).
223. Cf. Beermann, supra note 207, at 110–11 (“[T]he Senate has a say in personnel and can
refuse to approve appointments if it expects that the nominee will not execute the law in the
manner favored by the Senate. This power is often used to ‘convince’ the President to nominate
an individual favored by an influential Senator . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
224. See id. at 123 n.286 (citing Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the
Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 50–55 (1995)) (listing confirmation hearings as one of
the “ways in which congressional committees insinuate themselves into the execution of the
law”).
225. For example, Senator David Vitter blocked a vote on President Obama’s candidate to
head the Department of Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service until the Department had granted
fifteen permits for deepwater drilling in the waters where the Deepwater Horizon disaster had
spewed oil into the Gulf of Mexico for three months in 2009. Binyamin Appelbaum, Nominees
at Standstill as G.O.P. Flexes Its Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2011, at A17. At that point,
Senator John Barrasso placed a hold on the nomination until the Department could conduct a
review of the protected status of wolves. Id.
226. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
227. Cf. JULIET EILPERIN, FIGHT CLUB POLITICS 36–40 (2006) (describing the growing
partisan divide and animosity in Washington). Historically, it took a two-thirds majority (sixtyseven votes) to break a filibuster by invoking cloture, but a post-Watergate rules change in 1975
changed the requisite number of votes to sixty. David Nather, A Liberal Dose of
Disappointment, 67 CQ WEEKLY 1947, 1951 (2009). As filibusters became easier to break,
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nominee indefinitely. For example, not long after President Obama
had nominated Professor Peter Diamond to a position on the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors, Senator Richard Shelby placed a hold
228
on the nomination. The fact that Professor Diamond received the
229
Nobel Prize in Economics while his nomination was on hold did not
improve his chances; the hold had nothing to do with his
qualifications. Senator Shelby was adamantly opposed to the
nomination, rather, because he had problems with Professor
230
Diamond’s “economic philosophy.”
Because Senator Shelby’s
ideological objection had the tacit support of at least thirty-nine other
Republican senators, the nomination languished for many months
until Professor Diamond ultimately withdrew from the process in
231
disgust.
Long, drawn-out confirmation battles can deprive agencies of
much-needed talent in leadership positions in the early stages of an
232
administration when aggressive action is most feasible. Extended
confirmation processes are therefore more strategically advantageous
to regulated entities that prefer agencies to engage in as little
regulation as possible. Beneficiary groups may also oppose
probusiness nominees, but they risk hamstringing the agency during
the confirmation process. At the extreme, industry groups can use the
confirmation process to stop an agency in its tracks. In one instance,
Senator Shelby and forty-four other Republican senators, with the
strong backing of the banking industry, refused to confirm any
nominee to head the new CFPB until the president had agreed to
replace the director of the agency with a five-member board
233
composed of both Republicans and Democrats. Because the CFPB
Senators were less reluctant to employ the strategy. Id. During the 111th Congress, the
Democratic leadership apparently assumed that Republican senators would vote in lock-step
against any cloture motion. Because the leaders were unwilling to hold up the legislative process
by forcing a real filibuster, sixty votes were needed to pass any significant legislation. See infra
notes 283–88 and accompanying text.
228. Appelbaum, supra note 225.
229. Id.
230. Id. (quoting Sen. Shelby).
231. Zachary A. Goldfarb & Neil Irwin, Leadership Gaps May Hit Financial Policymaking,
WASH. POST, June 7, 2011, at A15.
232. For example, Senate Republican who were critical of the new CFPB established by the
Dodd-Frank Act effectively prevented the agency from promulgating any rules under its new
authority by promising to filibuster any vote to confirm Richard Cordray to be the head of the
agency. Ben Weyl, GOP’s Procedural Blockade, 69 CQ WEEKLY 1846 (2011).
233. See Kate Davidson & Cheyenne Hopkins, GOP Move Likely To Force CFPB Recess
Appt, AM. BANKER, May 6, 2011, at 1 (noting Senator Shelby’s involvement in the blockage);
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could not promulgate any regulations until it had a full-time director,
it was effectively prevented from implementing the consumer234
protection provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. In essence, a single
senator was nearly able to repeal the new statute, and he successfully
235
put it on hold for a year and a half.
G. Invocation of the Congressional Review Act
236

The Congressional Review Act, enacted in 1996, provides a
237
vehicle for Congress to overturn recently promulgated rules. Under
that statute, a “major” rule cannot take effect until sixty days after the
238
agency has published it in the Federal Register. If Congress takes no
239
action during the review period, the rule goes into effect as written.
If, however, Congress passes a joint resolution disapproving of the
rule during the review period and the president signs the joint
resolution, or if the resolution is passed over a presidential veto, the
rule may not take effect, and the agency may not issue a rule in

Ylan Q. Mui, McConnell To Block ‘Any Nominee’ for Top CFPB Job, WASH. POST, June 10,
2011, at A12 (stating that the Republicans wanted the single director to be replaced by a fivemember commission); Deborah Solomon & Maya Jackson Randall, Bank Challenger Picked To
Run Consumer Agency, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405
2702303661904576451921505704258.html (describing the banking industry’s support for the
Republican blockage).
234. JAMES HAMILTON & JOHN M. PACHKOWSKI, WOLTERS KLUWER LAW & BUS., THE
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: GOVERNANCE, STRUCTURE AND FUNDING
ISSUES 3 (2011); Sewell Chan, Limits Emerge for a New Bureau Without a Director, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2010, at B4; see also Davidson & Hopkins, supra note 233 (“What they appear to be
doing is holding the nomination hostage in return for concessions that would cripple the
agency . . . .” (quoting Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of
America)); Brady Dennis, Chamber Seeking ‘Pause’ Before New Bureau Issues Rules, WASH.
POST, Mar. 2, 2011, at A12 (noting that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urged the Treasury to
prohibit the CFPB from promulgating regulations until it had a permanent director).
235. President Obama finally made a recess appointment of Richard Cordray to head the
CFPB. David Nakamura & Felicia Somnez, Obama Defies Senate, Puts Cordray in Consumer
Post, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1.
236. Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, subtit. E, 110 Stat. 868 (1996)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006)).
237. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 83–84 (describing the procedures available to the
Congress under the Congressional Review Act); Seidenfeld, supra note 180, at 1083–84 (noting
that “the Congressional Review Act . . . provides for fast-track review of agency rules” and
summarizing the statute’s procedures).
238. Congressional Review Act sec. 251, § 801(a)(3)(A), 110 Stat. at 869 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(A)).
239. Id. sec. 251, § 801(a)(5), 110 Stat. at 869 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(5)).

MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/12/2012 12:12 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT

1717

substantially the same form for ten years unless Congress enacts
240
legislation specifically authorizing such action.
The Congressional Review Act is by nature confined to highstakes rulemaking, and it has been invoked very rarely. Between
April 1996 and October 2007, federal agencies promulgated more
than 46,000 rules, only thirty-two of which were the subject of a joint
241
resolution under the statute. More recently, Senator Rand Paul
attempted to use the Congressional Review Act to overturn an EPA
242
rule regulating power-plant emissions. A similar attempt by Senator
Lisa Murkowski to overturn the EPA’s “endangerment” finding,
which had triggered the agency’s efforts to regulate greenhouse-gas
243
244
emissions under the Clean Air Act, also failed after a close vote.
The statute has been successfully invoked on exactly one occasion—
the joint resolution overturning the Occupational Safety and Health
245
Act’s ergonomics regulations, which were designed to protect
246
workers from repetitive-strain disorders.
Invocation of the
Congressional Review Act is an available strategy for regulated
entities during blood-sport rulemakings, but it has not proved
especially effective.

240. Id. sec. 251, § 802(c), 110 Stat. at 871 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 802(c)).
241. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34354, CONGRESSIONAL
INFLUENCES ON RULEMAKING THROUGH APPROPRIATIONS PROVISIONS 1 (2008).
242. Dean Scott, Senate May Target EPA Cross-State Rule with Goal of Forcing Obama To
Accept Delay, 42 ENV’T REP. 2231 (2011).
243. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
244. See Juliet Eilperin, Senators Try To Thwart EPA Emission Curbs, WASH. POST, Jan.
22, 2010, at A2 (describing Senator Murkowski’s proposal); GOP Rider Poses Key Test for
Senate Democrats on EPA’s GHG Powers, INSIDE EPA, Sept. 25, 2009, available at LexisNexis
(analyzing the potential political implications of the proposal); Carl Hulse, Senate Rejects
Republican Effort To Thwart Carbon Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at A22 (stating that
Senator Murkowski’s proposal was defeated in the Senate in a 53–47 vote); Siobhan Hughes &
Corey Boles, Senate Rejects Ban on Greenhouse-Gas Rules, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2010, 7:29 PM
EST),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704312104575298832211062408.html
(same); see also Margaret Kriz Hobson, Questioning Cap-and-Trade, NAT’L J., Oct. 17, 2009, at
64, 64 (noting that Senator Murkowski questioned whether cap-and-trade is the most effective
means of addressing the climate problem).
245. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006 & Supp. IV
2010).
246. Joint Resolution of Mar. 20, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7; COPELAND, supra
note 241, at 1; David S. Rubenstein, “Relative Checks”: Towards Optimal Control of
Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2210 & n.206 (2010).
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H. Rifle-Shot Amendments
A far more successful strategy is a “rifle-shot” amendment to a
particular provision of a regulatory agency’s statute that modifies or
247
terminates an ongoing rulemaking initiative. Rifle-shot amendments
can be offered as stand-alone bills or attached as riders to must-pass
legislation, such as appropriations bills or continuing resolutions to
248
keep the government running. If the goal is to postpone a
rulemaking initiative, a three-line rider attached to an appropriations
bill that provides that no monies may be expended on the rulemaking
249
initiative can easily accomplish that goal.
When included in
subsequent appropriations bills, appropriations riders effectively
250
terminate a rulemaking effort.
Rifle-shot amendments have become one of the most frequently
invoked strategies of blood-sport rulemaking. As discussed in Part I, a
bill introduced by Senator Tester would have delayed implementation
251
of the interchange-fee regulation for two years if it had passed.
Three separate stand-alone bills would have amended the Clean Air
Act to extend the statutory deadline for compliance with the EPA’s
252
power-plant rules. Several other stand-alone bills were introduced
in the first session of the 112th Congress to hamstring the CFPB and
253
stall the EPA’s efforts to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. When
the stand-alone bills failed to move in the Senate, supporters attached
247. See McGarity, supra note 25 (describing “deregulatory riders” created to disrupt a
particular ongoing regulatory program implemented pursuant to authorizing legislation).
248. See id. (describing how riders attached to must-pass legislation are used by House
leadership to avoid the veto process and skirt the relevant authorizing committee’s legislative
processes).
249. See COPELAND, supra note 241, at 1–2 (“Even though the [Congressional Review Act]
has not proven to be an effective way for Congress to reverse agency rulemaking, Congress does
influence regulatory activity in a variety of other ways [such as] provisions included in the text
of agencies’ appropriations bills.”); Beermann, supra note 207, at 85 (observing that
“[a]ppropriations riders typically single out a specific regulatory activity and prohibit the
expenditure of funds for carrying out that regulatory activity or plan”); McGarity, supra note 25
(noting the effectiveness of limitation riders “associated exclusively with appropriation bills,
and . . . prohibit[ing] the relevant agency from expending any of the appropriated funds to
engage in a proscribed activity”).
250. COPELAND, supra note 241, at 3.
251. Hopkins, supra note 145; see also supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
252. Jessica Coomes, Johanns Bill Would Delay Cross-State Rule, Allow States To Submit
Implementation Plans, 42 ENV’T REP. 2519 (2011); Ryan Tracy, New EPA Rules Split Power
Industry, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020353730
4577028393431399820.html.
253. McGarity, supra note 25 (describing stand-alone bills introduced by members of
Congress to weaken the CFPB).
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the same or very similar provisions to appropriations bills that
254
Congress had to pass to keep the government running.
III. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE BLOOD-SPORT MODEL FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The interchange-fee experience demonstrates that blood-sport
255
rulemakings are exceedingly contentious. The disputes range across
a number of institutional settings as the regulated industries and
beneficiary groups attempt to move the disputes to any forum that is
256
likely to work for them. The lesson of blood-sport rulemaking is not
254. See id. (describing the two-tiered approach to a deregulatory agenda pursued by House
leadership, first attempting to pass stand-alone deregulatory bills, and then incorporating these
bills into riders as necessary to overcome pushback from the Senate and the president); cf. H.R.
REP. NO. 112-151, at 7 (2011) (“In light of ongoing concerns expressed by a bipartisan cross
section of Members, the Committee has included as General Provisions a number of EPA
funding prohibitions including a one-year prohibition on the use of funds for the
implementation of greenhouse gas regulations . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 112-136, at 8 (2011) (“The
Committee includes language limiting the transfer from the Federal Reserve to the BCFP to
$200,000,000 for fiscal year 2012. In addition, language is included limiting the BCFP’s authority
to obligate funding to $200,000,000 for fiscal year 2012.”). Senator Tester attempted to attach a
slightly modified version of his bill as a rider to the proposed Economic Development and
Revitalization Act of 2011, S. 782, 112th Cong. (2011). See James Hamilton, Tester-Corker
Amendment to Dodd-Frank Interchange Fee Provisions Would Delay Implementation Pending
Fed Study, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD OF SEC. REGULATION (June 8, 2011, 09:54 AM) http://jim
hamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/tester-corker-amendment-in-dodd-frank.html
(describing
the Tester-Corker Amendment). The rider would have required the Fed to repropose the
regulation after completion of a six-month study. See id.
255. The participants in other major rulemaking efforts since the early 2000s have adopted
blood-sport strategies. The FCC’s media-consolidation rulemaking generated fierce publicrelations campaigns, congressional-oversight hearings, and attempts to overturn the rules with
rifle-shot legislation and riders. See Hepp, supra note 198, at 563–75 (describing the process).
256. For example, in an effort to block or amend the EPA’s Utility MACT rule, utility
industry groups and supporters from labor unions testified at the EPA’s hearings. Air Toxics
Rule Backed by Most Speakers at Atlanta Hearing, Faulted by Utility Officials, 42 ENV’T. REP.
1206 (2011); Sandy Bauers, Unusual Allies Speak Out at EPA Hearing on Proposed Mercury
Limit Rule, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 25, 2011, at B1. They also met with OIRA on four occasions
while the regulations were under review before that agency. OMB Meets with Environmental
Groups, Industry To Discuss Interstate Transport Rule, 42 ENV’T REP. 1374 (2011). At the same
time, they launched a major lobbying campaign directed at the EPA and the committees in
Congress that had the power to influence or reverse the EPA’s decision. Manuel Quinones,
Coal Industry Deploys Donations, Lobbying as Its Issues Gain Prominence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
13,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/10/13/13greenwire-coal-industry-deploysdonations-lobbying-as-it-45582.html. During the first nine months of 2011, coal-mining interests
donated more than $2.8 million to federal candidates, and the electric-utility industry
contributed more than $5.9 million. Id. The top recipients were Speaker of the House John
Boehner and Fred Upton, the chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Id. A
coalition of coal and utility companies spent around $35 million on television advertising
criticizing the Utility MACT rule and the cross-state rule. Anna Palmer & Dave Levinthal,
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lost on the high-level agency officials who might suffer budget
reductions or, worse, be required to defend the agency action—and
their own integrity—before a hostile subcommittee chairperson in a
congressional hearing. The easy way to avoid such an unwelcome
experience is to kill the regulation, delay it for further study and
thereby insulate the agency from attacks from beneficiary groups, or
soften its provisions to make them palatable to the industry if the
industry appears to have the upper hand.
I could, of course, be wrong to suggest that the battles over the
interchange and power-plant rules are different in kind from
conventional notice-and-comment rulemaking. Federal agencies have
overseen contentious rulemakings and have taken abuse from
257
congresspersons and pundits in the past. Except in relatively rare
cases such as that of the Federal Trade Commission’s notorious “kid
258
vid” rulemaking, however, attacks on agencies have tended to be
Energy Wars, POLITICO (Aug. 9, 2011, 2:29 PM EDT), http://www.politico.com/politico
influence/0811/politicoinfluence74.html; Daniel J. Weiss, Poor Little Big Coal Says EPA Smog
Standards Too Expensive, GRIST (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.grist.org/coal/2011-11-17-poorlittle-big-coal-says-epa-smog-standards-too-expensive.
257. A good example is the EPA’s highly contentious 1978 rulemaking to amend the New
Source Performance Standards in light of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
The Subcommittee on Fossil and Nuclear Energy Research, Development and Demonstration
of the House Committee on Science and Technology conducted oversight hearings on the
rulemaking before the agency had even published the notice of proposed rulemaking. Oversight:
Effect of the Clean Air Act Amendment on New Energy Technologies and Resources: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Fossil & Nuclear Energy Research, Dev. & Demonstration of the H.
Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 95th Cong. (1978). The electric-utility and coal industries lobbied the
EPA and Congress on the matter throughout the pendency of the rulemaking. William C.
Banks, EPA Bends to Industry Pressures on Coal NSPS—And Breaks, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 67, 85–
88 (1980); Dick Kirschten, The New Clean Air Regs—More at Stake Than Breathing, 10 NAT’L J.
1392 (1978); Charles Mohr, Billions at Stake as U.S. Weighs Clean-Air Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
2, 1978, at A1; see also Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal
and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1551 (1980) (describing how a “dirty coal-dirty air
alliance” formed to resist the EPA’s suggested amendment to the New Source Performance
Standards). EPA Administrator Douglas Costle adopted the industry-preferred sliding-scale
approach to the standard after he and high-level White House officials met with Senate
Majority Leader Robert Byrd to hear his complaints about the economic impact of a stringent
standard on Eastern coal-producing states. Banks, supra, at 86–87.
258. Children’s Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (proposed Apr. 27, 1978); see also Ass’n of
Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 460 F. Supp. 996, 999 (D.D.C. 1978) (enjoining, at the request of
concerned trade associations and companies, the chairman of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) from participating in the rulemaking), rev’d, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979); MICHAEL
PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE OF THE CONSUMER
MOVEMENT 71 (1982) (“Now it was the [Federal Trade] [C]ommission—not amoral business—
that allegedly threatened to undermine the moral fibre and authority of the family by seeking to
substitute government-imposed censorship for parental discipline.”); SUSAN J. TOLCHIN &

MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/12/2012 12:12 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT

1721

generic in nature and have not focused upon particular agency
rulemaking initiatives. There may also have been instances in which
the regulated industry has lobbied Congress to take away a previously
delegated power before the agency has promulgated a single rule. But
in my experience, agencies implementing protective statutes enacted
in the wake of crises have had a reasonable opportunity to make their
respective statutes work before their efforts come under attack for
259
being job-killing overregulation.
The national debate over the role of the government in
protecting citizens from the adverse effects of private-sector activities
is far more contentious today than it was during the 1960s and 1970s,
an era in which the legitimacy of government regulation was taken as
a given and interest-group representation became the dominant
260
model of administrative law. The future will likely bring many more
blood-sport battles, as the banking agencies and the CFPB
MARTIN TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH TO DEREGULATE 7 (1983) (“Critics
linked regulation with America’s declining productivity and industrial growth, and claimed that
regulation created an uncertainty that discouraged investors.”).
259. For example, despite an energy crisis in 1973–1974 that inspired several attempts to
amend the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)), Congress allowed the EPA and
the states to promulgate and implement the original National Ambient Air Quality Standards
before amending the statute in 1977 to address problems that had arisen during the
implementation process. See JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 205 (1976) (“By the middle of 1973 a consensus
was growing that certain amendments to the Clean Air Act would be required.”); id. at 170
(describing the 1974 industry advertising campaign challenging pollution-control requirements);
ROBERT L. SANSOM, THE NEW AMERICAN DREAM MACHINE: TOWARD A SIMPLER
LIFESTYLE IN AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGE 45–46 (1976) (stating that President Nixon and
“energy ‘czar’” John Love announced in 1973 that “environmental standards should be
relaxed”); JOHN C. WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE: ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES IN THE NIXON-FORD YEARS 106 (1976) (noting that the Nixon administration
drafted amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1974). See generally Comment, The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977: Expedient Revisions, Noteworthy New Provisions, 7 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,182 (1977) (describing the 1977 amendments).
260. Cf. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 451 (2010) (“One response to the transmission-belt
model’s collapse was the emergence of an ‘interest-group representation’ model rooted in public
choice theory. Rather than focus on Congress’s statutory instructions as a source of democratic
legitimacy, the interest-group representation model characterized the public’s direct
participation in notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings under the APA as a form of
popular representation.” (footnotes omitted)); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So
Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV.
459, 487–88 (2008) (“Since [the middle of the twentieth century] . . . polarization has been
increasing—and most dramatically so since the late 1970s. . . . [P]olitical polarization has figured
prominently both in presidential efforts to gain control of independent agencies and in efforts
by the opposition party in Congress to limit presidential control.”).
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promulgate regulations with a large economic impact on the powerful
banking industry. Should the EPA, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), the Federal Drug Administration
(FDA), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, or any of the other
federal regulatory agencies initiate high-stakes rulemakings in the
near future, blood-sport strategies will probably be in evidence. If
these strategies prove to be as successful as they apparently were in
261
the context of the interchange-fee rulemaking, then administrativelaw scholars need to think about the role of the law, lawyers, and the
courts in a world of no-holds-barred, blood-sport rulemaking. In this
Part, I offer some preliminary thoughts on the implications of bloodsport rulemaking for several important aspects of modern
administrative law, starting with its implications for the never-fullyresolved bedrock question of the legitimacy of administrative
rulemaking.
A. Administrative Law and Legitimacy
Countless trees have been sacrificed for debates among
administrative-law scholars over whether one or more of several
competing models of administrative rulemaking best legitimizes the
role that regulatory agencies play in the modern political economy.
The question of legitimacy largely has to do with “accountability and
262
democratic responsiveness.” But the question ultimately turns on
the extent to which regulatees, regulatory beneficiaries, and ordinary
citizens are willing to accept agency exercises of rulemaking power as
legitimate intrusions of governmental authority into private economic
arrangements.
At the outset of the New Deal, the dominant paradigm for
informal rulemaking was the transmission-belt model. Under this
263
model, the regulatory agency acted as a “transmission belt,”
dutifully applying the policy decisions made by Congress at the time it
enacted the agency’s statute to the relevant facts as divined by the
264
agency during its factfinding proceedings. Under this model, the

261. See supra Part I.
262. Nina A. Mendelson, Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (2011).
263. Criddle, supra note 260, at 450–51; Kagan, supra note 209, at 2253.
264. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1663–64 (1975) (describing the traditional model of administrative rulemaking,
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exercise of administrative rulemaking power was legitimate because
Congress, not the unelected administrators, was prescribing the
265
policies. This model was replaced by the expertise model that
evolved during the 1940s and 1950s, largely in response to the
266
development of the New Deal agencies. Agency implementation of
the Public Interest Era statutes inspired the interest-representation
model, which styled regulatory statutes as legislative articulations of
“compromises struck between competing interest groups” and
portrayed administrative rulemaking as a continuation of the
legislative process through which interest groups once again debated
and compromised over the policy questions that arose in the context
267
of particular rulemaking exercises. A more recent model stresses
268
presidential control as the source of legitimacy. That none of these
models has supplied a generally accepted theory of legitimacy should
not come as a surprise.
All of these models take the legitimacy of regulatory
intervention itself as a given, so long as the intervention is authorized
269
by the agency’s statute. But this Article concerns the possible
emergence of a new period, one in which the animating debate is not
over the legitimacy of administrative rulemaking but over the
legitimacy of any government intervention into private economic

wherein agencies must use “factfindings supported by substantial evidence and the reasoned
application of legislative directives to the facts found”).
265. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 470–71 (2003).
266. Id. at 471–72; Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An
Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1618–19 (1985); Kathyrn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for
Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 33–34 (2009).
267. Stewart, supra note 264, at 1712; see also Bressman, supra note 265, at 475–78
(discussing the emergence of the interest-group-representation model); Kagan, supra note 209,
at 2253 (same).
268. Cynthia R. Farina, The “Chief Executive” and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 180 (1997); Kagan, supra note 209, at 2250–51 (“[I]n comparison with
other forms of control, the new presidentialization of administration renders the bureaucratic
sphere more transparent and responsive to the public, while also better promoting important
kinds of regulatory competence and dynamism.”); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political”
Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1137–38 (2010). Another model
regards administrative agencies as “agents and trustees of the people” such that they have
fiduciary obligations to exercise broad grants of delegated power in the best interest of the
beneficiaries of the relevant regulatory program. Criddle, supra note 260, at 466–67 & n.138
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
269. Cf. Stewart, supra note 267, at 1676–77 (noting that agencies’ authorizing statutes often
leave agencies with considerable discretion to direct economic and social policy).
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270

The Tea Party’s extreme hostility to federal
arrangements.
regulation is only one manifestation of a populist/libertarian assault
on government that has spanned much of the period between 1976
271
and 2012. The battle over an otherwise-routine bill to raise the debt
ceiling during the summer of 2011 demonstrated that a sufficient
number of members of Congress with extreme anti-interventionist
272
views were in place to have a demonstrable impact on public policy.
In the dysfunctional Senate, where any legislation essentially requires
273
sixty votes to be enacted, a single libertarian senator halted
legislation to improve pipeline safety—offered in the wake of the
massive San Bruno, California, explosion on September 10, 2010—
that had the support of both the industry and consumer advocates
solely because he was opposed to government regulation on
274
philosophical grounds. If I am correct, then no simple change within
or among the various models is likely to render agency rulemaking
more legitimate in the minds of those who are convinced that the very
task of regulation is illegitimate.
When the legitimacy of government intervention is a seriously
debated question in the broader political economy, every significant
rulemaking exercise becomes a possible occasion for acrimonious
debate over the need for government regulation. Those who contest
the legitimacy of any intervention feel free to launch an all-out war
against an agency whenever the agency engages in a significant
rulemaking effort, without regard to the impact on the agency’s
275
ability to carry out its statutory mandate. The industries affected by

270. See generally William Greider, Rolling Back the 20th Century, NATION, May 12, 2003,
at 11 (discussing what Greider perceives to be the George W. Bush era’s “assault” on modern
liberalism through deregulation and the protection of private wealth).
271. See MCGARITY, supra note 2 (manuscript ch. 7).
272. See generally Fred Barbash & Richard E. Cohen, Summer of Strife, 69 CQ WEEKLY
1736, 1736–39 (2011); Elizabeth Drew, What Were They Thinking?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 18,
2011, at 13.
273. See Kagan, supra note 209, at 2311–12 (discussing the increased use of the filibuster as
evidence of the polarization of political parties in Congress).
274. Joan Lowy, No Regs Are Good Regs: Single Senator Blocks Pipeline Safety Bill on
Principle, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 27, 2011, available at Factiva, Doc. No.
APRS000020110927e79r001bx. After about a month, the senator grudgingly relented, and the
Senate passed the Pipeline Transportation Safety Improvement Act of 2011, S. 275, 112th Cong.
(2011). Jaxon Van Derbeken, Tea Party Senator Lifts His Hold on Safety Bill, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
18, 2001, at A1.
275. Senator Paul’s objection to the Pipeline Transportation Safety Improvement Act, see
supra note 274 and accompanying text, is a good example of this phenomenon. The attacks by
many members of Congress on the EPA’s 2009 finding that greenhouse gases endanger public
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proposed regulations have in the past attracted support from various
coalitions of companies, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, that
276
might be affected by similar regulations in the future. But now,
industries can draw into the fray a wide variety of other organizations,
such as think tanks, business-oriented grassroots groups, talk-show
hosts, and bloggers, that are persuaded that because government is
277
always the problem, it can never be the solution.
The experience with the interchange-fee rule suggests that
agencies may have more reason to fear congressional oversight than
in the past. First, during the 112th Congress, the House of
Representatives intervened earlier in the implementation process
than past Congresses by passing bills containing rifle-shot
amendments to agency statutes regarding matters that had only
reached the proposal stage or that were still percolating within the
agency. For example, in early March 2011, Representative Fred
Upton and Senator James Inhofe introduced identical bills to prohibit
the EPA from promulgating any regulation or taking any other action
to address climate change—or even from considering the emission of
278
a greenhouse gas when undertaking such action. Second, during two
decades of fiercely divided government, the majority party in one or
health and welfare provides another example. Among other things, Senator John Barrasso
placed a hold on the nomination of Regina McCarthy to be the EPA’s Assistant Administrator
for Air and Radiation, claiming that the “economic consequences of hi-jacking the Clean Air
Act [would] be devastating.” Press Release, Sen. John Barrasso, EPA Nominee on Hold,
Barrasso Fears Hijack (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://barrasso.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=f8ef2677-e376-4d55-ddc6-d1c95b
07e842 (quoting Sen. Barrasso). Senator James Inhofe excoriated the finding as “the beginning
of a regulatory barrage that will destroy jobs, raise energy prices for consumers, and undermine
America’s global competitiveness,” and he urged Congress to pass legislation immediately
overturning the finding without any acknowledgment of the impact of such an action on the
climate. Press Release, Sen. James Inhofe, Inhofe Says EPA Endangerment Finding Will
Destroy Jobs, Harm Consumers (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://inhofe.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=b4d0a2a5-802a-23ad43a2-5cb9149b73a7&Region_id=4ac9611a-f866-2d29-9bcc-49bf092f17c0&Issue_id=4afeb468d083-8a0b-ce78-0731b2c4df61 (quoting Sen. Inhofe) (internal quotation mark omitted).
276. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, has been “standing up for American
Enterprise” in Washington, D.C., since 1912. About the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.uschamber.com/about (last visited Apr. 11, 2012); 100th
Anniversary, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.uschamber.com/about/100thanniversary (last visited Apr. 11, 2012). Other coalitions include the Business Roundtable, the
National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Federation of Independent Business.
See MCGARITY, supra note 3.
277. See supra notes 201–06 and accompanying text.
278. Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011, H.R. 910, 112th Cong. (2011); Energy Tax
Prevention Act of 2011, S. 482, 112th Cong. (2011).
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both houses of Congress has been more aggressive in attaching riders
to appropriations and other must-pass legislation to change specific
279
agency policies. For example, the resolution to fund the government
for the remainder of 2011 contained a number of riders prohibiting
the EPA from expending any funds to pursue environmental
280
initiatives, including the regulation of mountaintop-removal mining.
Third, the interrogation of high-level agency officials in congressional
281
oversight hearings may be less civil than in the past. For example,
Republican members of the House Subcommittee on Energy and
Power spent more than two hours berating EPA Administrator
Jackson for finding that greenhouse-gas emissions endanger the
public health and the environment; they asserted that the science
underpinning her finding was a hoax and accused the Obama
administration of killing jobs in a quixotic quest to address a
282
nonproblem. Finally, members of the Republican Party in both
houses of Congress have grown far more likely to vote in lockstep
than in the past, when many members characterized themselves as
283
“moderate” Republicans. In particular, Republican senators are not
284
likely to defy a demand by the leadership to vote against cloture.
This lockstep voting pattern ensures that no legislation of any
significance can pass Congress without the approval of the
Republican leadership when the Republican Party holds more than
forty seats in the Senate—a number that becomes even smaller when
Independents or conservative Democrats are willing to support a
285
filibuster.

279. McGarity, supra note 25.
280. 157 CONG. REC. H1304 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011).
281. I do not want to press this point too strongly because congressional committee hearings
have also created spectacles in the past. For example, House committees were very hard on
high-level EPA officials during the Gorsuch scandals of 1983. See, e.g., EPA: Investigation of
Superfund and Agency Abuses (Part 2): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 130–48 (1983) (relaying
how then-Representative Al Gore grilled EPA officials on the agency’s failure to clean up
contaminated sites).
282. H.R. ___, The Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Energy & Power of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 30–72 (2011); John M.
Broder, House Republicans Take E.P.A. Chief to Task, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at A16;
Margaret Kriz Hobson, Political Tidal Wave Turns EPA Strategy, 69 CQ WEEKLY 335 (2011).
283. Kagan, supra note 209, at 2311–12.
284. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 210–11.
285. Only three of the thirty-eight Republican senators voted in favor of the Dodd-Frank
Act in July 2010. See 156 CONG. REC. S5932–33 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (recording the votes on
the conference report of the Dodd-Frank Act); H.R. 4173 (111th): Dodd-Frank Wall Street
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B. Implications for Agency Structure
Congress pays a great deal of attention to the structure of
regulatory agencies when it enacts statutes empowering agencies to
286
intervene in private economic arrangements. Congress places many
regulatory agencies in the executive branch, where agency leaders are
appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate
287
but are subject to removal at will by the president. Congress also
creates independent agencies that are shielded from the political
influence emanating from the White House and, to a lesser extent,
288
from Congress. Usually designed as multimember commissions
made up of appointees from both major political parties, independent
289
agencies are supposed to stand above the political fray. Yet
although independent agencies have never been entirely immune to
290
politics, it appears that they are even less so in the context of highimpact rulemaking, particularly when the participants employ blood291
The fact that the Fed, perhaps the most
sport strategies.

Reform . . . (On the Conference Report), GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/
111-2010/s208 (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (breaking down the results by political party).
286. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 108 (recounting the debate between labor and
business interests over how to structure agency enforcement of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1592 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–
678 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010))); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control
of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 431–32 (1989) (describing the “extensive debate” in Congress
over how to structure the EPA’s rulemaking process).
287. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS § 4.4.1, at 99–100 (5th ed. 2009).
288. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 19 (2010) (“The aim in creating an independent agency is to
immunize it, to some extent, from political pressure.”); see also Devins & Lewis, supra note 260,
at 459, 464–66 (discussing concerns about presidential control over agency policy). But see
O’Connell, supra note 6, at 484–85 (noting political constraints on agency rulemaking).
289. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 260, at 462–63 (describing how the bipartisan,
politically insulated nature of independent regulatory agencies is intended to facilitate
expertise-driven approaches to policy problems).
290. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 109 (“Theoretically, these agencies are supposed to
be insulated from politics, but the truth is that while the independent agencies may be insulated
from the President, they are often much more responsive to direct (albeit informal)
congressional supervision than agencies within the executive branch.”); Keith S. Brown &
Adam Candeub, Partisans & Partisan Commissions, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 789, 810 (2010)
(“The scholarly literature underappreciates that independent agencies need not necessarily be
independent. . . . Independence is a choice . . . .”); Calabresi, supra note 224, at 83–84 (“[T]here
are no ‘independent’ government actors in Washington, D.C.”).
291. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 260, at 461–62 (referencing federal agencies’ politicized
responses to Hurricane Katrina and the credit crisis of 2008).
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independent of all of the regulatory agencies, became the locus of a
blood-sport battle over interchange fees suggests that the structure of
regulatory agencies may have little impact on the inclination of
292
participants to engage in blood-sport battles. If Congress wants to
shield agency decisionmaking from the influence that blood-sport
tactics are capable of generating, it will probably have to look beyond
agency structure for solutions.
C. Implications for the Quality of Agency Leadership
The blood-sport model has powerful implications for the quality
of agency leadership. In a contentious political environment, it is very
difficult for a nominee to achieve Senate confirmation if he or she has
taken a strong position in the past on issues that he or she is likely to
293
face when in office. In the not-too-distant past, the opposition party
assumed that the president was entitled to choose his people to head
regulatory agencies without much second guessing from opposition294
party senators. That is no longer the assumption. A single senator
can place an indefinite hold on a nominee that will last until the
nominee’s proponents can put together the sixty votes necessary to
295
overturn what has become an automatic filibuster threat. Unless
one party attains a dependable sixty-senator majority, affected
interest groups, through their allies in Congress, can enjoy an
effective veto over any nomination to an important regulatory
agency.

292. Cf. id. at 465–66 (describing congressional concerns about the Fed’s independence).
293. Karen Sloan, Law Professors Find a Hard Road to Federal Appointments, NAT’L L.J.,
July 25, 2011, at 1.
294. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 136 (writing in 2006 that “[t]he Senate normally
recognizes the President’s prerogative to appoint high-level officials”). Professors Devins and
Lewis chronicle the increase in partisan opposition to a president’s appointees since the
beginning of the Reagan administration. Devins & Lewis, supra note 260, at 461.
295. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 110–11 (“[U]nder Senate rules and practices, a
committee can prevent a nomination from coming up for a vote, and less than a majority of the
full Senate can filibuster, which also prevents the full Senate from taking a vote.”); Devins &
Lewis, supra note 260, at 462 (noting that “the opposition party in the Senate will make use of
holds and other delaying strategies . . . to ensure the President appoints opposition-party
commissioners [to multimember commissions] who are acceptable to opposition-party
leaders”); David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for
Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 377, 378 (2004) (“[Congress has] diluted presidential appointment powers by
giving agency administrators fixed terms and writing into law specific qualifications for
appointees.”).
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In addition, nominees opposed by powerful interest groups can
be subjected to intensive questioning about every aspect of their lives
and about their positions on important issues of the day, regardless of
how irrelevant such matters may be to their qualifications to lead the
296
agency. Such nominees can also be harassed by committees other
297
than the ones with jurisdiction over the nomination. And nominees
can count on being subjected to withering attacks from surrogates in
298
think tanks, on talk radio, and in the blogosphere. Ad hominem
attacks on nominees do not cease after those nominees’
confirmations. They can continue throughout the nominees’ eventual
tenures at the agencies. Former Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) Commissioner Michael Powell, for example, was
subjected to “[s]evere personal attacks” during the FCC’s
299
consideration of its media-ownership rules. One commentator
suggested that “[i]f Saddam Hussein had stayed in business, Powell
300
might have made a great minister of information.” Given the abuse
that nominees typically take both during confirmation hearings and
after assuming office, it is a wonder that any highly credentialed
candidate with a job would agree to become a nominee.

296. Cf., e.g., Nomination of Harold Craig Becker: Hearing of the S. Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 111th Cong. 1, 3 (2010) (opening statement of Tom Harkin,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions) (noting that Becker, “a nominee for
the National Labor Relations Board,” answered more than 280 written questions from
committee members); id. at 4 (prepared statement of Michael B. Enzi, Member, S. Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions) (demanding to know whether Becker’s “financial interests
ha[d] changed” during the past seven months); id. at 16 (prepared statement of Orrin G. Hatch,
Member, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions) (questioning Becker about work that
he had performed in the past for ACORN, a community-organizing group); id. at 17
(complaining that Becker’s answers “to well over 200 written questions” that Hatch had
submitted to Becker the previous year had been “entirely unsatisfactory”).
297. See How Will the CFPB Function Under Richard Cordray?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on TARP, Financial Services, & Bailouts of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://oversight.house.gov/hearing/how-will-the-cfpbfunction-under-richard-cordray.
298. Personal attacks on agency heads are not a new phenomenon. FDA head David
Kessler, a vigorous regulator who was appointed by President George H.W. Bush and then
reappointed by President Clinton, was the target of fierce personal attacks by the drug industry
and its allies in Congress. Then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich called Kessler “a thug and a
bully.” John Schwartz, Conservative Foes of Government Regulation Focus on the FDA, WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 1995, at A7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
299. Hepp, supra note 198, at 572–73.
300. Id. at 573 (quoting Jeff Chester, Executive Director, Center for Digital Democracy)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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D. Implications for Agency Choice of Policymaking Vehicles
Most agencies can choose to make policy through notice-andcomment rulemaking; through case-by-case adjudication in
permitting, licensing, or enforcement actions; or through nonbinding
articulations of agency policy in policy statements, interpretational
301
rules, guidance documents, and the like. Over two decades, many
agencies have migrated toward less formal policymaking tools in
response to the congressional and presidential imposition of
additional analytical requirements for informal rulemaking and more
302
intense judicial review under the “hard-look” doctrine. When faced
with the daunting prospect of blood-sport battles, however, agencies
may be even more inclined to adopt less constrained policymaking
tools. To avoid a looming battle, most agencies have two alternatives:
303
negotiated rulemaking and various nonbinding options.
Negotiated rulemaking, a process that gained prominence in the
early 1980s, initially offered a promising decisionmaking method for
304
escaping rulemaking ossification. Under this approach, which has a
305
statutory basis, the agency convenes a group of representatives from
all of the affected interests and charges the committee with reaching a

301. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1383, 1386–90 (2004) (describing the “[m]enu” of agency choices).
302. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking Process—For Better or
Worse, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 469, 478 (2008); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and
Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 164–66 (2000); see also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal
Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 11–12 (1991)
(describing the increasing reliance on ad hoc adjudication, instead of publicly visible
decisionmaking procedures, in administrative rulemaking to deflect pressure from hostile
legislatures and constituencies). See generally McGarity, supra note 21 (identifying ossification,
its causes, and tools to avoid it); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995) (discussing jurisprudential shifts with the potential to
deossify agency rulemaking).
303. Rakoff, supra note 302, at 166–67.
304. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1261–62 (1997) (“Negotiated rulemaking was introduced more
prominently in the early 1980s as a way of curing a ‘malaise’ that some thought characterized
federal rulemaking practice at the time.” (quoting Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 113 (1982))); Daniel P. Selmi, The Promise and Limits of
Negotiated Rulemaking: Evaluating the Negotiation of a Regional Air Quality Rule, 35 ENVTL. L.
415, 417 (2005) (“For almost 25 years the possibility of utilizing negotiation as a means of
breaking deadlocks over administrative rulemaking has attracted the attention of academic
commentators.”).
305. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570a (2006) (codifying “a
framework for the conduct of negotiated rulemaking”).
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consensus on as many aspects of the rulemaking initiative as
306
possible. If the committee is successful, the agency publishes the
consensus rule as a proposal and accepts public comments in what is
307
hopefully a pro forma exercise. Although it is unnecessary for every
affected entity to agree with the consensus, negotiated rulemaking
fails if a party is sufficiently troubled by the consensus result to
308
challenge it in court or in another public arena. Whatever benefits
negotiated rulemaking may bestow on the agencies that use it to
facilitate routine rulemakings, it is not likely to be of any use in the
high-stakes rulemaking initiatives in which the stakeholders are
tempted to engage in blood-sport strategies. In a divided and highly
partisan atmosphere, an agency’s desire to secure a truce among the
warring factions in a high-stakes rulemaking is often wishful thinking.
Agencies usually have the option of avoiding notice-andcomment rulemaking altogether by issuing guidance documents,
policy statements, and interpretative rules that are not legally binding
but that nevertheless determine agency policy for purposes of issuing
309
permits or filing enforcement actions. These less formal actions
“can have substantial practical impact when issued by those in
310
power.” The advent of blood-sport strategies should give agencies
an even stronger incentive to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking
and to make policy through these less formal decisionmaking
vehicles. This strategy may ultimately fail, however, as stakeholders
with the resources to do so may follow the agency into these less
charted waters with additional blood-sport strategies, such as

306. Id. §§ 563–570a (establishing the rules for convening a rulemaking committee and the
duties of such a committee).
307. See Coglianese, supra note 304, at 1257 (“[When] the committee reaches consensus, the
agency typically adopts the consensus rule as its proposed rule and then proceeds according to
the notice-and-comment procedures specified in the APA.” (footnote omitted)).
308. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 33–66 (1997) (describing the negotiated-rulemaking process and providing illustrations
of the process in action); Harter, supra note 304, at 28–31 (identifying several advantages of
negotiated rulemaking, including the ability of parties to shape substantive rules); Rakoff, supra
note 302, at 166 (“The assumption . . . is that the negotiated rule will become the final rule and,
moreover, that it will not be challenged in court because it has already been vetted by the
interests involved.”).
309. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) § 4(b)(3)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006); see
also David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut,
120 YALE L.J. 276, 278 (2010) (“Nonlegislative rules . . . are not meant to have binding legal
effect, and are exempted from notice and comment by the APA as either ‘interpretative rules’
or ‘general statements of policy.’” (quoting APA § 4(b)(3)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A))).
310. Rakoff, supra note 302, at 167.
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persuading Congress to expand notice-and-comment and regulatoryanalysis requirements to policy statements and guidance documents
that have a significant impact on the economy.
E. Implications for Rulemaking Procedure
Administrative-law scholars understand that the rulemaking
process is a good deal more complicated in the real world than the
conventional model suggests. The advent of blood-sport rulemaking
represents what may be the culmination of a long-running tendency in
rulemaking away from the informal, but still confining, procedures of
the conventional model toward an unconstrained, influence-oriented
model that more closely resembles a political free-for-all. A single
private meeting with the head of an agency or the head of OIRA may
have a greater impact on the outcome of a rulemaking exercise than
ten thousand pages of technical data and analysis. A single hearing in
which members of Congress who are sympathetic to a regulated
industry cross-examine the agency decisionmaker may be worth more
than the most deftly crafted appellate brief. Public policymaking
through rulemaking has become a full-contact sport in which the
strategies highlighted in this Article and strategies that are still in the
process of evolving are more likely to yield results than even the most
thoughtful and thoroughly prepared public comments.
In the context of adjudication, the APA prohibits ex parte
311
overtures to the decisionmaker. Given that the content of such
communications is not part of the public record and is not reflected in
any written opinion, these communications are inconsistent with the
due-process norm that the decision should be based on the evidence
312
presented at trial. In addition, ex parte contacts raise the unseemly
possibility that the judge’s decision may be based on irrelevant
313
considerations or on “threats, bribes or flattery.” In the context of
legislation, however, things are very different. Attempts to influence
legislators are part of the everyday life of the highly paid lobbyists

311. See APA § 8(d), 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (banning ex parte communications in formal
adjudications); Edward Rubin, It’s Time To Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 119 (2003) (“The prohibition of ex parte contacts
emanates from the basic character of adjudication as an adversary proceeding with a decision
‘on the record’ by an impartial decision maker.”).
312. Rubin, supra note 311, at 119.
313. Id.
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314

In high-stakes
who inhabit K Street in Washington, D.C.
rulemaking, attempts to influence agency staff and high-level agency
officials either directly or through the intervention of the White
House or sympathetic congresspersons are common blood-sport
strategies. In these situations, agency officials, OIRA staff, and even
the White House chief of staff think nothing of meeting with lobbyists
315
who represent stakeholders with sufficient resources to pay them.
Although the contents of those conversations are rarely made public,
one suspects that they include threats, flattery, and even thinly veiled
bribes in the form of campaign contributions or a loss of
appropriations.
The law on the extent to which ex parte overtures are
316
permissible remains “somewhat murky.” The Supreme Court has
yet to decide a case on point, and the D.C. Circuit precedents are not
317
318
altogether consistent. In Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, the D.C.
Circuit held that an agency should place in the rulemaking record any
written ex parte contacts and written summaries of any ex parte oral
319
communications that have occurred during the comment period. In
320
Sierra Club v. Costle, however, the same court held that an “ex
parte blitz” of contacts from interested parties after the close of a
comment period, including numerous meetings with lobbyists for
interested parties and members of Congress, was not prohibited by
321
the APA. The court observed that “[w]here Congressmen keep
their comments focused on the substance of the proposed rule . . . ,
administrative agencies are expected to balance Congressional
322
pressure with the pressures emanating from all other sources.” The
court did, however, find that provisions in the Clean Air Act
prohibited the EPA from relying on any material not included in the
rulemaking record and required the EPA to place in the rulemaking
314. See generally JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: THE HARD TRUTH ABOUT
WASHINGTON CORRUPTION FROM AMERICA’S MOST NOTORIOUS LOBBYIST (2011) (detailing
Jack Abramoff’s experience as a lobbyist); JOHN HARWOOD & GERALD F. SEIB,
PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE: PROFILES IN BACKROOM POWER (2008) (exploring the modern
political process through profiles of effective dealmakers).
315. See supra notes 185–93.
316. Beermann, supra note 207, at 130.
317. Id. at 131.
318. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
319. Id. at 57.
320. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
321. Id. at 396.
322. Id. at 409–10.
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record any documents it had received and summaries of any oral
communications that had been of central relevance during the
323
rulemaking. The consensus appears to be that, because the APA
does not prohibit such contacts in informal rulemaking and does limit
them in formal rulemaking and adjudication, they are probably not
324
unlawful per se.
Yet, as Professor Rubin notes, “There is something vaguely
troubling . . . about the image of all those legally required written
comments flowing in, to be time-stamped and filed by the back-room
myrmidons, while interest group representatives whisper into the ears
325
of the agency’s top officials over steak and champagne dinners.”
Members of the public-health and environmental groups who had
spent more than a decade trying to persuade the EPA to lower the
primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard for ozone were no
doubt more than vaguely troubled to learn that President Obama had
ordered the administrator of the EPA to withdraw the agency’s final
ozone rule after the president met with industry lobbyists who had
focused his chief of staff’s attention on the political implications of
326
tightening the standard. But for the oil companies whose economic
interests were greatly advanced during that meeting, the overture
only confirmed the value of blood-sport strategies in rulemaking.
F. Implications for Transparency in Policymaking
By almost any measure, the conventional model of informal
327
rulemaking is quite transparent. Under the APA as interpreted by

323. Id. at 402.
324. See Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and Public
Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 932 (2009) (reading the case law as clarifying “that there is no
inherent legal bar” against “interactions with external entities following the issuance” of the
notice of proposed rulemaking); Rubin, supra note 311, at 119–20 (“[P]rovisions [that bar ex
parte communications relevant to the merits of the proceeding and require other ex parte
contacts to be placed on the public record] do not apply to informal rulemaking under [5
U.S.C.] § 553 . . . .”); Watts, supra note 266, at 48 (“The APA expressly regulates ex parte
contacts in the context of formal adjudications and formal rulemakings required to be
conducted on the record but not in the context of informal notice-and-comment rulemakings.
This suggests that Congress did not intend to prohibit or limit ex parte communications,
including those coming from political actors, in informal rulemakings.” (footnote omitted)).
325. Rubin, supra note 311, at 120.
326. See supra text accompanying note 193.
327. See Coglianese et al., supra note 324, at 930 (“Compared to many other countries, the
United States has long had a relatively open and transparent rulemaking process.”); Jacob E.
Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the
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the courts, agencies must identify the information that they have
relied on and the policy judgments that determine the outcome of
individual rulemakings in their notices of proposed and final
328
rulemaking. But OIRA review is not governed by the APA, and the
transparency of that review process has waxed and waned over the
329
years. Negative reactions by beneficiary groups to attempts by
regulated interests to influence rulemaking outcomes through
sympathetic officials in OIRA during the 1980s resulted in somewhat
more transparency with respect to communications between outsiders
and OIRA—as well as between OIRA and the agencies—while rules
330
are pending. Often this information winds up in the administrative
record, either because the agency places it there or because one of the
331
participants submits it.
The content of conversations between lobbyists and agency
officials during the preproposal stage of informal rulemaking,
however, need not be disclosed to the public; nor do communications
among lobbyists, officials in OIRA, and the immediate inner circle at
332
the White House have to be disclosed. OIRA review remains far
Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1161–62 (2009) (“Conceptually, we note that
administrative agencies in the United States are some of the most extensively monitored
government actors in the world. Almost all policy decisions an agency makes must be published
in the Federal Register for all to see.”).
328. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS §§ 7.2, 7.3.3, at 382–84, 390–92 (5th ed. 2009) (describing
the Court’s jurisprudence requiring agencies to provide substantial evidence from agency
rulemaking procedures in order to enable judicial review of agency decisions).
329. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1309–10 (2006) (“OIRA has a long and well-documented
history of secrecy. Although sustained criticism in the 1980s led to reforms that made the review
process more transparent, it remains remarkably difficult today for outsiders to get a strong
grasp of what OIRA review entails.” (footnote omitted)).
330. Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 533, 580–82 (1989) (describing the pressure to reform OIRA).
331. See id. at 582–86 (describing OIRA’s increased transparency following 1986 reforms);
Kagan, supra note 209, at 2287 (“[A]fter publication of the regulatory action (or a decision not
to go forward with it), OIRA was required to disclose all written communications between itself
and the agency.”); John Shattuck & Muriel Morisey Spence, The Dangers of Information
Control, TECH. REV., Apr. 1988, at 62, 72 (“[Congressional efforts to cut OIRA’s funding]
prompted OIRA director Wendy Gramm to set up a policy of disclosing OMB exchanges with
other agencies . . . .”).
332. See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1368 (“The agency must log its ex parte contacts in the
public record only after publishing the proposed rule and generally not before.”). In 1986, OMB
reached an agreement with members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in
which it agreed to send to agencies the written materials it had received from outside parties
and to advise the agency of all of its outside communications. Bruff, supra note 330, at 582–83. I
am aware of no judicial holding that these disclosures were required; and, more importantly, the
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from transparent because the rules of engagement with agencies are
333
often ignored in practice. A 2011 study concluded that OIRA had
334
routinely violated the governing executive order’s requirement that
335
OIRA disclose the content of its communications with agencies.
Still another round of conversations between industry and
interest-group representatives and government officials may take
336
place after the rule has been challenged in court, a virtual certainty
in high-stakes rulemaking. At that time, the parties will negotiate
about the content of the regulations as part of an overall effort to
337
settle the litigation amicably. These negotiations are not bound by
any rules or procedures, and the content of the discussions is not
338
generally available to the public.
Similarly, I am not aware of any disclosure requirements
regarding the content of conversations between lobbyists for affected
entities and members of Congress or their staffs, even when the
lobbyists are feeding questions to members of committees or drafting
rifle-shot legislation to overturn or delay ongoing rulemaking. Indeed,
the riders themselves are often far from transparent, and members
may vote favorably on legislation containing riders without even
339
knowing that the riders are in the bill. And I am unaware of any
requirement that the provenance of attack advertisements and other
sophisticated public-relations exercises be disclosed to the public.
Think tanks functioning as 501(c)(3) charities need not disclose the
identities of the individuals who have contributed to their coffers or

agreement did not oblige the agency to disclose the information it received from OMB to the
public. See id. at 583 (noting that OMB agreed to “make[] available in its public reading room
written materials and lists of meetings and communications involving persons outside the
federal government”).
333. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 329, at 1309–10 (describing OIRA’s stubborn lack of
transparency); Mendelson, supra note 262, at 1354 (noting the difficulty of determining the
influence of executive review on specific rules).
334. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 745 (2006), and 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 108 (Supp. IV 2010).
335. STEINZOR ET AL., supra note 188, at 7.
336. Wagner, supra note 5, at 1369.
337. See id. (“Litigation thus opens the doors to a second round of negotiations that, even
more than the pre-NPRM period, can involve secret deals over details, interpretations, and
related features of a rule with only a narrow slice of the affected interests.”).
338. Cf. id. at 1369–70 (explaining that the privileged status of this round of negotiations
contributes to an even greater degree of secrecy).
339. Beermann, supra note 207, at 88–89.
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340

the content of their interactions with their sponsors. And bloggers
who may receive substantial support from industries that have been
aided by those bloggers’ attacks on regulatory agencies do not have to
341
reveal such support in their blogs and podcasts. In short, the aspects
of informal rulemaking that fall within the conventional model are
modestly transparent, whereas the blood-sport strategies that often
characterize high-stakes rulemaking are generally shielded from
public disclosure.
G. Implications for the Quality of Agency Decisionmaking
One of the primary functions of regulatory agencies is to provide
the expertise needed to resolve complex questions that arise in the
342
course of implementing regulatory programs. An agency acquires
technical expertise by hiring scientists, engineers, economists, and
other professionals with the training and experience in the kinds of
343
issues that the agency must typically resolve. Blood-sport strategies,
by contrast, are designed to win policy battles, not to achieve
technically sound policy outcomes. Blood-sport contests are fought
over easily comprehensible concepts that can be reduced to sound
bites. For example, when the Luminant Corporation announced that
it would be closing two power plants and laying off five workers
because of the EPA’s cross-state rule, the debates focused on the
EPA’s willingness to adjust the emissions cap for the state of Texas,
not on the engineering logistics of complying with standards that
340. Note, The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor
Disclosure, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1502, 1515 (2002) (“Think tanks offer a way to affect the
political process while avoiding disclosure; indeed, such avoidance is often a primary motivation
for using section 501(c)(3) organizations rather than political committees.”).
341. The FTC published guidelines governing endorsements of products, companies,
services, or industries by bloggers. Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials
in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0–.5 (2011). The guidelines, however, do not apply to
endorsements or criticisms of regulations or legislation. See id. § 255.0 ex. 8.
342. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative
Law: Agency Power To Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 655 (1985) (“[I]n any
area of regulation, the federal government is likely to have some comparative advantage in
access to expertise vis a vis smaller states.”); Rubenstein, supra note 246, at 2184 (“[A]gencies
generally have more expertise with regulatory issues than do Congress, the President, or the
courts.”).
343. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 180 (2008) (“Federal regulatory agencies typically
employ their own experts to gather information and prepare analyses of proposed agency
actions. When specialized expertise is required, they can hire independent consultants. They can
also call on more formal sources of expertise by empaneling scientific advisory
committees . . . .”).
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similar power plants were meeting with relative ease. In addition to
breeding public distrust in agency decisionmaking, this tendency of
blood-sport strategies to allow political salience to trump expertise is
a recipe for bad decisions that may have adverse long-term
345
consequences.
H. Implications for the Rulemaking Record and Judicial Review
Judicial challenges to agency rules are routine in high-stakes
rulemaking, but the advent of blood-sport strategies may alter the
346
focus of judicial review of agency action. In the future, beneficiaries
of regulatory programs may attempt to persuade courts to set aside
regulations on the ground that the decisionmaker had been unduly
influenced by political pressure generated by the regulated industries
and channeled through sympathetic members of the relevant
oversight and appropriations committees.

344. Nancy J. Moore, Luminant To Close Texas Facilities, Sues EPA over Cross-State Air
Rule, 42 ENV’T REP. 2057 (2011) (relaying Luminant’s and Texas Governor Rick Perry’s
complaints that the regulation would lead to lost jobs); Elizabeth Souder, EFH Says It Will Keep
500 Jobs if EPA Backs Off Pollution Rule, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 14, 2011, at D1;
Souder & Loftis, supra note 192 (reporting a dispute between Luminant and the EPA over
Luminant’s ability to comply with regulations); Elizabeth Souder, Utility Blames EPA for Job
Cuts, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 2011, at A1 (same); Jim Marston, Playing Politics with
Power, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Sept. 15, 2011), http://blogs.edf.org/texascleanairmatters/2011/
9/15/playing-politics-with-power (quoting Robert Flexon, CEO of Dynergy, as seeking
enforcement of the cross-state rule to protect his company’s “investment-backed expectations”).
345. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 209, at 2363 (“We should expect that the same party
competition under divided government that gridlocks the legislative process and motivates
presidential administration will create an adversarial ‘oversight arms race’ between the
President and Congress over the bureaucracy. The administrative equivalent of legislative
impasse is a politicized, strategic bureaucracy, subject to fragmented and conflicting
accountability, sacrificing neutral competence and efficiency . . . .” (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 227, 235 (1998))).
346. The APA empowers a court to set aside an agency rule that reflects an impermissible
interpretation of the agency’s statute, that was arrived at through impermissible procedures, or
that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
Administrative Procedure Act § 10(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). The Fed’s interchangefee rule, the EPA’s greenhouse-gas rules, and the EPA’s cross-state rule have all been
challenged in the federal courts. See Robin Bravender, 16 ‘Endangerment’ Lawsuits Filed
Against EPA Before Deadline, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/
02/17/17greenwire-16-endangerment-lawsuits-filed-against-epa-bef-74640.html
(listing
the
lawsuits filed in response to EPA’s greenhouse-gas endangerment finding); Gabriel Nelson,
Lawsuits Pour in Before Deadline To Challenge EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, N. Y.
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/10/10/10greenwire-lawsuits-pour-inbefore-deadline-to-challenge-67959.html (noting that over thirty lawsuits were filed in response
to the cross-state rule); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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The Fifth Circuit, in Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, held that a
congressional committee’s intense questioning of the chairman of an
independent agency on a legal question central to the resolution of a
pending adjudication could be grounds for setting aside the agency
348
349
action. Then, in the Three Sisters Bridge case, Judge David
Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit suggested that a threat by a powerful
congressman to reduce an appropriation to the Department of
Transportation for a subway construction project could invalidate the
agency’s quasi-adjudicatory decision to build a bridge from the
350
Virginia suburbs to the District of Columbia. Applying the nascent
hard-look doctrine of judicial review, Judge Bazelon reasoned that
the agency’s statute specified the exclusive decisionmaking criteria
that the agency could consider, and a threat of lost congressional
351
appropriations for a subway did not fall within those criteria.
According to Judge Bazelon, allowing the agency’s decision to turn
on such congressional pressure would “effectively emasculate the
352
statutory scheme,” which was designed to preserve urban parkland.
Several years later, the D.C. Circuit limited the scope of the
Three Sisters Bridge dicta in Sierra Club v. Costle, a case involving the
EPA’s monumental struggle to promulgate a New Source
353
Performance Standard for coal-fired steam electric plants. In that
case, which involved informal rulemaking, the court addressed an
environmental group’s allegation that Senator Robert Byrd had
improperly influenced EPA Administrator Douglas Costle’s

347. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966).
348. Id. at 965.
349. D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe (Three Sisters Bridge), 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
350. Id. at 1246–47.
351. Id. at 1247–48.
352. Id. at 1248; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in
Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 496
(1990) (“The court found that Secretary Volpe’s decision was infected with impermissible bias
as a result of pressure from the legislative branch.”); Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of
Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review 20–21 (Nov. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961753 (“[T]he District Council’s response to the threat
regarding the withholding of subway funds constituted a consideration of a factor that was not
relevant to the approval of the bridge.”).
353. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 311–12 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“On this appeal we
consider challenges to the revised [standards] brought by environmental groups which contend
that the standards are too lax and by electric utilities which contend that the standards are too
rigorous. Together these petitioners present an array of statutory, substantive, and procedural
grounds for overturning the challenged standards.”).
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decisionmaking process by “strongly hinting” to Costle and White
House adviser Stuart Eizenstat that he would withdraw his much354
needed support for the pending Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
and the windfall-profits tax if the EPA’s standard were to constrict
355
national markets for West Virginia coal. Relying on the Three
Sisters Bridge case, the court stated that an informal rulemaking
would be overturned if two conditions were met: “First, the content
of the pressure upon the [agency] is designed to force [it] to decide
upon factors not made relevant by Congress in the applicable
statute. . . . Second, the [agency’s] determination must be affected by
356
those extraneous considerations.” In the case before it, the court
held that there was no “persuasive evidence” that either criterion had
357
been satisfied. The relevant question for blood-sport rulemaking is
whether the Three Sisters Bridge case retains any vitality or is merely
a quaint judicial relic that should be placed on a shelf next to Judge
Bazelon’s opinion in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S.
358
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
But the pressure emanating from congressional committees is
not always covert, such that “persuasive evidence” may be difficult to
gather. Sometimes it is exposed to full view, such as in the case of
Senator Estes Keefauver’s grilling of FTC Chairman John Howrey in
359
Pillsbury Co. v. FTC. The pressure may come from a member of
Congress bent on securing a particular regulatory outcome for a
constituent, but it is more likely to come from a member who has
voted against the law that the agency is tasked with implementing. Is
capitulation to a browbeating member of Congress—who strongly
354. Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto, U.S.U.S.S.R., June 18, 1979, S. Exec. Doc. Y, 96-1 (1979).
355. Costle, 657 F.2d at 409 n.539 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Margot Hornblower, EPA
Will Relax Pollution Rules for Coal Power, WASH. POST, May 5, 1979, at A1 (emphasis added)).
356. Id. at 409.
357. Id.
358. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633
(D.C. Cir. 1976), rev’d sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); see also id. at 646 (observing that to preserve the meaningful
dialogue envisioned by the APA’s rulemaking section, agencies must provide a “reasoned
response,” including “particulars in the record”). Professor Richard Pierce argues for the latter
view. See Pierce, supra note 352, at 496–98 (calling the Three Sisters Bridge decision “hard to
explain” and “a singularly arrogant decision”).
359. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 956 (5th Cir. 1966) (“The questions were so probing
that Mr. Howrey, the chairman of the Commission, announced to chairman Kefauver of the
subcommittee that he would have to disqualify himself from further participation in the
Pillsbury case.”).
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believes that the agency should not be doing what the statute instructs
the agency to do—a sufficient departure from reasoned
decisionmaking to warrant overturning an insufficiently stringent
agency rule? This question goes to the first of the two Sierra Club
inquiries—whether the content of the pressure was designed to use
360
statutorily irrelevant factors to affect the agency’s decision. Is a
member’s conviction that Congress erred in enacting the statute
under which the agency is acting a relevant factor? Is a direct or
indirect threat to the agency’s appropriation a statutorily irrelevant
factor? If Three Sisters Bridge has any vitality left, these are questions
that easily could come up during judicial review of agency decisions
361
allegedly influenced by improper congressional pressure.
There exists a lively debate among administrative-law scholars
over the extent to which reviewing courts should allow agencies to
rely on political considerations as part of their reasoned analysis in
support of rulemaking. Nearly all scholars acknowledge that political
considerations are relevant to, and sometimes dominate, regulatory
decisionmaking in high-stakes rulemakings. According to Professor
Nina Mendelson, agencies almost never relate the political
considerations that have influenced their decisions in informal
rulemaking, even though such considerations often play as strong a
role in determining the outcome as the factors identified in the
362
agency’s statute. Professor Kathryn Watts suggests that a primary
reason for this phenomenon is that agencies know that courts would
363
be highly unreceptive to such explanations. Consequently, agencies
either “fail[] to disclose or affirmatively hid[e] political factors that
364
enter[ed] into the mix.”
Professor Watts argues that courts should expand what they
count as “valid” considerations to include “certain political influences
from the President, other executive officials, and members of
Congress, so long as the political influences are openly and

360. See supra text accompanying note 356.
361. The conspicuous invocation of the Three Sisters Bridge case in Aera Energy LLC v.
Salazar, 642 F.3d 212 (D.C. Cir. 2011); id. at 220, suggests that the case has retained its
relevancy.
362. See Mendelson, supra note 268, at 1146–59 (“Despite [presidential] directives and the
executive order disclosure requirements . . . public information about the content of the
executive supervision of an agency decision itself . . . is surprisingly rare.”).
363. Watts, supra note 266, at 5–6.
364. Id. at 6.
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transparently disclosed in the agency’s rulemaking record.” She
reasons that if courts accept that agencies may properly be influenced
by political considerations in rulemaking, then courts should be
prepared to deal with an agency’s truthful acknowledgment of that
reliance and should allow the agency to cite such considerations in its
366
rulemaking rationales.
Among other things, this revision in
permissible considerations would reduce the pressure that agencies
feel to stretch scientific and technical rationales to explain decisions
reached on political grounds and would increase political
367
accountability.
Not all administrative-law scholars—and, one suspects, appellate
368
judges—are prepared to accept Professor Watts’s bold suggestion.
One serious problem with increased transparency and candor about
relying on externally generated political considerations is that such
considerations will rarely be among the criteria specified in an
agency’s statute or susceptible of derivation from less-than-precise
369
statutory language. I am not aware of any regulatory statute that
lists “politics” or “political considerations” among the factors that
agencies may consider in promulgating particular rules, and it is
unlikely that Congress would ever list “the President’s political
preferences” as a criterion. There is, however, authority for the
proposition that agencies may consider factors in rulemaking that are
not explicitly identified in the statute at issue if those factors are
370
consistent with the underlying policies of the statute.

365. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
366. Id. at 32–33.
367. Id. at 40–42.
368. See Seidenfeld, supra note 352, at 2–3 (rejecting Professor Watts’s suggestion).
Professor Mark Seidenfeld worries that allowing agencies to rely upon political considerations
runs the risk of encouraging them to “hide value judgments behind simple incantations that
their actions are justified by political influence.” Id. at 3, 22–24.
369. In its seminal opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), the Supreme Court concluded that
a reviewing court may set aside an agency action as arbitrary and capricious when “the agency
ha[d] relied on factors which Congress ha[d] not intended it to consider,” id. at 43; see also FCC
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1829 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
applicable law “does not permit [agencies] to make policy choices for purely political reasons
nor to rest them primarily upon unexplained policy preferences”).
370. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 453–55 (4th
ed. 2002) (noting that “[t]he D.C. Circuit had adopted the interpretation” that an agency is
prohibited from “considering a factor only if Congress prohibited an agency from considering
that factor”); Watts, supra note 266, at 47–48 (positing that “Congress’s silence leaves agencies
free to consider political factors and influences” when not explicitly prohibited).
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Professor Watts sees a way around this objection by
distinguishing between “valid” or “permissible” political
considerations, upon which agencies may properly rely, and “invalid”
or “impermissible” political considerations, which the agencies may
371
not cite in support of their decisions and, apparently, must ignore.
In the first category are “those influences that seek to further policy
considerations or public values,” whereas the second category
includes “those that seek to implement raw politics or partisan
politics unconnected in any way to the statutory scheme being
372
In the real world of high-stakes rulemaking,
implemented.”
however, it is highly unlikely that any agency would ever rely on “raw
politics or partisanship” to explain a regulatory decision, and not just
because such an explanation would invite judicial reversal. Pundits
and partisans from the other party would pillory the agency and the
president it served if the agency were to cite raw political advantage
as a reason for government intervention into the marketplace.
Instead, the agency would always frame the political contribution to
its decisionmaking process in terms that were compatible with public
373
values or the policies underlying the agency’s statute. From a
transparency perspective, it is hard to see how this arrangement
would be an improvement over the status quo.
An even more serious drawback to Professor Watts’s suggestion
is that it would leave the matter entirely within the agency’s
discretion. If political considerations do in fact play a prominent role
in determining the outcome of the rulemaking process—a definite
possibility when blood-sport strategies are employed—it is unclear
why it should be up to the agency to decide when to cite those
considerations and how to characterize them in its “reasoned
374
decisionmaking.” If one or more of the rulemaking participants
have evidence to suggest that political considerations, be they valid or
invalid, played a role in the agency’s decision, it is unclear why that
evidence should not be included in the record for the parties to cite in

371. Watts, supra note 266, at 8–9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
372. Id. at 9; see also id. at 53–57 (discussing “what sorts of political influences should be
viewed as legitimate”).
373. See Seidenfeld, supra note 352, at 27 (“[T]he administration would couch its decision as
being based on opposition to intrusive and needless government regulation, or some similar
political platitude.”); id. at 36 (“Any government action can be framed as serving some purpose
other than merely satisfying the preferences of those in political power.”).
374. Watts, supra note 266, passim.
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challenges to the rule under the arbitrary-and-capricious test. Nor is
it clear why reviewing courts should not require the agency to explain
how political considerations did or did not affect the rulemaking
outcome if a participant introduces evidence of political pressure into
376
the rulemaking record.
I.

Implications for the Stability of Regulatory Regimes

Stability is a virtue in any legal regime. It is, for example, the
primary virtue underlying the hallowed common-law doctrine of stare
377
decisis. Individuals and organizations that are subject to particular
rules or that benefit from particular rules need to know that those
rules are not likely to change dramatically over short periods of time
to be able to plan for the future. Companies that spend millions of
dollars complying with regulations need some assurance that those
regulations will not be changed in a way that gives an advantage to
competitors that have not bothered to comply. If every decision made
by an agency is instantly contestable and subject to renegotiation
after every national election, the necessary stability will be lacking.
The blood-sport model of rulemaking is generally inconsistent
with regulatory stability. Participants in blood-sport attacks on agency
rules sometimes challenge not merely a specific aspect of a particular
rulemaking, but also the legitimacy of the entire rulemaking
378
exercise. On some occasions, the interest groups engaged in blood375. For example, Professor Watts cites as an example of an invalid consideration that
should not be citable by an agency to support a decision “one congressman’s ‘hard-ball’ threats
made through the back door to an executive agency (e.g., a threat that if the agency proceeds
with a certain rule, the congressman will withhold all financial support for other unrelated
programs).” Watts, supra note 266, at 65. In my view, if evidence of such a threat is included in
the record, either by the agency or by some other person, the agency should be required to
explain the role that the threat played in a subsequent decision to withdraw the rule or soften its
requirements. If the agency may rely on valid political overtures in its reasoned decisionmaking,
it should also be obliged to include in its analysis an explanation as to how it excluded invalid
overtures.
376. Id. at 66.
377. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 723, 749 (1988) (“At its most general level, stare decisis operates to promote systemwide
stability and continuity by ensuring the survival of governmental norms that have achieved
unsurpassed importance in American society.”).
378. Several opponents of the EPA’s greenhouse-gas rules took the position that the entire
rulemaking exercise had been illegitimate, despite a Supreme Court holding in Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), that the EPA did have the authority to regulate greenhouse gases
under the Clean Air Act, see, e.g., H.R. ___, the Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011, supra note
280, at 76 (prepared statement of Greg Abbott, Att’y Gen., State of Texas) (advocating for
legislation that would overrule the EPA’s greenhouse-gas endangerment finding); GEORGE
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sport attacks opposed the statute at the time it was enacted and have
379
never reconciled themselves to the new statutory regime. One
suspects that these groups’ ultimate strategy is to undermine political
support for the statutory regime and overthrow it. To these
combatants, regulatory stability is not a significant concern.
J.

Implications for Influence Asymmetries

Administrative-law scholars have long observed that the broadly
participatory informal-rulemaking model has evolved into an
unwieldy amalgamation of submissions, analyses, and explanations
that favors those entities with the resources to generate the most
380
Professor
information and the most sophisticated arguments.
Wagner cautions that “[p]luralistic processes integral to
administrative governance threaten to break down and cease to
function when an entire, critical sector of affected interests drops out
381
due to the escalating costs of participation.”
High-stakes
rulemakings are precisely the sort of proceedings in which companies
and trade associations have a strong incentive to control the outcome
by flooding the agency with information and analysis.
The advent of e-rulemaking has greatly facilitated participation
by individual members of the public and representatives of
382
beneficiary groups in the conventional aspects of rulemaking. But it
has not necessarily increased their influence over rulemaking
ALLEN & MARLO LEWIS, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., OVERTURNING EPA’S
ENDANGERMENT FINDING IS A CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE 2–3 (2010), available at http://
cei.org/sites/default/files/Marlo%20Lewis%20-%20Overturning%20EPA's%20Endangerment
%20Finding%20-%20FINAL,%20May%2019,%202010,%20PDF.pdf (arguing that the EPA’s
tailoring rule constituted a “blatant breach of the separation of powers”).
379. The banking industry opposed the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act and the
interchange-fee rule that implemented that amendment. See supra notes 66, 84–86, 92–119 and
accompanying text. Similarly, large Wall Street banks opposed the Volcker Amendment to the
Dodd-Frank Act and later the regulations implementing that amendment. David D.
Kirkpatrick, Irked, Wall St. Hedges Its Bet on Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at A1
(noting the banking industry opposition to the Volcker Rule prior to its enactment); Aaron
Lucchetti & Liz Rappaport, Officials, Bankers Face Off on Reach of Volcker Rule, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 8, 2010, at C1 (“Dozens of career regulators at the Federal Reserve, the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Treasury Department are facing off against bankers, lawyers
and other officials at financial firms that want to soften the impact of the rule named after
former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker . . . .”).
380. See, e.g., Coglianese et al., supra note 324, at 932 (“Agency officials too often hear
mainly from politically popular or well-organized interests, which may make up only a subset of
the overall interests that will be affected by many regulatory decisions.”).
381. Wagner, supra note 5, at 1332.
382. Lubbers, supra note 302, at 479.
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outcomes. Professor Mendelson notes that comments from individual
members of the public tend “to relate to . . . questions of value or
policy” rather than to the economic and technical underpinnings of
383
the rulemaking exercise. Because agencies are putatively more
interested in sophisticated technical input—which is far more relevant
to judicial review than expressions of opinion—they tend to discount
384
comments from members of the public. Consequently, those who
have sufficient resources and access to prepare sophisticated
economic and technical analyses retain a considerable advantage in
385
conventional rulemaking. This advantage persists in the context of
high-stakes rulemaking despite the fact that policy considerations,
386
rather than technical judgments, often dominate. When regulatees
deluge the agency with thousands of pages of technical comments, the
flood can distract the agency from the less technical comments
387
submitted by other groups.
The influence asymmetry persists when the forum shifts to
OIRA. A 2011 analysis of meetings between OIRA officials and
members of the public from 2001 to 2011 found that 65 percent of the
rulemaking participants who had met with OIRA officials
represented regulated industries, whereas only about 13 percent of
the meetings had been with representatives of public-interest
388
groups. OIRA met with representatives of industry alone 73 percent
of the time, and it met with representatives of public-interest groups
389
alone only 7 percent of the time. OIRA changed 76 percent of the
rules submitted for review during the Obama administration and 64
390
percent during the George W. Bush administration. Rules that were
the subject of meetings with outsiders were changed 29 percent more
391
often than other rules. Thus, the survey suggests unsurprisingly that
information asymmetry benefits industry.

383. Mendelson, supra note 262, at 1346.
384. Id. at 1346, 1359.
385. See id. at 1357–58 (noting that “business groups dominate rulemaking participation
[because] . . . participation is not cost free” and because “regulated entities possess greater
control of certain types of information . . . that may be especially valuable to agencies”).
386. See id. at 1349–52 (“[A]gencies must decide values and policy questions left unresolved
by their authorizing statutes.”).
387. Id. at 1358.
388. STEINZOR ET AL., supra note 188, at 21.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 9.
391. Id.
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There are good reasons to believe that the disparity is even
worse when the forum shifts to Congress or the court of public
392
opinion. Rifle-shot legislation and appropriations riders are the
tools of special-interest lobbyists with access to key congressional
players; they are not the tools of the ordinary citizens who are the
393
intended beneficiaries of most regulatory programs. Public-interest
groups can be effective lobbyists for these beneficiaries, but these
groups lack sufficient resources to flood the agencies and halls of
Congress with well-connected staffers and former legislators to get
394
responses from people in power.
Beneficiary groups can also sponsor the occasional
advertisement in the Washington, D.C., area or on television and
radio networks in key congressional districts, but they cannot devote
the tens of millions of dollars that business groups such as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and the American
395
Petroleum Institute can spend on a single public-relations initiative.
Likewise, a few progressive think tanks, such as the Center for
American Progress, the Center for Progressive Reform, and the
Economic Policy Institute, can produce white papers and blogs on
396
high-stakes rulemakings. But even they cannot match the output of
392. Mendelson, supra note 262, at 1370 (“[C]ompared with well-organized groups,
individuals who submit comments may have less ability to invoke forms of political discipline
(whether it is congressional or presidential oversight) and fewer resources with which to
challenge an agency action in court.”).
393. Cf. Beermann, supra note 207, at 88 (“[One] criticism of the use of riders is that they
often fly below the political radar, placed in the bill by a few connected members of
Congress.”).
394. As described in Part I.F, the Independent Community Bankers of America alone spent
around $1.2 million lobbying banking regulators and Congress during the first quarter of 2011.
See supra text accompanying note 101. The Public Interest Research Group, a lobbyist for
consumer interests in the interchange-fee proceedings, expended a total of $48,336 on all its
issues for the entire year. U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GRP., LOBBYING REPORT 1 (2011),
available at http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=41D32B7996D7-4927-836C-2C0B49C28A2D.
395. For example, the Global Climate Coalition—which was composed of most of the major
oil companies, the American Forest and Paper Association, the American Petroleum Institute,
the major automobile manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and managed by a
major Washington, D.C., public-relations firm—spent more than $63 million between 1994 and
2001 on advertising and a “grassroots” letter-writing and telemarketing campaign against efforts
in Congress and the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases. SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER,
TRUST US, WE’RE EXPERTS! 270–71 (2002). The entire budget for the Public Interest Research
Group in 2009 was $1,363,768. U.S. PUB INTEREST RESEARCH GRP., IRS FORM 990: RETURN
OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX pt. 3, § 4a, at 2 (2010).
396. See, e.g., John Irons & Isaac Shapiro, Regulation, Employment, and the Economy,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.epi.org/publication/regulation_employment_
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the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, or the
Mercatus Center, all of which devote considerable attention to
397
Because blood-sport strategies are largely
regulatory issues.
employed by regulated interests with money to spend and not by
beneficiaries or beneficiary groups, they give those regulated interests
398
an inherent advantage in high-stakes rulemaking exercises.
K. Implications for Administrative Lawyers
For administrative lawyers, perhaps the most difficult question
raised by the ascent of blood-sport strategies in high-stakes
rulemaking concerns the extent to which lawyers should engage in
blood-sport battle. In administrative adjudications, the lawyer’s role is
virtually identical to that of the attorney in civil litigation. In the
context of rulemaking, however, attorneys for both the agency and
the stakeholders serve their clients best when they provide legal
arguments for interpreting the relevant statute consistently with their
clients’ positions, present technical and economic studies in the light
most favorable to their positions, and marshal policy arguments to
support their preferred outcomes. Although the latter two functions
are not foreign to civil litigation, they are far more common in
informal rulemaking.
The American Bar Association’s (ABA’s) Model Rules of
399
Professional Conduct provide that lawyers representing clients in
nonadjudicative proceedings must conform to most of the rules
governing candor toward the tribunal, fairness to opposing parties,
impartiality, and decorum that apply to attorneys representing clients
400
before courts. Thus, the ethical obligation of an attorney not to
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation is fully applicable to attorneys engaged in

and_the_economy_fears_of_job_loss_are_overblown; Alice Kaswan, Greenhouse Gas Standards
for New Power Plants: Glass Half-Full and Half-Empty, CPRBLOG (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.
progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=5AB070F0-CCCE-C1CD-B9F7C9D9AB10A2F9;
Daniel J. Weiss & Zachary Rybarczyk, Don’t Believe the Hype: Opponents of Mercury Rules
Puff Up Costs While Ignoring Benefits, THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 9, 2012, 10:04 AM), http://think
progress.org/romm/2012/02/09/421812/dont-believe-the-hype-opponents-of-mercury-rules-puffup-costs-while-ignoring-benefits.
397. Cf. supra note 201 and accompanying text.
398. See CROLEY, supra note 3, at 29–52 (discussing various theories that explain the
collective-action problem in agency decisionmaking).
399. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2010).
400. Id. R. 3.9.

MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/12/2012 12:12 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT

1749
401

rulemaking activities and is not limited to factual statements.
Attorneys would presumably run afoul of their ethical obligations if
they consciously falsified data in a submission or manipulated an
402
economic or technical analysis in a way that rendered it misleading.
High-stakes rulemaking might generate pressure from clients to
violate these ethical obligations, but conscious falsification of data or
manipulation of analyses are hopefully not characteristics of bloodsport rulemaking.
The role of the lawyer as a lobbyist in high-stakes rulemaking is
also nothing new. Full-service law firms are prepared to present
information and arguments to agencies outside of the procedural
confines of informal rulemaking and to lobby members of Congress
for legislation that they have drafted that would change relevant
403
statutes. When they engage in lobbying activities, lawyers are bound
404
by similar rules of professional conduct. Rule 5.7 of the ABA Model
405
Rules provides that a lawyer who provides “law-related services,” a
406
term that includes lobbying, is subject to all of the rules applicable
to nonadjudicative proceedings if those services are provided “by the
lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer’s
407
provision of legal services to clients.” Representing a client in an
administrative rulemaking by lobbying agency officials before, after,

401. Cf. id. R. 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation . . . .”).
402. Falsifying data would also presumably violate Model Rule 3.3(a)(1), which provides
that a lawyer shall not knowingly “make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.”
Id. R. 3.3(a)(1).
403. Cf. Michelle Gilbert, Some Law Firms Hire Non-Lawyers as Their Lobbying Arm on
Capitol Hill, 15 NAT’L J. 1899 (1983) (describing law firms that specialize in lobbying); Burt
Solomon, Clout Merchants, 19 NAT’L J. 662 (1987) (describing “mega-firms” that “offer onestop, all-purpose cures for what ails their clients”); Matthew C. Stephenson & Howell E.
Jackson, Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 5–6 (2010) (describing “‘contract lobbyists’—typically public relations
firms or law firms”).
404. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.9 (“A lawyer representing a client before
a legislative body or administrative agency in a nonadjudicative proceeding . . . shall conform to
the provisions [governing candor to the tribunal, fairness, impartiality, and decorum].”).
Comment 3 clarifies that “[t]his Rule only applies when a lawyer represents a client in
connection with an official hearing or meeting of a governmental agency or a legislative body to
which the lawyer or the lawyer’s client is presenting evidence or argument.” Id. R. 3.9 cmt. 3. To
the extent that a lawyer’s lobbying efforts are carried out in connection with such an official
hearing or meeting, the provisions of Rule 3.9 apply.
405. Id. R. 5.7(a).
406. Id. R. 5.7 cmt. 9.
407. Id. R. 5.7(a)(1).
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or during the formal comment period is probably indistinguishable
from providing other legal services to those clients. Whether lobbying
for a client to change an agency’s statute is similarly a “law-related
408
service[]” is perhaps a closer question, but it is probably also
indistinguishable from the provision of other legal services.
The role of the lawyer in more far-ranging blood-sport strategies,
such as public-relations campaigns aimed at swaying public opinion
and feeding information to talk-show pundits and bloggers, has been
409
the subject of little attention in the legal literature. One question
worth raising at the outset is whether such activities are “law-related
services” within Rule 5.7, which defines that term to mean “services
that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in
substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are
not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a
410
nonlawyer.”
Although lawyers have not traditionally been
associated with the preparation of advertisements, press releases,
blogs, and the like on issues of relevance to ongoing rulemakings,
their involvement is apparently becoming more common in blood411
sport rulemakings. The prescriptions and proscriptions of the Model
Rules are therefore arguably applicable to these functions when
lawyers perform them for clients. In any event, the proscription in
Rule 4.1 against a lawyer’s knowingly making a false statement of
material fact to a third person is presumably applicable to statements
made in support of a client’s position in advertisements; in press
412
releases; and in overtures to think tanks, pundits, and bloggers.
Professor Michele Beardslee has written an important two-part
413
article on the ethical obligations of corporate counsel with respect
to public-relations campaigns undertaken by their companies on legal

408. See supra note 405 and accompanying text.
409. See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion (pt. 2), 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119, 1123 (2010) (noting the lack of scholarship in this area).
410. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7(b) (internal quotation marks omitted).
411. See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion (pt. 1), 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1279 (2009) (“A major sentiment [in the literature] is that lawyers
are behind the eight ball when it comes to legal [public relations]. . . . However, more recently,
there is . . . literature contending that lawyers are increasingly developing sophisticated,
integrated legal [public-relations] strategies.” (footnote omitted)).
412. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (prohibiting lawyers from making
“false statement[s] of material fact” “[i]n the course of representing a client”).
413. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion (pts. 1 & 2), 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259 (2009), 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119 (2010).
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414

matters that are tried in the “court of public opinion.” Although
both parts of the article are mostly limited to corporate publicrelations campaigns in the context of ongoing civil or criminal
litigation, some of the analysis is clearly relevant to public-relations
campaigns undertaken in association with high-stakes rulemaking
415
activities.
The corporate counsel whom Professor Beardslee
interviewed demonstrated a clear concern for “the way that a legal
issue is spun in the media,” and they indicated that “corporate
lawyers are avidly advocating in the court of public opinion, but doing
416
so ‘behind the scenes.’”
Professor Beardslee’s analysis of the applicable rules of
professional responsibility suggests that “current ethics rules are not
relevant for corporate practice as it relates to public relations,”
because they “do not provide adequate guidance to lawyers on how
far they may or should go towards using the media in favor of their
corporate client when they are not acting as spokespersons but
417
instead are managing legal PR behind the scenes.” According to
Professor Beardslee’s assessment, the existing rules “do not actively
encourage lawyers to behave socially responsibly or to convince
418
clients to behave socially responsibly in the court of public opinion.”
Indeed, the existing rules, which are “grounded in the adversary
ethic[,] risk a race to the bottom—where corporate lawyers act like
‘hired guns,’ valued (professionally and economically) for
manipulating legal PR over providing effective legal advice that
incorporates PR concerns and the corporation’s and public’s long419
term interests.” The absence of clear guidance is even more
apparent in the context of public-relations activities undertaken in
support of a company’s position in an agency rulemaking proceeding
or during congressional consideration of legislation that would affect
420
the outcome of a particular rulemaking proceeding. Administrative
414. Beardslee, supra note 411, at 1259; Beardslee, supra note 409, at 1121–22.
415. Beardslee, supra note 409, at 1123–24 (“The first installment of this Article investigates
the emerging trend of general counsels acting as legal public relations managers for legal issues
facing large, publicly traded corporations . . . . [T]his installment . . . turns to the existing ethical
obligations that regulate attorneys’ management of legal [public relations].”).
416. Id. at 1124.
417. Id. at 1124–25; see also id. at 1145 (“For statements that misrepresent or stretch the
truth, the current interpretations of the Model Rules do little to constrain the behavior with
which this Article is concerned.”).
418. Id. at 1124–25.
419. Id. at 1125.
420. Cf. supra notes 402–12 and accompanying text.
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lawyers need better ethical guidance tailored to the rulemaking
environment.
IV. SOME POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO BLOOD-SPORT STRATEGIES
421

The APA was enacted in 1946 after “a long period of study and
422
strife” in which the business community resisted the regulatory
controls that had been imposed in response to strong public demand
for a greater government role in protecting citizens in the wake of the
423
Great Depression. The APA represented an effort by the business
community and its lawyers to square the exercise of bureaucratic
424
power with existing legal norms. As the nation struggles with the
economic dislocation brought on by the Great Recession and the
financial meltdown of 2008, the government may be in the midst of a
similar period of study and strife. It might therefore be an appropriate
time to think about amending the rulemaking provisions of the APA
to include procedural constraints on the tactics that may be employed
to influence agency decisionmakers, or at least to think about
imposing disclosure requirements aimed at exposing blood-sport
strategies to the public. If the impetus for procedural change that
ultimately insulated agencies from political influences in the early
1940s came from the regulated industries, the advocates of change
this time will be the representatives of beneficiaries who are greatly
disadvantaged by the shift to blood-sport rulemaking.
Administrative-law scholars should be thinking about several
questions: (1) whether this new blood-sport approach to regulatory
implementation is consistent with the due-process and participatory
norms that underlie modern conceptions of administrative law;
(2) whether blood-sport rulemaking is a desirable development; and
(3) if the answer to either of the previous questions is “no,” whether

421. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006)).
422. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951, ch. 1052, 64 Stat. 1044 (1950), as recognized in
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991).
423. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromises: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1561–62 (1996) (describing the pre-APA
backlash from the business community against the “avalanche of new federal agencies and
commissions” created under the New Deal).
424. Id. at 1569–72 (describing the ABA’s efforts on behalf of the APA as being driven both
by “the elite bar’s fears for its major [industry] clients” and lawyers’ desire to protect the legal
status quo).
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blood-sport strategies can be cabined by law so as to make highstakes rulemaking more consistent with legal and democratic norms,
425
given First Amendment constraints on the power of the federal
government to limit the rights of citizens—human and, more recently,
426
427
corporate —to petition the government.
Working from an
assumption that many scholars would answer one of the first two
questions in the negative, this Part suggests some potential responses
to the third question.
A. Legislative Responses
1. Structural Shields. Independent agencies were created to
428
shield administrative decisionmaking from political influences. The
Fed’s experience with the interchange-fee rulemaking, however,
suggests that independence alone will not necessarily protect such
429
agencies from blood-sport strategies.
Nevertheless, political
influence may be more difficult to exert on an agency whose head
serves for a term of years and whose budget is not subject to annual
appropriations. It may therefore be advisable for Congress to give
future agencies greater financial independence from the annual
budget-setting process, at least for the first few years of those
agencies’ lives. Even with this added protection, however, the early
history of the CFPB suggests Congress’s hesitancy to rely exclusively
on agency structure to protect regulators from blood-sport
430
strategies.
Proponents of stringent financial-services regulation originally
designed the CFPB to have a single director and thus to be free from
the institutional and administrative constraints of independent

425. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
426. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (“[T]he First Amendment does
not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate identity.”). In Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), the Court “explicitly overruled longstanding Court
precedent and struck down as unconstitutional federal prohibitions on the use of corporate
treasury funds for campaign finance expenditures.” Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44
IND. L. REV. 243, 243 (2010).
427. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of
the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
428. See Barkow, supra note 288, at 19 (“The main aim in creating an independent agency is
to immunize it, to some extent, from political pressure.”).
429. See supra notes 100–60 and accompanying text.
430. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
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commissions and insulated from partisan attacks on its budget. But
the financial-services industry’s allies in the Senate successfully
neutered the new agency by refusing to confirm any appointee to be
director of the agency unless the statute was amended to turn the
leadership position into a multimember agency with an annual
432
appropriation. The battle over the confirmation of a CFPB head is a
testament to the staying power of blood-sport strategies in the context
of independent agencies.
2. Procedural Shields. Congress could reduce the influence of
stakeholders employing blood-sport strategies by limiting the contacts
that can occur between agency officials and lobbyists for potentially
affected parties. Ex parte contacts with an agency before the
publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking and after publication
of a notice of final rulemaking are not prohibited by the APA, and it
is not at all clear that ex parte contacts during the time that the
433
agency is receiving written submissions are prohibited either. A new
APA could be modeled after the CPSC, which has promulgated
regulations that govern ex parte contacts with respect to matters of
“substantial interest,” a term that is defined to include any nontrivial
issue “that is likely to be the subject of a regulatory or policy decision
434
by the Commission.” The agency publishes public notice of all
meetings between agency personnel and outside parties involving
such matters and makes records of those meetings available to the
435
public. The agency further discourages telephone conversations
between agency staff and outside parties concerning matters of
substantial interest, and when they do occur, the agency recipients are

431. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1011(b)(1), 12
U.S.C. § 5491(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2010) (creating “the position of the Director, who shall serve as
the head of the Bureau”).
432. See Solomon & Randall, supra note 233 (noting that Republican senators vowed to
block confirmation of any CFPB director unless the agency was turned into a multimember
commission and describing the banking industry’s support for this position).
433. See Richard A. Nagareda, Comment, Ex Parte Contacts and Institutional Roles: Lessons
from the OMB Experience, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1988) (describing the ambiguities in judicial,
legislative, and executive prohibitions on ex parte contacts in informal-rulemaking procedures
and arguing that this lack of clarity has enabled regulated industries to influence administrative
decisionmaking).
434. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1012.1(a), 1012.2(d) (2011); see also Bremberg, supra note 180, at 31–32
(discussing the agency’s “[o]pen meetings policies”).
435. 16 C.F.R. § 1012.1(a).
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required to memorialize the content of such conversations and then
436
to place that documentation in a public file in chronological order.
A new APA could define a moment in time at which a similar
“cloak of invisibility” is draped over agency officials involved in a
particular rulemaking exercise to protect them from overtures by
outsiders. The statute could allow agency officials to seek information
from outsiders but could also make it improper for outsiders to
initiate ex parte communications with agency officials from the
initiation of the rulemaking initiative within the agency—usually
signaled by the convening of a working group—through the
437
publication of the final rule in the Federal Register. The same
prohibitions would have to be imposed on contacts between
stakeholders and OIRA during that time period. This statutory
prohibition might not put an end to attempts by participants in highstakes rulemakings to influence agency officials, but it would give the
officials a good reason to avoid unwanted overtures.
To be effective, the prohibitions on ex parte contacts would have
to be extended to members of Congress and their staffs. Otherwise, a
stakeholder could simply avoid the prohibition entirely by channeling
its contacts through a sympathetic congressional office. It is difficult
to imagine a crisis of sufficient magnitude, however, to impel
Congress to enact such legislation. Members of Congress have
become so dependent on moneyed interests to finance their
campaigns that, in my view, they are unlikely to vote for a measure
that would predictably reduce the flow of funds from stakeholders
who could no longer seek subtle quid pro quos for their contributions.
Whether a similar prohibition should extend to OIRA and White
House communications with agency staff and upper-level agency
decisionmakers is a far more controversial topic that is beyond the
scope of this Article.
3. Greater Transparency. One response to the blood-sport
phenomenon that should not be controversial would be to increase
the transparency of interactions between the agency and interested
outsiders, OIRA, and Congress. Transparency enhances the
legitimacy of the rulemaking process, ensures that the decisionmaking

436. Id. § 1012.7.
437. Cf. Wagner, supra note 5, at 1422–23 (suggesting that agencies should “be largely, if not
completely, insulated from stakeholders and political input during the embryonic stage of the
development of [their] regulatory proposal[s]”).
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process is not contaminated by extraneous and irrelevant political
considerations unrelated to the agency’s statute, and generally
enhances the quality of the policy decisions that underlie the resulting
438
rules. In lieu of a flat prohibition on ex parte contacts, Congress
could at least require that the content of such contacts be
memorialized and placed in the public record. Disclosure could go a
long way toward holding the initiators and recipients of such contacts
accountable for their behind-the-scenes attempts to influence the
outcomes of high-stakes rulemakings. Disclosure should reduce the
incidence of backroom deals in which agencies barter away public
protections in return for promises from stakeholders and members of
Congress to reduce political pressure. And that dynamic in turn may
make stakeholders and members of Congress more reluctant to
initiate contacts in the first place.
Greater transparency will not, however, eliminate blood-sport
strategies in high-stakes rulemaking. Even if stakeholders were to
avoid direct overtures to agency personnel, they could still make their
positions known through public-relations and advertising campaigns,
and think tanks and media pundits would continue to amplify
stakeholder attacks. Another step in the direction of greater
transparency would be a requirement that entities, such as the U.S.
439
Chamber of Commerce, that pay for political advertisements must
identify the companies that have contributed toward the purchase of
those advertisements. This requirement would allow the public to
draw the connection between the economic interests of the
companies sponsoring the advertisements and the content of the
advertisements.
4. Leveling the Playing Field. One unintended consequence of
the interest-group-representation model was to cast regulatory
beneficiaries as just another interest group with a place at the
bargaining table, thereby relieving the regulatory agency to some
extent of its statutory obligation to represent the intended
440
beneficiaries of protective regulation. The practical problem with

438. Coglianese et al., supra note 324, at 927–28.
439. See Tom Hamburger, Chamber of Commerce Vows To Punish Anti-Business
Candidates, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at A1 (describing how the Chamber of Commerce uses
corporate contributions to create “attack ads targeting individual candidates without revealing
the name of the businesses involved in the ads”).
440. Cf. Stewart, supra note 267, at 1764 (arguing that “‘[p]ublic interest’ advocates . . . do
not represent . . . the interests of the community as a whole”).

MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

4/12/2012 12:12 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT

1757

the model is that the representatives of beneficiary groups do not
bring equivalent resources to the table and therefore lack equivalent
441
bargaining power. Because all of the participants in a high-stakes
rulemaking presumably know that the regulatees can direct more
firepower at the agency than beneficiary groups can, this disparity can
442
predictably affect the outcome of the rulemaking exercise.
A strong argument can be made that blood-sport rulemaking is a
desirable way to democratize bureaucratic decisionmaking. Bloodsport strategies may render agencies more responsive to the interests
that engage in those strategies. But they do not necessarily make
agencies more responsive to the beneficiaries of regulatory programs.
Although blood-sport strategies have been employed by publicinterest groups representing the beneficiaries of regulation, the
overall impact of the move toward blood-sport strategies in
administrative rulemaking has been to advance the interests of the
regulatees over those of the beneficiaries, despite numerous polls
reporting that a large majority of Americans supports strong
443
regulation of business conduct.
Professor Wagner suggests that Congress should consider
subsidizing public participation in “specific rulemakings in which
certain sets of interests, such as those representing the diffuse public,
444
will be otherwise underrepresented.” This suggestion was high on
445
the political agenda in the 1970s, but it fell out of favor during the
446
Reagan administration. Though this leveling approach remains
441. See Kuttner, supra note 186, at 28 (“Every lawyer in town is on the payroll of one bank
or another. There is a huge imbalance of resources . . . .” (quoting former FDIC Chairperson
Sheila Bair) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
442. See Stewart, supra note 267, at 1713 (“It has become widely accepted, not only by
public interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency
members, that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process
of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.” (footnotes
omitted)).
443. See Rena Steinzor, The Truth About Regulation in America, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
323, 334 (2011) (summarizing the results of a poll demonstrating public support for strict
regulation).
444. Wagner, supra note 5, at 1416.
445. Federal Agencies That Pay the Way, 12 NAT’L J. 778 (1980); Paying To Hear Divergent
Views, BUS. WK., Jan. 15, 1978, at 110; Taking Public Hearings Public, BUS. WK., Mar. 7, 1977,
at 43.
446. See, e.g., Michael Wines, Miller’s Directive to the FTC—Quit Acting like a “Consumer
Cop,” 13 NAT’L J. 2149 (1981) (“[FTC Chairman James Clifford Miller III]’s proposed 1982
budget would eliminate funds for the agency’s ‘public intervenor program,’ under which public
interest groups receive grants to research consumer issues and present arguments to the
commission.”).
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attractive, it probably does not represent an adequate response to the
blood-sport phenomenon for at least two reasons. First, it is
extremely unlikely that Congress in this highly partisan age would
enact such legislation. Second, should Congress manage to pass such
legislation, the bill would still do nothing to remedy the disparate
resources of companies and trade associations that can bring bloodsport strategies to other fora, such as the broadcast media. The same
legislative realities probably doom other solutions aimed at enhancing
the ability of beneficiary groups to participate in blood-sport
rulemaking—solutions like creating consumer advocates within
agencies to solve the collective-action problems in regulatory
programs with diverse and unorganized beneficiaries.
B. Judicial Responses: Modifying Judicial Review
In light of the advent of blood-sport strategies in high-stakes
rulemaking, it may make sense to take Professor Watts’s suggestion a
step further and to allow any participant in a rulemaking to raise
political considerations in its comments, invite participants to add
evidence of agency reliance on political overtures to the rulemaking
record, and require agencies to explain how such considerations did
or did not affect their decisions. First, the courts might expand the
scope of “political” considerations to include political pressure from
sources other than officials located in the executive and legislative
branches of government. For example, a subtle warning from a wellconnected lobbyist that the agency’s budget might suffer if the
lobbyist’s client were adversely affected by a proposed rule should
447
count as a political consideration.
Second, if the record reveals that political considerations may
have influenced the agency, then the courts might require, not merely
allow, agencies to include documentation of communications
involving those considerations in the rulemaking record and to
explain how those communications factored into the agency’s
448
decision.
If, for example, orchestrated attacks on agency
decisionmakers are now the norm in high-stakes rulemaking, then it
447. Professor Watts would apparently limit the sources of political influence to formal and
informal communications from the president, high-level White House officials, and members of
Congress. See Watts, supra note 266, at 57–65 (identifying the president, other high-level
officials in the executive branch, and Congress as the source of opinions that “might most
appropriately count as valid factors”).
448. See Mendelson, supra note 268, at 1129–31 (proposing judicially enforced disclosure
requirements to reveal political motivators in agencies’ decisionmaking processes).
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might be appropriate to expand the definition of the rulemaking
record to include evidence of those attacks and to allow that evidence
to be cited by parties seeking judicial review.
Third, the courts might require agencies to respond to comments
referencing evidence of ex parte communications of a political nature
by explaining how those communications affected the agency’s
decisions. Finally, if political considerations or ex parte
communications have played a role in the decisionmaking process,
the reviewing court might consider whether such considerations are
relevant factors under the agency’s empowering statute during its
449
substantive review of the rule.
These suggestions naturally raise the practical question of
enforcement. How would anyone know whether an agency
decisionmaker has received ex parte communications of a political
450
nature? The Freedom of Information Act may be available to
uncover documentary evidence of attempts to exert improper
451
political influence. Beyond that, media reports and congressional
investigations can draw out such information, and when they do,
there is no reason not to include that information in the rulemaking
record. If the reports or investigations are factually erroneous, the
452
agency may say so in its reasoned analysis. Many political overtures
that influence high-stakes rulemakings will no doubt escape public
scrutiny, but that fact should not deter the courts from requiring
agencies to explain those overtures that do find their way into the
rulemaking record.
C. Legal Responses: Changing the Political Culture
There are many grounds for pessimism about the prospect of
reforming rulemaking to reduce the impact of blood-sport strategies
on regulatory agency decisionmaking. Attacks on government in

449. See supra note 369.
450. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
451. See id. (setting “public information” requirements for government agencies).
452. Professor Watts raises the possibility that an affirmative obligation should be imposed
on agencies to disclose political influences as they are brought to bear on an agency. Watts,
supra note 266, at 76. She correctly notes that this change would no doubt require an
amendment to the APA, and she ultimately concludes that such a change “would likely face
various hurdles—including claims of executive privilege.” Id. I agree that requiring disclosure of
political pressure from the Oval Office and nearby offices might raise executive-privilege claims,
but that in no way undermines the attractiveness of the suggestion as it applies to ex parte
contacts from members of Congress, their staffs, and politically well-connected lobbyists.
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general and regulatory agencies in particular are commonplace, and
this constant “bureaucrat bashing” has bred a political culture in
which the public no longer trusts regulatory agencies to enhance the
453
public welfare. Before any significant substantive or procedural
changes can be implemented, there will probably need to be a change
in the prevailing culture of distrust.
It may be that the same American legal culture that resisted the
politicization of regulatory agencies in the post-New Deal years will
likewise resist the politicization of the regulatory process through
blood-sport rulemaking. In an era in which government agencies are
perceived by many powerful politicians as wholly illegitimate, it is
encouraging to see Peter Barton Hutt, the dean of food and drug
lawyers, urging Congress and anyone else who will listen to support
454
legislation to maintain a robust FDA. Professor Beardslee suggests
that lawyers who engage in public-relations activities should serve as
a “professional conscience” to their clients, “balancing public455
mindedness against zealous partisanship.” If the attorneys who
regularly participate in high-stakes rulemakings could be persuaded
to adopt a public-conscience role in their lobbying activities as well as
their public-relations work, it might go a long way toward civilizing
blood-sport strategies.
As I have discussed, the ABA Model Rules do not directly
address the lawyer’s role in public-relations activities related to
456
informal rulemaking. As blood-sport strategies, which nearly always
involve public-relations exercises, become more prevalent in agency
rulemaking, more detailed guidance from the ABA along these lines
would be beneficial. Such guidance is unlikely to materialize,
however, because a professional-conscience role is not one to which
many lawyers have become accustomed. Moreover, it is difficult for
in-house lawyers and even outside counsel “to separate themselves
and their professional ethical obligations from organizational

453. Steinzor, supra note 443, at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted).
454. See Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, in
SUBCOMM. ON SCI. & TECH., FDA SCI. BD., FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK app. B at B-1
(2007) (“Congress must commit to a two-year appropriations program to increase the FDA
employees . . . and to double the FDA funding, and then at least to maintain a fully burdened
yearly cost-of-living increase . . . across all segments of the agency.”).
455. Beardslee, supra note 409, at 1126 n.20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
.
456 See supra notes 402–12, 417–20 and accompanying text.
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objectives and the norms elevated by the most powerful players” in
457
the corporations that they serve.
CONCLUSION
As the radical regulatory reformers of the 104th Congress
aggressively attempted to tear down the protective governmental
infrastructure that Congress had put in place during the Public
Interest Era of the 1960s and 1970s, I wrote the following about the
prospects for a revival of the role of government in regulating
business conduct:
The prospects for a revived regulation scenario are probably highest
if the radical relief scenario first plays itself out. Congress may be
willing to contemplate enacting additional protections only after a
period of time in which the radical anti-interventionists and free
marketeers have their way: the existing protective statutes are
repealed or undermined, the free market reigns supreme, the
consequences of unrestrained capitalism become increasingly
apparent, and pressures build to remedy the most egregious abuses.
It may, in other words, take another tragedy like the Great
Depression to revive the conviction that government has an
458
important protective role to play in private arrangements.

During the past five years, this nation has experienced just such a
confluence of crises, including a financial meltdown, the largest oil
spill in U.S. history, the deadliest mining disaster in decades, and a
deep recession with persistently high unemployment rates. Yet bloodsport strategies have, if anything, become even bloodier. Government
agencies seem even less capable of going about the business of
regulating than they were before the enactment of the reform
legislation of the late 2000s.
The reaction of the financial-services industry to the new
consumer-protection program of the Dodd-Frank Act demonstrates
how far beyond the familiar processes and procedures of
administrative law the strategies have ranged. Rather than hiring
seasoned administrative lawyers to engage in the familiar process of

457. Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U.
MEM. L. REV. 631, 634 (2005) (quoting Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General
Counsel in Promoting Corporate Integrity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J.
989, 1023 (2007)).
458. Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1531 (1996).

MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1762

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/12/2012 12:12 AM

[Vol. 61:1671

eroding statutory protections, the regulated industries have begun
employing political strategists, lobbyists, and public-relations experts.
These players pursue strategies aimed at indirectly disrupting the
implementation of regulatory programs by blocking Senate
confirmation of new agency leaders, cutting off promised funding for
agencies, introducing rifle-shot riders aimed at undoing ongoing
agency action, and subjecting agency heads to contentious oversight
hearings in an attempt to intimidate them into adopting industryfriendly positions.
At this early juncture, I remain pessimistic about the prospect of
limiting these blood-sport strategies in informal rulemaking. They
could be a transient phenomenon, limited to a moment in time in
which the business community somehow co-opted a budding populist
movement by replacing that movement’s outrage over government
bailouts of Wall Street banks with outrage over government spending.
But that assessment overlooks important realities. Blood-sport
strategies were largely in place before the Tea Party made its surprise
appearance in 2009, and they are likely to remain in place until their
practitioners are shamed into abandoning them or until they no
longer work. Because members of Congress have become heavily
involved in blood-sport strategies, such strategies are likely to
continue for as long as voters fail to punish their representatives for
uncivil attacks on regulatory agencies and the public servants who are
attempting to advance the goals of protective legislation.

